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Summary
In seeking to evaluate a Christian ethic in the modern and postmodern world, we should
first search for the ethical principles of modernism and of postmodernism. Thereafter, we
should attempt to find a common ethical principle in both modernism and postmodernisrn.
In this way we can establish whether or not modern and postmodern ethics approximate to
Christian ethics.
Modern ethics originated from and were established on the concept of 'the self or self-
centrism as defined in this thesis. More exactly, modern ethics were grounded on the basis
of the 'reason' of the autonomous self. In this way modern ethics can be characterized by
universal laws or universal norms. They served oppressive political norms. In modern
times the rational ethics, therefore, correlated with the langauge of totalization and
colonization. This modern ethical paradigm was criticized by postmodernists.
Postmodernists deconstructed modernist universal norms which were constituted on the
concept of 'the self. They discovered 'the other'. Thus the postmodern ethics were
developed on the concept of 'the other'. Postmodern ethics are expressed in uncertainty
and can be characterized as 'rninimalistic morality'. Even though modern ethics and
postmodern ethics were established on different concepts, they have a common principle.
We recognized that the this-worldly self-life centrism is a common principle of modern
ethics and postmodern ethics. We established this in chapter 2.
In Chapter 3 we studied the Christian ethics in the Bible. Christians must follow Christ.
Christians must become the image of Christ. The Holy Spirit transforms us into the image
of Christ. Therefore, Christ is the origin and model of Christian ethics. But we also
investigated the reason why so many believers fail to live Christ-like life. We discovered
that the this-worldly life centrism always hinders believers from becoming Christ-like
people. We suggested that life-giving love is the core ethical principle in the Bible.
iii
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In Chapter 4 we applied Biblical Christian ethics to the modern and postmodern world.
We found that Christian ethics could not match up with modern and postmodern ethical
principles in certain respects. Christian ethics are different from modern and postmodern
ethics. From this application we proposed that Christian ethics are not expressed in either
modern rationalism or postmodern deconstruction. We disclosed the reason why modern
rational ethics and ethics of deconstruction cannot comprehend Christ-like ethics.
Modern and postmodern ethics were not established on the model of Christ. Modern and
postmodern ethics did not emphasize the life-giving love which Jesus portrayed. In this
thesis, therefore, the conclusion is that Christian ethics must be Christ-centric ethics. The
Christ-centric ethic that can counter postmodern life comes true in life-giving love.
Countering modern rational ethics which are based on the concept of 'the self' or self-
centrism we, Christians, must emphasize suffering and self-giving by loving 'the other', for
example: women, the isolated, and so on. Countering postmodern ethics of deconstruction
based on the concept of 'the other', 'the other' must strive to become a Christ-like person
rather than pursue his/her own perfect self-realization and liberation.
iv
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Opsomming
Ten einde Christelike etiek in die moderne en postmoderne we reid te evalueer, moet ons
eerstens soek vir 'n etiese beginsel ten opsigte van modernisme en postmodernisme, asook
'n gemeenskaplike etiese beginsel van sowel modernisme as postmodernisme. Slegs daarna
kan ons klaarheid he of moderne en postmoderne etiek inpas in die Christelike etiek.
Moderne etiek het ontstaan uit en is gebaseer op die konsep van 'die self of self-
gesentreerdheid, soos na verwys is in hierdie tesis. Om meer presies te wees, moderne
etiek het ontwikkel op die grondslag van die 'rede' van die outonome self. Dus kan die
moderne etiek op die wyse uitdrukking vind in universele wette of norme. Dit het
onderdrukkende politieke stelsels bedien. In moderne tye het die rasionele etiek dus
ooreengestem met die taal van kolonialisme en 'n totalitere benadering. Hierdie moderne
etiese paradigma is deur die postmoderniste gekritiseer. Postmoderniste het die universele
norme gebaseer op die konsep van 'die self deur moderniste, afgetakel. Hulle het 'die
ander' ontdek. Die postmoderne etiek is dus ontwikkel op die konsep van 'die ander '.
Postmoderne etiek word uitgedruk in onsekerheid en kan gekarakteriseer word as
'geminimaliseerde moraliteit'. Alhoewel moderne etiek en postmoderne etiek op
verskillende konsepte gevestig is, het hulle tog 'n gemeenskaplike beginsel. Ons het die
gerigtheid op hierdie-wereldse selfgesentreerdheid herken as eie aan beide moderne etiek
en postmoderne etiek. Ons het dit in hoofstuk 2 ondersoek.
In hoofstuk 3 het ons Christelike etiek in die Bybel bestudeer. Christene moet navolgers
van Christus wees. Christene moet Christusgelykvormig word. Die Heilige Gees herskep
ons tot die beeld van Christus. Daarom is Christus die oorsprong en die model van
Christelike etiek. Ons het ook die rede ondersoek waarom die dissipels Christus nie kon
navolg nie. Ons het ontdek dat die hierdie-wereld lewensgesentreerdheid gelowiges altyd
verhinder om Christusgelykvormige mense te word. Ons stel voor dat lewegewende liefde
die kern etiese beginsel in die Bybel is.
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In hoofstuk 4 het ons Christelike etiek soos ons dit in die Bybel bestudeer het, toegepas op
die moderne en postmoderne wereld. Ons het bevind dat die Christelike etiek op sekere
punte nie in lyn gebring kan word met moderne en postmoderne etiek nie. Christelike etiek
verskil van moderne en postmoderne etiek. Voortvloeiend uit hierdie toepassing het ons
voorgestel dat die Christelike etiek nie kon ontstaan het vanuit die moderne rasionalisme
en postmoderne dekonstruksie nie. Ons het die rede blootgele waarom moderne rasionele
etiek en dekonstruktiewe etiek nie Christusgelykvormige etiek kan omvat nie.
Moderne en postmoderne etiek is nie gevestig op die model van Christus nie. Moderne en
postmoderne etiek is nie beklemtoon in die lewegewende liefde wat Jesus gedemonstreer
het nie. Die gevolgtrekking in hierdie tesis is dus dat Christelike etiek Christus-sentriese
etiek moet wees - Christus-sentriese etiek wat die postmoderne lewensuitkyk kan weerle
deur 'n openbaring van lewegewende liefde.
Om moderne rasionele etiek gebaseer op die konsep van' die self of selfgesentreerdheid te
weerle, moet ons as Christene die klem laat val op lyding en om onsself te gee deur ander
lief te he, byvoorbeeld: vroue, die gel soleerdes en ander. Ten einde postmoderne etiek se
dekonstruksie gebaseer op 'die ander' te weerle, moet dit 'die ander' se mikpunt wees om
Christusgelykvormig te word eerder as om sy volkome selfrealisering en bevryding na te
streef.
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Chapter 1, Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Kasper ( 1976 : 15) sees that the problem of the Church and Christian ethics at the end of
the 20th century lies in the relationship of the Church to present-day society. Actually the
Christian Church could not but encounter all world paradigms. The Church and the
believers encountered the premodern paradigmatic world and is still encountering the
modern and postmodern paradigmatic worlds.
It is within these world paradigms that the Church and Christians have to become the
witness of Christ At this time, when moving from modernism to face postmodernism, the
Church and each individual Christian should strive to be the body of Christ and the Christ-
like being. Therefore, the Christ-like ethical identity of its members must be questioned.
'Throughout history people have struggled with ethical questions. In fact, certain ethical
issues are perennial' (Grenz 1997: 14-15). 'The great issues of ethics --like human rights,
social justice, balance between peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion,
synchronization of individual conduct and collective wellfare -- have lost nothing of their
topicality. '( Bauman 1994: 4) In postmodern times all premodern and modern moral codes
are being deconstructed. There remains only uncertainty, and proximity and responsibility.
We must question thus: Is there really nothing beyond uncertainty, proximity,
responsibility? For, surely, in the present era of pluralism and deconstructuralism of
theology and of complex ethical issues, a Christ-like ethic is urgently needed. And how do
we reconstruct Christian ethics in this postmodern context?
In this situation Christ's personality and life must be embodied in the Church and the
believers. Christ and the believers, faith in Christ and the ethics of Christians as the saved,
4
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should be united. In other words, faith in Jesus Christ and Christian ethics should be
united. This union we can call 'Christ-like' ethics.
Jesus said, in Matthew 10: 28, 'Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill
the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell'. He also
said, in Matthew 10. 38-9, 'And anyone who does not take up his cross and follow me is
not worthy of me. Whoever finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake
will find it'. In Matthew 16: 24 we read, 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny
himself and take up his cross and follow me' (Mark 8: 34; Luke 9: 23). 'For even the Son
of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many'
(Mark 10: 45 ). Jesus commands us to live a Christ-like life. How do we apply this
commandment to modern and postmodern paradigmatic ecclesiological and ethical issues?
Therefore my motivation for writing this thesis arose from the need to understand how we
Christians encounter this modern and postmodern world.
1.2. Problem setting
Therefore, the main problem of this thesis is to establish the Christian counter to
postmodern ethics, overcoming the ethics of modern rationalism and the ethics of
postmodern deconstruction.
In this thesis we would like to find the Christian counter to postmodern ethics. To do this,
we should investigate the idiosyncrasy of modernism that gave birth to postmodernism.
So, inevitably, Christian postmodern ethics includes the criticism of modernism.
Obviously, the criticism of postmodernism is the essential part of this thesis. To find the
Christian ethics we are going to set up the sub-problems as follows:
The first sub-problem is to determine a prime ethical principle of modernism and of
postmodernism respectively, and a common ethical principle in modern rationalism
and in postmodern deconstruction.
5
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Modem Christian ethics were manifested in modem ideas, such as individualism and
rationalism. The postmodem ethic, on the other hand, is the result of criticism of modern
ethics.
Bauman (1994: 2) states the postmodem approach to morality thus: 'what has come to be
associated with the notion of the postmodem approach to morality is all too often the
celebration of the "demise of the ethical", of the substitution of aesthetics for ethics, and of
the "ultimate emancipation" that follows. Ethics itself is denigrated or derided as one of
the typically modem constraints now broken and destined for the dustbin of history; fetters
once deemed necessary, now clearly superfluous: another illusion the postmodern men and
women can well do without. '
He ( :2) continues to criticize the postmodem idea: 'In our time the idea of self-sacrifice
has been delegitimized; people are not goaded or willing to stretch themselves to attain
moral ideals and guard moral values; politicians have put paid to utopias; and yesterday's
idealists have become pragmatic.' Therefore we can define the postmodern ethics as
'minimalistic morality'.( :3)
In the process of postmodernisation, Christianity has imbued itself with limitless relativism
and aimless narrative flow: there are only unnumbered human gods. Postmodernism has
moved radically towards endless relativism and pluralism. In this postmodernist stage,
ethics are expressed in uncertainty and chaos.
Given the superstitious theocracy of premodernism, the rationalism of modernism, and the
revaluation in postmodernism of all that was devalued by modernism, we find it easy to
understand how ethics has been variously perceived as a duty, as moral codes, and as
moral relativism.
Recent philosophies and theologies have become the combatants on the battlefield of
deconstruction against modernism. The ecumenical movement, multi-religious cultural
6
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
approaches, the concepts of a plural society, multi-dimensional approaches, etc, are all
included in this trend of postmodernism in all areas, and especially in theology.
But the postmodernism of recent times still, ironically, reflects modernism in common
ethical principles. We suspect here that the rationalism of modernism and the
deconstructuralism of postmodernism have engendered certain ethical principles that bring
about the demise of Christ-like ethics.
The second sub-problem is to discover a Christian ethic which God initiated.
The third problem is to establish whether the Christian ethic runs counter to the
modern and postmodern ethic or not.
1.3. Hypothesis
According to the above problems, we are going to formulate the hypothesis as follows:
Our main hypothesis is that the Christian ethic, counter to postmodern ethics, is the
Christ-centric ethic that was revealed in Jesus Christ. Its principle content is life-
giving love.
The sub-hypotheses are as follows:
Firstly, the prime ethical principle of modernism is the concept of 'the self" or self-
centrism, and that of postmodernism is the concept of 'the other', and the common
ethical paradigm of both modernism and postmodernism is the this-worldly life
paradigm.
7
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Secondly, a Christian ethic, initiated by God, is the Christ-centric ethic which can
be embodied in Christians by the Holy Spirit and the core Christ-centric ethic is life-
giving love.
Thirdly, the Christ-centric ethic must be applied in the present modern and
postmodern world, and it must be the counter ethic to the present modern and
postmodern principles which could cause the believers to fall short of Christ-like
ethics. Therefore life-giving love should be emphasized in the modern and
postmodern world.
Neither Christian ethics nor the Church can be fully established on an ethics based on the
modern rationalism and the postmodern deconstruction. In order to deconstruct this
modern and postmodern ethic to some extent, and to reconstruct the counter to
postmodern ethics, we will examine the reliability of an alternative Christian ethics. When
we achieve, to some degree, the paradigm shift from a modern and postmodern ethics to
an alternative Christian ethics for the Christ-like image, the counter to postmodern ethics
will shine through.
1.4. The delimitations
This study is grounded on the research of modern and postmodern thinking, but will not
attempt to describe fully the theories of modernism and postmodernism; neither will it give
a critical analysis of all aspects of modern and postmodern thinking. We will choose a few
philosophers and theologians representative of modernism and postmodernism for this
research.
1.5. Assumptions
In this thesis we honestly try to follow the Reformed tradition. We agree with the doctrine
of grace, the total corruption of man, redemption by faith alone, and the uniqueness of
8
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Jesus Christ. What we are trying to do here is faithfully keep and reinterpret our Reformed
tradition in this postmodern context. What we hope to do, finally, is to distil Christian
ethics from the struggling dilernrria of the Christian Churches.
The first assumption is that faith and works should be related to each other. But my
hypothesis is not based simply on the relationship between faith and works but on their
unification. That is, how can we unify faith and works and what are the characteristics of
this unification? With regard to unification of faith and works, my hypothesis is to
reconsider a biblical paradigm.
The second assumption is that philosophy and religion are correlated.
The third assumption is that believers and non-believers share the same self-centrism.
The fourth assumption in this thesis is that even though the believers must be united with
God, the distinction between God and man is never removed. There is no mysticism that
can destroy the ontological distinction between God and man.
The fifth assumption in this thesis is that ethic is interpreted as a Christ-like image rather
than any human moral code.
1.6. The importance of this study
In the twentieth century the Church has been affected by the impact of the challenges of
dualism, individualism, materialism and postmodernism.
All of these trends have brought about the spiritual apathy of the Church and have resulted
in socio-political crises, ecological and nuclear crises, differentiation and exclusion. In this
situation, how the Christian can live in faith is our chief concern.
9
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1.7. Definitions of terms
1. The life-giving dying is a condition of Christian life, requiring that Christians should
always remember Jesus' suffering and crucifixion. In sum, Jesus' sacrifice for 'the other' is
the model of the life-giving dying. Here we can use this terminology interchangeably with
life-giving living, because both dying and living involve our whole life. But in this thesis
we will predominantly use life-giving dying because only dying can fully express Jesus's
suffering, crucifixion and eternal communion with God. The term, 'life-giving,' is derived
from 1 Cor. 15: 45f 'the last Adam became the life-giving Spirit.' In this thesis, the life-
giving paradigm is a basic principle of creation and redemption.
2.In the this-worldly-life paradigm, humans pursue the worldly life, political liberation,
prosperity, material well-being, and so on. Therefore the this-worldly-life paradigm is the
antithesis of the life-giving paradigm. In this paradigm, self-centrism will be included.
3. Self-centrism embraces authoritarian theocracy, self-sufficient rationalism and organic
holism. In this perspective, all knowledge starts from the knowledge of the self: therefore,
the self stands at the centre of the world view. Of course, in self-centrism egoism is
included.
4. In this thesis, dualism opposes the life-giving spirit that represents the alternative
Christian paradigm and God-man communion. Dualism is used here not just as a
philosophical term; it also has religious meaning. Dualism is seen as inherent in all
thought: including premodern hierarchy and theocracy which were common characteristics
of medieval thinking; the individualism of the Renaissance; the Cartesian frame of mind
and matter which has influenced Western civilization, idealism and materialism; and the
humanism of modernism. The separation of not only christology and soteriology, faith and
work, but also life and death, mind and matter, self and other results from dualism.
10
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5. Holism is the worldview in which all things are seen in unity. It rejects the dualism of
mind and matter, subject and object. The acceptance of plural dimensions in individuals
and society can be characterized as the holistic worldview.
7.On paradigm, Kuhn contends that each period of normal science in the development of a
scientific discipline corresponds to one and only one methodological framework or
paradigm. In a nut-shell, paradigms are 'universally recognized scientific achievements that
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners' (The
Oxford English Dictionary).
In this thesis, we define paradigm more widely as a frame of thought that covers the
spiritual and physical, the visible and invisible realm. It is a common human thought
system at any given time. It, therefore, affects and formulates the nature of human society
and even the contents of faith. Even though we use radical language such as the 'self-
centrism of divine self, and so on, this is because we would dismantle the Christian
illusive conceptual framework covering God, creation and redemption.
8.Pneumatological context is the dimension of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the Trinity. In
this thesis it is primarily used in antithesis to the modern and postmodern social and
political contexts which are based on self-centrism. Hypostasis oj the Holy Spirit is a
proposed concept adopted in order to establish the opinion of this thesis that the Holy
Spirit actively dwells in humanity and that Christianity must move, therefore, from a
linguistic paradigm to a Christ-centric paradigm. Pneumatological realism means that the
Holy Spirit is the present modifier of the Christian's life exactly as it was of the early
apostolic Christians.
1.8. Method of research
According to the above problems and hypotheses the method of this thesis is as follows:
11
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In chapter 2, modernism and postmodernism will be discussed. What is the basis of
modem and postmodern ethics ? What is the common ethical principle of modernism and
postmodernism? For proof of our hypothesis we use the opinions of modem and
postmodern scholars and philosophers. They are Kant, Schleiermacher, Levinas, and
Derrida.
In chapter 3 we will re-exarrune alternative Christian ethics. In this chapter we will
examine the Bible. We will use some opinions of scholars who contributed towards finding
the Christian ethics in the Bible. But we would not like to investigate the Bible to prove
every ethical point. In this thesis we are going to find Christian ethics in the kingdom of
God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. Concerning the Holy Spirit, we will constitute some logic
concerning how the Christ-like ethic can be accomplished in the believers by the Holy
Spirit. We will use the concepts of pneumatological context and hypostasis of the Holy
Spirit. And then we will find an alternative biblical ethic to modem and postmodern ethics
and we will reflect on the doctrines of the Trinity, creation and redemption.
All human beings experience the following dilemma. In the first place, human beings are
made in the image of God and must be differentiated from other creatures due to their
capability and humanity. Yet, at the same time they feel that they are incapable due to their
intrinsic imperfection. So they feel that they need God to make them perfect as individuals
and in society.
As a result, ethics and religion have co-existed on eternally parallel rails. There is
religiosity of ethics and the ethicalness of religion. In order to overcome this dilemma we
should consider how the Christian ethics can be embodied in concrete Christian practice.
In chapter 4 we will discuss how to apply an alternative ethical principle which goes
beyond the modern and the postmodern paradigm. And we will apply this principle to
modem and postmodern issues.
12
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To do this we shall undertake literature study.
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Chapter 2. The modern and postmodern ethics
In this chapter our problem relates to the nature or principle of modern and postmodern
ethics. To find the nature of modern and postmodern ethics we are going to study modern
and postmodern thinking.
2.1. 'The self' in Modernism
In modern times philosophy and theology were as closely connected to each other as in
premodern times. This relationship between philosophy and theology, however, took a
new form in modernism. Concerning this relationship between philosophy and theology
Kenny states: 'as a result of the Reformation and the religious wars a new relationship has
developed between philosophy and theology. It is not that the philosophers have ceased to
believe in God; of the major figures of the period only Hume was an atheist, and the idea
of God plays a fundamental role in the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza, and Berkley.
What changed was the attitude to ecclesiastical hierarchy' ( Kenny 1994: 109). Even
though in modernism philosophy and theology had a close relationship, they resisted the
ecclesiastical hierarchy of prernodernism.
Modern philosophy and theology tried to overcome the authoritative theocracy of
premodernism by means of the autonomous 'I' of Descartes. In order to overcome
premodern ecclesiastical hierarchy modern philosophers constituted the human autonomy.
The thinkable 'I' could by itself constitute truth. The thinking mind of 'I' was the
foundation of truth.
The modern presumption was that 'everything, according to Descartes's system, is to be
explained in terms of the dualism of mind and matter. Indeed, we owe it to Descartes that
we think of mind and matter as the two great, mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive
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divisions of the universe we inhabit' (: 113 ). Only the human mind has power to access
the truth. Such dualism liberated science and reason from the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It
provided 'a neat division of labor and let the new modem science escape the control of the
church. ' (Nelson 1992: 126)
Thus the modem religious thought came from the dogma of rationalism against premodern
authoritative hierarchy. 'Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza and Rousseau knew well the sting of
ecclesiastical censure, as well as the experience of civil punitive measures. Hobbes, too,
knew the requirements of political flight. But more than the exodus from the pressures of
social institutions, the idea of self-preservation represented a departure from the outlook
of Calvinist and Aristotelian humanism, which subscribed to the belief in pre-ordained
goals for all individuals' (Pacini 1988: 52-53). The idea they had in common was that self-
preservation exemplified the emancipatory aspirations of the age. As a reflexive notion, it
captured the inward turn away from 'external authorities, whether ecclesiastical or civil' (
:52-53).
In this way now the non-bodily realm of the spirit could now be left to the church, and the
physical, bodily world could be science's own domain (Nelson: 126.). In modern times
only the material and bodily sphere was accepted as fitting object of science and reason.
In this flow of thought, therefore, the modern theologians expressed themselves in
rationalistic language.
This trend of modernism resulted in the loss of belief. According to Cupitt ( 1986 : 107 ),
in this modernist thinking, 'the central theme of the crisis of faith is the sudden loss of
belief in an objective. Since the seventeenth century, the secularization of the physical
universe and of society has forced religious belief to become privatized and
psychologized' ( :107 ). The religious and spiritual dimensions of humanity were ingnored
in public life. Actually, this religious paradigm paralled human reason in the public area.
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This liberation of human reason from Church control influenced all areas of human life. In
other words, the earliest Christian belief became privatized in the modernist thinking. It is
not only the academic realms which have been overrun by this modern theological
outlook. Pacini (1988: 52-53) states, 'The religious outlook of modernity did not, as has
often been supposed, belong to any particular people, but was expressive of a deeper
transnational culture'.
Actually, the modern emancipatory teachings influenced all modern spheres, that is,
physics, political social theory, ethics and metaphysics, economics and the philosophy of
religion ( :52-53).
Indeed, this modernist religious paradigm has also overrun almost every country.
According to Pacini ( 53) 'the initial proponents of this religious outlook were to be found
in England, France, Switzerland, Italy, and Holland: all regions of religious intolerance and
bitter ecclesiastical, political disputes. Others in Germany, Scandinavia, the United States,
Austria, and Russia would soon contribute to the making of this outlook. The most
prominent names associated with this view are Grotius, Hobbes, Descartes, Newton,
Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, Kant, Hegel, Coleridge, and Emerson. In their ways,
Darwin, Marx, and Freud would develop the possibilities latent within this framework. '
2.1.1. Modernism as self-centrism
Modernism was formed on the basis of Descartes' doctrine of the self, individualism, and
humanism. The reason of the self, individualism, and humanism became the myth which
replaced the medieval ecclesiastical myth and came to dominate modernist theology which
held that without it there is no divine revelation.
In this modernism theology was overruled by 'a theoretical intentionality and the adequacy
of thought to that which is thought in thought, which is assured on the basis of the unity of
transcendental apperception of a self sovereign in its exclusive isolation as Cogito, with its
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assembling and synthetic reign.' (Levinas 1998: 220) In modernism the One understood as
an 'I think', the self, produced a new myth.
Cupitt ( 1990: 173) rightly described the modern new myths: 'Roughly speaking, although
the enlightenment believed itself to be demythologized, in fact it merely replaced old
religious myths with new and very similar secular myths about reason, truth, progress,
enlightenment and so forth.' In short, modernism was dominated by the myth of self-
sufficiency of reason as much as the philosophies of previous ages were. Therefore,
recognizing it, during the late nineteenth century there began to take place the event that
really mattered, the second demythologizing, as it became realized that all the beliefs of the
enlightenment had been mythical too.
The purpose of these myths was to establish the human being as an independent and
autonomous being. Louis Dumont (1986: 25) said: 'One by one, modernity stripped man
of all "particularistic" trappings and pared him to the (assumed) "all-human" core - that of
the "independent, autonomous, and thus essentially non-social moral being"'.
According to Griffin, this modernism evidenced two main characteristics (Griffin 1988: 8-
14 ): individualism and differentiation, because the autonomous and independent self who
identified with the divine self became a non-social being and differentiated itself from the
other. The autonomous and independent self produced new spirituality that dominated
modern people.
The characters of modernism that are based on a modern spirituality related to the doctrine
of homo oeconomicus ( Griffin: 13 ) because the human spiritual dimension which related
to God and the other was intentionally ignored. The modern spirituality based on
individualism and differentiation developed from the serious illusion of a materialistic
utopia for the autonomous self.
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Therefore the Industrial Revolution, according to Polanyi ( 1957:40) 'a revolution as
extreme and radical as ever inflamed the minds of sectarians', produced the materialistic
creed 'that all human problems could be resolved given an unlimited amount of material
commodities' and human rationality.
Griffin also described the modern materialistic character: 'The [modern] creed, combined
with the treatment in public discourse of the human being as homo oeconomicus, has
allowed us to assume a virtual identity between material prosperity and general health and
welfare of the society' ( Griffin: 13; Dumont 1977: 75 ).
The characteristics of individualism and differentiation strongly relate to the hegemonic
power of individuals who desire to get more material prosperity and wealth. This
inevitably led people of modern times to a power game of domination. The homogenic
world view ruled the modern world.
Further, according to Ross Poole ( 1991: 43 ), reason brought endless competition
because the self needs power over the other in order to establish his moral code. In the
modern society the goal was to have more power over than 'the other'. Since the power
sought is essentially comparative - it involves power over others - having must mean
having more than others. What is achieved is not the efficient realization of goals, but
endless and compulsive repetition.
In the absence of togetherness and solidarity, modernity created materialism and a
preoccupation with this world and its wealth. Therefore modernism resulted in an
oppressive political and religious paradigm.
If we develop this logic further, ironically, modern ideology has also developed into
religious intellectualism. This has overruled the Church. Intellectualism, in turn, has
developed into a more strict authoritarianism. Thus modern religious intellectualism has
led Christianity to become an authoritarian and heteronomous religion which brings total
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separation between the self and the other. This modern religious intellectualism has
generated political and religious colonization.
Cupitt ( 1980 : 126-7 ) explains as follows:
This intellectualism is very spiritually immature. It is also very authoritarian
because the more you see religious faith as assent to a set of propositions that
are factual but not strictly empirically verifiable, the more you will be obliged
to rely upon external authority to certify the truth of those propositions. So
among Protestants and Catholics alike .... we have in modern times seen faith
becoming more heteronomous, authoritarian and immature.
The modern method of higher criticism in theology could be cited as an example of
modern intellectualistic methodology based on reason of the autonomous self
Hauerwas ( 1992 : 37 ) criticized both the classical fundamentalism of premodern thinking
and the higher criticism of modern thinking: 'Both higher criticism and fundamentalism are
but attempts to maintain the influence of Constantinian Christianity - now clothed in the
power of enlightenment rationality - in the interest of continuing Christianity's hegemony
over the ethos of our culture - a culture that increasingly learns it can well do without
Christian presuppositions'.
For Hauerwas (: 36), both higher criticism and fundamentalism are enlightenment
ideologies in service to 'the fictive agent of the enlightenment - namely the rational
individual - who believes that the truth in general and particularly the truth of Christian
faith can be known without initiation into a community which requires transformation of
self.
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Hauerwas' negative appraisal of the modem higher criticism shows us that modernist
theology also belonged to the authoritative and the oppressive paradigm based on the
autonomous self
In this modern Christianity, there was no longer a real commitment to love beyond the
self. Thus the enlightenment proceeded along a misleading path for true knowledge comes
from the agony and suffering of the individual in community, from love for one another
and from the suffering of the communal body.
To sum up, the modem invention of autonomy of self definitely has a connection with
modem human self-centredness and with the differentiation of the self from the other.
Indeed modem dualism was established on this ground of self-centrism, and self-centrism
caused the real dualist paradigm that the self could not open towards the other and to
tragedy and to the suffering body.
Thus modernism was the absolute expression of the self-centrism of humanity. It liberated
the human self to reach out to the truth via the instrument of reason. This reason made
universal rules. Therefore modernism can be characterized as a paradigm of totalization,
because modernism is established on the moral codes which tolerate only one rationalistic
dimension, to which all other dimensions are subordinated, and which demands the
complete subservience of the individual to the reason. This totalization has dominated all
areas of life, viz., politics, economy and religion. Churches, also, have become distorted
and overrun by modem totalization.
Cupitt rightly indicates that modern Christianity has become a self-worshiping religion;
ironically, human authoritative reason has been substituted for God. Furthermore, human
reason is identified with God. In modernity there has been a close link between the ideas of
God and of self; the more strongly centred the idea of God, the more strongly centred the
self has become ( 1986: 123).
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The very character of modernism actually ensured that there was no freedom from the
human authority of the self. Modernism inherited the self-centric universal myths.
The modern religious, cultural and ethical achievements have been gained within the self-
centric dimension. In fact, even the Christian doctrine of salvation is concerned chiefly
with self-salvation.
Under the self-centric paradigm Christian dualism arose and modern Christian ethics
became indentified too closely with rationalized moral codes. The modern ethic was
correlated with reasonableness, materialism or benevolence under the myth of the self.
2.1.2. The influence of self-centrism upon the modern ethics
Wogaman (1993: 148) described the general relationship between reason and modern
ethics thus: 'the development and increasing prestige of science and reason in the
postmedieval world began to impact upon Christian ethics more seriously in the eighteenth
century, especially in England and France. Religious claims based upon revelation were
increasingly subjected to rational criticism. Writers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke
grounded their ethical thought on the analysis of human nature'
For Locke, all human beings are ultimately free and independent so that we find in him
liberalism ( Long 1967:208). But we are vulnerable in our independence to the like
independence of others. Hence, we form a political covenant for the purpose of protecting
our natural rights, 'life. liberty, and property'. These humanistic values replaced the
premodern theological ideas, sin, redemption, grace, so on. 'Among Christian thinkers, the
Age of Reason stimulated efforts to portray Christian ethics as an expression of natural
reason--or at least as being consistent with natural reason.' (Wogaman: 148-149)
On the basis of reason Bishop Joseph Butler ( 1692-1752), for instance, relates Christian
ethics to the concept of benevolence. This he understands to have the same relationship to
21
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
society that self-love has to individuals ( Wogaman: 150). For Butler there is no serious
conflict between self-love and benevolence.
Butler ( 1937: 374) writes that though benevolence and self-love are different, and though
the former tends most directly to public good and the latter to private; yet they are so
perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfaction to ourselves depends upon our having
benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour
towards society. Therefore, there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression,
treachery, ingratitude, but only eager desires after external goods. Thus, the principles and
passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and benevolence,
primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to others as well as himself
(: 375).
Butler's version of Christian ethics was thus based on moral codes such as self-love and
benevolence among human beings whose nature predisposes them to reasonableness and
benevolence.
The modem ethics based on the natural reason of the human autonomous self was fully
developed in Immanuel Kant. Therefore we must investigate the philosophical basis of his
ethics and concrete ethics.
2.1.2.1. Immanuel Kant
Firstly we are going to survey his ethics in his own books
A. Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals
For Kant (1724-1804) the morality of an act is not derived from its end and goal but from
its motivation. The only thing that can be said to be morally good is the good will. Kant
(1900: 10) said that nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,
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which can be called good without qualification, except a Good will. 'All talents of the
mind, intelligence, wit, judgement, courage, resolution, perseverance are undoubtedly
good, but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will
which is to make use of them is not good' ( :10)
This moral principle also holds for the gifts of fortune. Kant (: 10) states that 'power,
riches, honour, even health, and general well-being and contentment with one's condition
which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not good will to
correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle
of acting, and adapt it to its end.' For Kant none of the talents of the mind and the gifts of
fortune have intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose the good will of the self.
Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation which were
so unconditionally praised by the ancients seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of
the person, but without the good will of the self they have nothing to do with the good.
Kant vividly praises this good will as good in itself, but states that it must relate to reason.
Kant ( :12 ) explained that there is 'something too strange in this idea of the absolute value
of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the
thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may
perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have
misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. '
Reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e. as one which is to have influence on the
will. Reason allows our human nature to direct its capacities towards an end and to
produce a will ( :14). From this reason comes moral duty. Therefore, the will stands
between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is
material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it follows that
it must be determined by the formal priciple of volition when an action is done from duty,
in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it. ( :19)
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The action of the autonomous self, for Kant, must be controlled by duty, not inclination.
Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with
it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except
objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently
the maxim that should follow this law even to the thwarting of all inclination.( :20) The
pre-eminent good which Kant calls moral consists in the conception of law which certainly
is only possible in a rational being in so far as this conception determines the will ( :20).
For Kant this law must become a universal law because 'if I deprive the will of all
inclination which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but
the universal conformity of its action to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a
principle, i.e. I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that may maxim
should become a universal law' ( :21). For Kant to will the good is to will in accordance
with universal law. Kant's 'categorical imperative' calls for us always to act in such a way
that the basis of our action is universal law (Wogaman: 162).
But for Kant, man's common reason in its practical judgement perfectly coincides with a
universal law. Our common reason and universal law never contradict one another. Kant(
:23-24) states that, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we
have arrived at its principle. In other words, 'although common men do not conceive it in
such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes, and
use it as the standard of their decision' ( :24)
What Kant attempted is to make a priori ethical judgements, that is, judgement based
upon the reason acting apart from any traditional authority or experimental investigations
(Long: 5). The human common reason has its own autonomy to distinguish what is good
and what is bad, therefore, men do not need science and philosophy to Know what we
should do to be honest and good, even wise and virtuous. So all individuals can reach a
universal law. Kant ( :24)said that indeed 'we might well have conjectured beforehand that
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the knowledge of what every men is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be
within the reach of every man, even the commonest. '
For Kant the question of what is in accordance with universal moral law must be by reason
and experience ( Wogaman: 162). In this way Kant's moral self envisages the universal
self. Against all the commands of duty which reason as the faculty of the universal self
represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in
his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of
happiness ( Kant 1900:25). According to Kant, 'Now reason issues its commands
unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard
and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible,
and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command.' ( :25-26)
Thus, Kant is convinced that one canon of universal law is that one ought never to tell a
lie. Another is that we should always treat other persons as ends in themselves, and not
exploit them merely as means to other purposes. For Kant the modern moral codes, or the
ethics of duty are firmly established on the reason which belongs to the autonomous self (
Long: 5).
We found that Kant's philosophical basis for his ethics is the reason which belongs to the
autonomous self. We are now going to examine Kant's opinion regarding some concrete
ethics to clarify the philosophical basis of his ethics.
B. Concrete ethics
For Kant( 1930: 71) ethics is 'philosophy of disposition; and as dispositions are the
cardinal principles of action and correlate actions and their grounds of impulse,' ethics is a
practical philosophy. In order to explain disposition, Kant takes the example of a man who
pays his debts. He may be swayed by the fear of being punished if he defaults, or he may
pay because it is right and proper that he should. In the first case his conduct has rectitudo
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juridiea and marks him as a good citizen and in the latter case his conduct has rectitudo
ethiea which constitutes him a good man.
Therefore, the moral law must be pure ( :74). But its purity is not that of the fantastic
theologian or moralist who puzzles his mind over things that do not matter and with
sophistry and needless subtlety tries to extract some moral essence from them ( :74). 'Its
purity lies in its principles.' And the ethics must be precise and holy. The moral law is holy
not because it has been revealed to us. Its holiness is original and our own reason is
capable of revealing it to us ( :75). Kant exalts our practical reason as the faculty for
judging revelation. Men become capable of a pure judgement in questions of good
conduct. Men have their own authority to be pure and holy in disposition. Kant's ethical
opinion on the following subjects will serve to demonstrate this further.
( i ) Natural religions
Kant envisaged that morality based on the reason of the human self should be an essential
part of natural religion. 'Natural religion is no rule of morality.' Instead 'religion is
morality applied to God. It is ethics applied to theology.'( 1930:79) Theology must
contain the condition of moral perfection. But the source of theology that contains moral
perfection must be found in sound reason ( :80).
Let us examine the source of this theology according to Kant. For Kant a clear exposition
of morality of itself leads to the belief in God. Kant set this belief on reason rather than
revelation ( :80). This belief in a God is deeply ingrained in 'our human self's moral
feeling,' for the pre-erninant consideration in morality is purity of disposition ( :80).
In this thesis we query some aspects of Kant's opinion on belief. Kant said that without
belief in the existence of such a being man could not possibly attain to and be conscious of
highest moral worth ( :80). After Kant questioned as follows: 'Only God can see that our
dispositions are moral and pure, and if there were no God, why ought we to cherish these
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dispositions?', he ( :80-81) answered that 'our conduct might be the same, we might still
go on doing good, but not from any pure motive; we might be guided by considerations of
honour or pleasure in benevolent actions; the action would be the same as if the
disposition were moral because the analogues of morality are identical with it in the event'
Therefore, he ( :81) confirmed that 'it is impossible to cherish morally pure dispositions
without at the same time conceiving that these dispostions are related to the Supreme
Being to whom alone they can be an open book.' We cannot be moral without believing in
God.
From his statements we can infer that he considers God's revelation to be prior to human
moral understanding; however, he never plays down the human intrinsic autonomy which
exists in our dispositions. God's own inherent goodness commits us to goodness, but he
looks to the disposition and to inner goodness. 'It follows, therefore, that the proper
ground of action should be morality, and not the divine will directly.'( :83) Kant ( :83)
continues: 'The divine will is the motive to action, not the ground of it. Religion is not
concerned to secure the performance of actions, without respect to the ground and
intention of their performance, but to secure that they are done from a certain disposition.'
What Kant means is that God does not usurp human autonomy. Therefore, Kant identifies
human practical reason with divine will.
According to Schneewind ( 1998: 512 ): 'Kant transposes onto human practical reason the
relation he tried to work out between God and the goodness of the outcomes of his
choices.' The invention of the autonomy of the self influenced Kant. So Kant thought that
humanity must share moral capability with God.
(ii) Trust in God and the concept of faith
For Kant our human ability and power of reason can never be given up, even in faith. As
he( 1930: 95) said, we shall now take belief in the sense that we may hope that God, in His
wisdom and goodness, will make up our shortcoming, but only when we do our best and
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when we do what lies in our power ( :95). Faith means to trust in God that he will supply
our deficiency in things beyond our power, provided we have done all within our power.
Even humility and modesty are closely related to human moral duty.
We agree with Kant when he ( :96) said of faith: 'Practical faith does not consist in saying:
"If only I trust implicitly in God He will do what I want'; rather in saying: "I will myself do
all I can, and if I then leave myself in God's hands, He will strengthen my weakness and
make up my shortcomings as He knows best.'" Certainly, we must not use God for our
selfish wants. We must obey him. What we question in Kant, however, is that he appears
not to understand that even our best action can only be done by the grace of God.
(iii) Duties to oneself
Kant emphasized the duty to one's self To him duty to oneself is prior to even duty to the
other. First among our duties is the duty we owe to our own selves ( : 117).
We must be worthy of our personhood; whatever makes us unworthy of it makes us unfit
for anything, we cease to be human ( :119). We must respect ourselves. Therefore, Kant
strongly declares that 'the most serious offence against the duty one owes to oneself is
suicide. '( :119) He explained why suicide should be so abominable as follows ( see 119-
120 ). It is no answer to say' because God forbids it'. Suicide is not reprehensible because
God has commanded us not to do it. Instead, for Kant, 'the ground for regarding suicide
and other transgressions as abominable and punishable must not be found in the divine
will, but in their inherent heinousness. Suicide is an abomination because it implies the
abuse of men's freedom of action: he uses his freedom to destroy himself (:120).
For Kant the ground for regarding suicide is inherent in each person as an autonomous
being. From this autonomous human nature the rule of morality inevitably ~omes true. We
can say that morality is codified in our human nature. In other words, the rule of morality
is categorized universally. Therefore the rule of morality commands apodeictically and
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categorically that we must observe our duties to ourselves; and in committing suicide and
reducing himself to a carcass, man uses his powers and his liberty against himself ( :120).
Kant agrees that a person can serve as a means for others, but only when he does not
cease to be a person and an end. When he says 'a person and an end' he implies the
autonomy of the human self
For Kant freedom is that faculty which gives unlimited usefulness to all other faculties. It
is the highest order of life, which serves as the foundation of all perfections and is their
necessary condition. Therefore, to Kant this freedom is the inherent value of the world.
Here again human nature has its own value without the other or even the Wholly Other.
Mankind differs from animals, because man alone can properly use freeedom. Animals and
nature use it according to sensuous impulse. But man does not use freedom according to
sensuous impulse. Kant ( :122) states: 'mankind apart, nature is not free; through it all
there runs a subjectively necessitating principle in accordance with which everything
happens regularly. Man alone is free; his action is not regulated by any such subjectively
necessitating principle; if they were, he would not be free.' But in the next sentence Kant
(: 122) states: 'If the freedom of man were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the
result would be the completest savage disorder.' In other words, our freedom must be
restricted by 'objective determination'. but the grounds of this objective determination
must lie in understanding. Therefore, the proper use of freedom is the supreme rule (
:122).
From this supreme rule the universal law must be established. The universal law can be
explained: 'Let thy procedure be such that in all thine actions regularity prevails.'( :122)
Kant thereby inevitably establishes the universal law above the human autonomous self.
The universal law rules the human self Kant either replaces the universal law with God or
identifyies it with God. In other words, the individual autonomous self becomes the
universal self which identifies with God.
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( iv) Self-respect
Kant notes that humility and true, noble pride on the other hand are elements of proper
self-respect. Shamelessness is its opposite ( :1L.6). Why must we respect ourselves? The
reason is that we must be humble as individuals, but we ought to hold ourselves in high
esteem as representatives of mankind. Why must we be humble as individuals? Kant (
:126) answered thus: 'In the light of the law of morality, which is holy and perfect, our
defects stand out with glaring distinctness and on comparing ourselves with this standard
of perfection we have sufficient cause to feel humble.' From his view we can easily
understand that our humbleness relates only to the law of morality, but not to other
persons.
So Kant ( : 126) reasons that 'if we compare ourselves with others, there is no reason to
have a low opinion of ourselves; we have a right to consider ourselves as valuable as
another.' Kant ridicules the monk's virtue of self-abasement because this implies a low
opinion in comparison with others. Kant criticizes this 'virtue' as unnatural.
Kant considers that the true form of humility closely relates to a true form of pride. For
Kant even humility is accepted as moral duty from the presupposition that the human self
has his own autonomy. For Kant even humility is self-centric. He ( :127) states that 'there
is nothing unjust or unreasonable in self-esteem; we do no harm to another if we consider
ourselves equal to him in our estimation. '
Kant does not see the place of humility in the relationship between the self and the other.
This result is inevitable because human practical reason has its own authority. It is only
when we recognize that we are not in authority over our own selves, that we can be
humble in relationship with God and the other. As Kant does not give up ~he autonomy of
the human self, he cannot understand the humility in a personal relationship with God and
the other.
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Kant relates humility only to the purity of the moral law. Therefore, he ( : 127) says that 'if
we are to pass judgement upon ourselves we must draw a comparison between ourselves
and the purity of the moral law, and we then have cause to feel humble.'
Kant also considers that our self-esteem relates to self-love. Therefore he ( :127) stresses
that moral self-esteem which is grounded in the worth of humanity should not be derived
from comparison with others, but from comparison with the moral law. In Kant's concept
of self-esteem related to self-love we can recognize the self-centrism of his ethics.
Kant says that when men find that there are some whom they surpass it gives them a
feeling of moral pride, but they can feel much more than moral pride when they believe
themselves perfect as measured by the standard of the moral law. When a man recognizes
by his own autonomy that he is the perfect moral self, for the first time he can take pride in
himself.
According to Kant our self-conceit comes from our lenient View of the moral law.
Therefore, for Kant 'the remedy against such self-conceit is to be found in our being able
to hope that our weakness and infirmity will be supplemented by the help of God who
presented morality in its purity if we but do the utmost that the consciousness of our
capacity tells us we are able to do' ( :128). In this concept of self-conceit we discover
Kant's human centric autonomy.
(v) Care for one's life
To Kant life itself is not the greatest thing for man. Rather moral duty is far greater than
life. Therefore, a worthless man values his life, but he who has a greater inner worth places
a lesser value upon his life ( :154). The latter would sacrifice himself rather than be guilty
of neglecting moral duty which exalts human nature and its dignity. He values his person
above his life ( :154). He ( :155) says that 'a man of inner worth does not shrink from
death; he would die rather than live as an object of contempt, a member of a gang of
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scoundrels in the galleys; but the worthless man prefers the galleys, almost as if they were
his proper place. '
Therefore there exist moral duties that man should subordinate, and in order to accomplish
them he must give no countenance to cowardice and fears for his life ( :155). Kant places
the life of man below moral duty. In Kant man must sacrifice his life not for the other
person but for moral duty.
For Kant our own personhood must be an object of the highest esteem. Therefore rather
than dishonour it, or allow it to be dishonoured, man should sacrifice his life. If a man
cannot preserve his life except by dishonouring his humanity, he ought rather to sacrifice
it; it is true that he endangers his animal life, but he can feel that, so long as he lived, he
lived honourably ( :156). Always Kant values the human self as above all. To him
humanity is meritorious being.
For him ( :156) how long man lives is of no account; it is not his life that he loses, but only
the prolongation of his years, for nature has already decreed that he must die at some time;
what matters is that, so long as he lives, man should live honourably and should not
disgrace the dignity of humanity; if he can no longer live honourably, he cannot live at all;
his moral life is at an end.
But we should ask him why we should live honourably. And Kant would answer, 'We
should live honourably for the universal law, ' not for God and not for the other as person.
In other words, according to him, we should live for the human self because the human
self has its own meritorious value which is equal to God.
( vi) Duties towards the body in respect of sexual impulse
When a person loves another purely from sexual desire, nobody can love another ( :163).
Sexual love makes of the loved person an Object of appetite ( :163). Sexual love degrades
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human nature, for as soon as a person becomes an Object of desire for another, all motives
of moral relationship cease to function, because as an Object of desire for another a person
becomes a thing and can be treated and used as such by every one ( :163).
Kant approaches sexual morality from the stand point of human nature. If man does not
degrade human nature, sexual relationship is natural. So Kant criticizes the strict moralists
who had pretensions to be regarded as saints. When man degrades another human's nature
the sexuality is an immoral thing. The immoral desire which a man has for a woman is not
directed towards her because she is a human being, but because she is a woman; that she is
a human being is of no concern to the man; only her sex is the object of his desires ( :164)
In this sexual desire human nature is always subordinated. Human nature is thereby
sacrificed to sex.
As Kant approaches sexuality only from the perspective of autonomous human nature, he
cannot see the point that sexual immorality disgraces the holiness of God.
Furthermore, we contend that man cannot dispose over himself because he is not his own
property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory, for in so far as he is a person he is a
subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property,
he would be a thing over which he could have ownership ( :165). Man is a subject so
nobody can degrade him. From human autonomy, thus, according to Kant the sexual
moral rule comes forth, for example, matrimony and monogamous marriage.
These rules of sexual morality become universal law. Yet monogamy as universal law
marginalizes the person who is born in polygamous culture. The Kantian universal law
based on human autonomous self marginalizes the other person.
When we investigated Kant's ethics in his own works, we noted that Kant elevated the
active human mind as the definitive agent both in the process of knowing and in the life of
duty (Grenz 1996 : 79). Green ( 1978: 28) argues that for Kant the whole cognitive and
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practical process is the realization of objects or states desired by the mind of the human
self as rational agents. Kant's elevation of the mind of the human self influenced
subsequent philosophers to concentrate their interest on the individual self ( Grenz: 79).
This centrality of the autonomous self was the foundation of the modernist ethics ( :79).
Kant (cited from Lewis 1960: 122; Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 33[122] )
himself emphasized this autonomy of the human self. He said that 'The autonomy of the
will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them .....The
moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e.,
freedom.' For Kant the human self has freedom from empirical determination because as a
rational being the self follows a formal principle or a universal law but this formal principle
or law is formulated completely by the autonomous self ( Lewis: 122-123).
When the mind of the autonomous human self functions scientifically, it cannot approach
absolute freedom and God. When it functions in a practical way, however, it necessarily
presupposes freedom to act ethically as a formal principle or a universal law, and the
human self can thus know God in this ethical life ( Griffin 1989: 60). The mind of the
autonomous self is subject in scientific thinking as well as ethical practice. Kant liberated
the autonomous human self from all authority of both religion and metaphysics ( Lakeland
1997: 14). Therefore the individual exercise of critical reason could not be limited to what
may be subjected to critique ( :14). Lewis ( : 123) expresses Kant's human self-centrism
thus: 'Only a law given by myself as a member of the intelligible world can interest me
directly as a member of the empirical world; all other laws and actions under them can
interest me only indirectly.' Therefore, only a self-given law can support the rule of
morality.
For Kant, the freedom of human self from all authority means that the human self as the
subject can become an object to himself, and can come to know himself ultimately as a
transcendental subject over against the other and the world ( Lakeland: 14). For Kant the
human self becomes his own master, but in his morality the human self must subordinate to
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a self-given law (Lewis: 123). The self produces the law and the self is subject to the law.
This is the 'paradox of Kantian ethics' based on the autonomous self. Kant's 'central
moral phenomenon is the restricting of the self by law; its explanation is the lawgiving of
the self, the autonomy.' ( :123).
Kant's ethics, therefore, are the rational ethics or the ethics of the autonomous self (
Green :6). His ethics were generated from human self-centrism.
Friedrich Schleiermacher is a typical modem theologian. Therefore, to study
Schleiermacher's theology it is helpful to understand fully the character of modem ethics.
But we cannot survey all his theological opinions. We investigate only his work on
regeneration and sanctification because these two concepts are closely connected with
Christian ethical life in his theology.
2.1.2.2. Friedrich Schleiermacher
( i) Regeneration
For Schleiermacher the essence of redemption is that the God-consciousness is present in
human nature ( 1928: 476 ). Before redemption the 'God-consciousness was envinced
only casually in isolated flashes, never kindling to a steady flame'. At that time God-
consciousness did not constantly control the various elements of life.
And regeneration means that human nature changes from the old to a new life. This new
life means that our human passive element becomes part of the God-consciousness
produced by the influence of the Redeemer; and every active element works by an impulse
of the same God-consciousness ( :476). According to Schleiermacher our relation to God
is really the business of human self-consciounesss, looking at itself reflected in thought and
finding a consciousness of God included there ( : 478-479).
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Our relationship to God compnses relationship with his holiness and righteousness.
Therefore, our corporate life of sin should change to divine holiness and righteousness.
For Schleiermacher ( :479) the 'two elements cannot be held separate in such a manner
that a conversion could even be imagined without justification, or a justification without
conversion'. Conversion has two meanings, repentance and faith. But repentance and faith
cannot be separated from each other. Human nature regrets the continual abjuration of the
fellowship of the sinful life and at the same time desires to receive the power that comes
from Christ ( :485). In other words, repentance as self-consciousness moved by the
consciousness of sin comes to rest in forgiveness which is the outcome of faith.
For Schleiermacher justification is a change in our relation to God ( :500). For this reason
justification and conversion cannot be separated from each other. Conclusively for
Schleiermacher regeneration is total change from the consciousness of sin to God-
consciousness.
( ii ) Sanctification
Schleiermacher considers sanctification from two standpoints. The first is the etymological
point that God's people must separate themselves from ordinary social life and devote
themselves to God. This new relationship with God is the same as that which Christ
brought, because this relationship to God that was seen in the absolutely powerful God-
consciousness of Christ includes severance from participation in the common sinful nature
( :505). The second point is the connexion of the term with holiness as a Divine attribute.
Sanctification generates the action that is not quite identical with any previous sinful
action. For Schleiermacher ( :512) grace is not lost by the action of the new man, but by
his not acting. Therefore in everyone who believes in Christ the activity of the life of Christ
defines itself by the demands that meet him in virtue of his position within 'the common life
( :516).
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For Schleiermacher, on the one hand, good works cannot bring about the conversion and
justification. If a man were to put his trust in good works, it would be injurious to
salvation. On the contrary, anyone who does good works has blessedness already in his
faith, and therefore cannot find himself wanting first to rely upon his works ( :518). Thus
good works are the natural effect of faith. If a man has a living fellowship with Christ, he
is laid hold of by the union of the divine with the human nature in His Person, and consent
to this becomes a constant and active will to maintain and extend this union ( :518).
Anything this will produce is a good work, were it only an incipient resistance to sin. For
Schleiermacher good works are the object of divine good-pleasure. For man's actual deeds
are at the same time good works and sin.
Schleiermacher ( :521) says that it is therefore quite right to say that it is really only the
person, and the person only as God regards him in Christ, that is the object of divine good-
pleasure; the works are so regarded merely for the person's sake. This consciousness,
necessarily involved in the will for the kingdom of God, is the blessedness which
accompanies that will. The will for the kingdom of God creates for every believer
challenges of activity in the kingdom of God, answering to the powers at his command and
his knowledge of the conditions by which he is surrounded ( : 521-522).
At this point Schleiermacher does not deny the law of reason. On the contrary, for him (
:522), 'something like legislation will always exist in Christian life in order in certain
spheres to guide the actions of those who lack insight. '
We have briefly investigated Schleiermacher's theology in so far as it can be related to
Christian ethics. Even though he strongly claims the priority of God's grace, he remains
within the modernist paradigm.
He emphasized religion as feeling, because he saw that in the face of rationalism, there was
a crucial need to state the unique and essential nature of religion as an indelible aspect of
human existence ( Clements 1987: 36). He used modern ideas in order to defend the
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Christian religion. But this brought the result that modem rationalism and scientific
materialism perverted Christian belief.
Schleiermacher, in particular, presents the view that 'the Redeemer, then, is like all men in
virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by the constant
potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him' (
1928: 385). Therefore, in Schleiermacher, 'Jesus was a man with a uniquely developed
consciousness of God and an exceptional spirituality, similar to the great prophets of old
or the champions of civil rights of our own day, but supremely so' ( Hughes 1989: 325 ).
Jesus was the beginner of fulfilled human nature ( Schleiermacher 1928: 389).
Schleiermacher's modem christology resembled the heterodoxical prototype of theology
of the Ebionites and of the unitarians like Paul of Samosata, which led them to portray
Jesus as a divinely inspired man, and thus, in effect, to affirm his homoosia with man but
to deny his homoosia with God (Hughes1989: 324-325).
In Schleiermacher Christian faith was not understood as the revelation of God, but as the
experience of man ( Barth Protestant theology: 463). On the other hand, Schleiermacher
manifested the strongest tendency towards identity and homogeneity between God and
man, in the opinion ofIdealists Fichte, Schelling and Hegel ( Rosato 1981: 20).
Schleiermacher's theology started from the concept of the human self. When he refers to
the 'feeling' or 'sense' of God as the Infinite in which all finite things exist, it does not live
apart from ethical activity, or from scientific speculative knowledge based on rationalism (
Clements:36-37). His ethics as the perfect civil rights are based on the autonomous self.
Schleiermacher's theological ethics are established on an attitude of a reasonable
accommodation to the Enlightenment principle (Lakeland 1997: 40).
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As we discovered, the modern ethics are established on the self-sufficiency of human
reason. Modern ethics are identified with rationalized moral codes in Kant's case and with
reasonableness and benevolence. Modern ethics can be called the ethics of 'the self.
2.2. 'The other' in postmodernism
We have investigated modernism that took away the bridle of premodern hierarchical
Church domination. Thereafter modernism firmly proclaimed its "man-made" provenance
(Bauman 1994: 8). But there was another problem. In modernism rational individuals had
to be recaptured by rational faculties or institutes. Therefore in this section we try to
discover how postmodernism reacted against the rational human self of modernism and
what goal postmodernism pursued.
2.2.1. Postmodern reaction against modernism
The Kantian view of religion and the Enlightenment conception of history hold in common
the assumption that there is one set of universal and unalterable principles that govern the
affairs of the race. Therefore in modernism human nature is fundamentally the same in all
times and places, 'consisting, as it does, of a constant central core, with which universal
goals could be derived and verified through a logically connected structure of scientific
laws' ( Pacini 1988 : 48 ).
Contrary to these modern universal principles, the expressionist conception of religion and
the counter-enlightenment conception of history rejected scientific universality, objectivity,
rationality, and the belief in the human self to provide permanent solutions to all genuine
problems of thought ( : 48 ). Postmodernism, therefore, seeks to deconstruct universalized
modern rationalism.
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Phillips and Okholm ( 1995 : 12-13 ) have described postmodernism as follows:
'Postmodernism' is a reaction against 'modernity' as it developed out of the
Renaissance and Enlightenment. Rejecting the superstitious past as well as its
'blind and bloody fanaticism,' modernity attempted to establish culture and life
on a universal and objective foundation. Over against the illusions, prejudices
and fanaticism of the past, modernity offered Reason to scrutinize critically
every claim and to ground the edifice of knowledge. Not only would all
rational beings concur in Reason, but what is more important, Reason
provided a set of rules and criteria for correct thinking about reality thus
accessing Absolute Truth. In contrast to modernity, postmodernism repudiates
any appeal to Reality or Truth. The very attempt to propose totalizing
metanarratives that define and legitimate realities are denounced as oppressive.
In the postmodem world people are no longer convinced that knowledge is inherently
good. Therefore, postmodernists no longer believe in any universal Reality or Truth. They
also reject all totalizing metanarratives. The emphasis on holism among postmodernists is
related to their rejection of the assumption of the Enlightenment - namely, that truth is
certain, and hence purely rational, knowledge.
The postmodem mind refuses to limit the truth to its rational dimension and thus
dethrones the human intellect as the arbiter of truth. There are 'other valid paths to
knowledge besides reason, says the postmodernist, including the emotions and the
intuition' ( Grenz 1996 : 7 ). Therefore, postmodernism confers meaning on the emotions
and 'the other'.
Actually, even modern knowledge could not be inherent in only the self without the other.
The resources of modern knowledge, in truth, were produced in dialectics ( Lyotard 1984
: 29 ) which inherently must comprise the other.
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For Lyotard, even modern knowledge could not escape from its dialectic relationship in its
quest for legitimation. In fact, modern knowledge was narrative knowledge. But the
modern scientific narrative knowledge itself has inherited the problem of its own
legitimation.
Lyotard ( : 30) says that narrative knowledge makes a resurgence in the West as a way of
solving the problem of legitimating the new authorities. It is natural in a narrative context
to solicit the name of a hero in response to the questions, Who has the right to decide for
society? Who is the subject whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate? This
means that, even though rational knowledge itself was a narrative knowledge, modernism
totalized rational knowledge on the base of the self. In other words, this modern dialectics
produced the self-centrism in knowledge by legitimating it.
But in the postindustrial society and postmodern culture the metanarrative has lost its
credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a
speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation( : 37 ). This delegitimation is the
counter narrative of postmodernity ( : 40). Postmodernism does not accept the universal
narrative. Therefore, postmodern science and knowledge can be characterized as
incomplete information, "fracto", catastrophes, pragmatic paradox; it is a 'paralogy' in
Lyotard's term.
What Lyotard indicates here, however, is that, in postmodern times, neither science nor
social pragmatics has a metaprinciple. Postmodernism, therefore, is contrasted in its
uncertainty against the modern certainty of universalized rationalism. Postmodernism is
established on this uncertainty and the unknown paradox.
Therefore Lyotard goes on to say that postmodern politics emphasized both the desire for
justice among divers opinions and the desire for the unknown. These politics in turn mean
that postmodern deconstruction of the legitimation of knowledge forces people to accept
the postmodern style of life. People must live in uncertainty. There are strangers as the
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other whom '1', the self, cannot control. Postmodernism shifted the paradigm from the
self to the other in recognition of the impossibility of one culture maintaining total power.
In this postmodern thinking, the other who was marginalized and isolated becomes a
member of the world community. In this postmodernism, therefore, the other, women,
homosexuals, and so on, claim their own rights and own life styles. Nobody can control
the other.
In sum, postmodernism takes on the counter values of modernism. Palmer ( 1975: Journal
of religion 55 : 319 ) indicates this as follows:
To take a postmodernist turn in one's thinking, one must be willing to call the
whole development of modern culture during the past three centuries into
question. It is not postmodern to demand a "holistic" or "gestalt" psychology
that remains satisfied to encourage the individual to adjust to society as it is. It
is postmodern to treat mental illness as a 'myth' and to find in schizophrenia a
phenomenon that calls ordinary consciousness into question. It is not
postmodern to say that the medium is the message, or to advise us to get ready
for a 'future shock' of paper dresses and throwaway toothbrushes. It is
postmodern to call into question the whole scarcity-oriented, manipulative,
exploitative mind-set that dominates modern existence.
All the above-mentioned postmodern trends have rejected the modern universalized
rationalism. Generally, postmodernism has deconstructed the universality of human reason
and its foundation of truth. It has destroyed the human rational self
This postmodern deconstructuralism inevitably innately inherit postmodern holism. Let us,
therefore, examine postmodern holism.
2.2.2. Postmodernism and its character of holism
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Christians are striving to remove the dualistic view reflected in 'the Newtonian-Cartesian
laws about the dichotomies of subject-object, existence-essence, idea-phenomenon et
cetera, that radically changed the description of the ontological status of God concerning
his creation' ( Van de Kamp 1987 : 312 ).
Indeed, the dualistic view is losing credibility even in scientific discoveries. The Quantum
theory states that no object is real before it is perceived in the subject's perspective
(Talbot 1987: 29,40; Brink 1985:16).
Holism has emerged in the wake of this destruction of dualism. In certain respects
postmodern holism even tries to unify ontological God with man. In fact, 'recent organic
holism as a postmodern philosophical view of God amounts to a quantum leap: the total-
otherness of God is exchanged for the deification of the physical' ( Van Aarde 1994
611).
The meaning of this is evidently that organic holism as a postmodern phenomenon is by
nature monistic, but it is also open to the divine dimension from a pantheistic perspective
(: 613 ). Thus organic holism, despite its monistic metaphysical nature, acknowledges
two mutually exclusive forms of 'being': 'the metaphysical is drawn into the physical, and
thus time is blended with eternity, evil with good, and man with God' ( : 614 ).
Ironically, from the perspective of organic holism, some Judeo-Christian denominations,
while boasting of monism, were essentially dualistic because they separated God from his
creation. For Capra, organic holism wipes out these boundaries and identities; immanence
and transcendence become one and the same ( Van Aarde 1994: 606 ). Capra ( 1989: 75-
89) did not split the universe dualistically into mind and matter, or into any other separate
realities.
Banathy ( 1993 : 211 ) clearly describes human life from this perspective of organic
holism. We must seek a balanced and coordinated development of the various existential
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systems: 'of social, econorruc and political,cultural, ethical/moral,
physical/mental/spiritual, intellectual/scientific/technological, and the aesthetic'. We aim to
reconcile the opposition of body-mind-spirit, autonomy and responsibility, and
cooperation and competition. Such reconciliation is manifested in a holistic perspective of
life.
Postmodern holism is a world-view against modern dualism in all dimensions of human
life. Let us then, in concrete terms, examine the characteristics of holism, in both the
industrial and postindustrial worlds. According to Banathy (: 211 ), the difference between
modernism and postmodern holism is as shown below :
A Comparison of general Characteristics
Industrial age Postindustrial age
Key mode of
production
Keyevolu-
tionary
markers
Technologies
Principal
commodity
Context of
social con-
sciousness
Processes organized around
energy for material production
in an assembly-line mode
Processes organized around
intellectual technology
for information!knowledge
development and utilization
Extension of our
physical powers
by machines
Extension of our cognitive
powers by cybernetic/systems
technologies(hi-tech)
Telecommunication Global information networks
of all kinds
Inventing, manufacturing,
fabricating, heating, transporting
Gathering, storing, organizing
information and knowledge,
communicating, planning,
designing
Material(raw and
processed), machines,
hard products
Informationlknowledge
organized to use for
learning, innovating, de-
signing, fomulating policy
National and race In addition: regional,
transnational, global,
universal.
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More widely, Banathy (: 209) presented the cognitive mapping of societal systems in
postmodern holism. The general characteristics apply to all three domains. Sociocultural
characteristics influence both the scientific and the organizational domains. The scientific
paradigm influences all the others.
General characteristics
Information/knowledge explosion, accelerating advancements in intellectual
technology, new modes of communication, extension of our cognitive powers,
a new world-view.
Sociocultural characteristics Organizational characteristics
Ethical/moral evolution, economic and social justice,
increase of integrative power, participative governance
Increasing complexity, uncertainty; acc-
elerating rate of dynamic change;
increasing interdependence
New scientific paradigm
New paradigm of disciplined inquiry, cybernetics and systems science, the
science of complexity, synthesis, expansionism, emergence, recursive causation
(Banathy 1993: 210).
Poststructuralism ( for example Escobar) extends holism to the realm of nature. The triple
cultural reconversion of nature, people, and knowledge represents, for poststructuralism, a
novel internationalization of production conditions (Escobar 1996 ).
From this perspective, nature has the value of a positive actor, in other words, the co-
dynamic operator with human beings. Combined with capital, invented technologies, and
biodiversity discourse, biotechnology indicates to the bio-society that 'nature will be
modeled on culture understood as practice. Nature will be known and remade through
technique and will finally become artificial, just as culture becomes natural' ( Rabinow
1992 : 234-52 ).
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In postmodern holism, as in the 'nexus of production relations' ( Yapa 1996: 71 )
production is determined within a web of mutually constitutive technological, social,
ecological, cultural, and academic relations ( Watts and Peet 1996 : 262 ).
Postmodern holism is also an attempt to establish a new perspective beyond the
'logocentric' and 'anthropocentric' perspectives. After all, in Ross Thomson's words (
1990: 133) : 'We are being taken away from the "logocentric" perspective which, while
man is the only word-maker in the universe we know, is necessarily also an
"anthropocentric" perspective'.
Ross Tomson explores how this move takes us from the "'man-centred" monopoly of
mind to a confusingly polycentric universe, in which meanings and interpretations
proliferate beyond the human' (: 133 ). What this means to him is that 'there is no return
to the old theocentricity here, but perhaps a new sense of "immanent transcendence", as
everywhere the openness of being to meaning unfathomable to us confronts us'" (: 133 ).
In sum, postmodern holism saw the world as one unity, breaking the boundaries between
God and man, man and woman, man and nature, and even between different religions.
Actually, in modernism the premodern self-closed divine being became unified with the
rational human being. In postmodernism and postmodern holism any objective entity or
boundary was deconstructed. There were no outsiders, marginality, or isolation.
2.2.3. The postmodern ethics based on the concept of 'the other'
While modern ethics were established on 'the self or self-centrism of the autonomous self,
postmodern ethics amended the modern ethics in terms of 'the other'. We are going to
survey Immanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, as well as some feminist ethics and eco ethics.
2.2.3.1. Immanuel Levinas
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Levinasian ethics bears representatively a critical relation to the modem philosophical and
ethical tradition ( Critchley 1992:5). In this reason understanding Levinasian ethics is of
crucial importance to our understanding of postmodern ethics.
( i ) Discourse and ethics in Totality and Infinity
Levinas criticizes the European thought that man is the measure of all things because he
has reason. Actually in the European thought, however, the 'sentient l' could not find
Reason. Instead the 'sentient l' was defined by reason. In European thought the pure I
was ruled by a universal idea which produced separation between the self and the other.
Therefore, for Levinas, Reason which speaks in the first person never addresses the other.
The external reason not only commands the first person but also it makes the first person
rule the other. It conducts monologue. It would recover 'the sovereignty characteristic of
the autonomous person only by becoming universal.' ( 1979 :72 ) The modern
autonomous person thinks that his/her rationality must be unique and the measure of
discourse. The modern autonomous thinker would himself enter into his own discourse.
'But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of
language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts.' ( :72). Language
innately suppresses 'the other,' who breaks the coherence and is hence essentially
irrational. Therefore for Levinas language of the human self is involved in suppressing the
other, in making the other agree with the self ( :73).
The ego, the knowing subject, self-consciousness that Levinas, following Plato, calls the
Same, oppresses the other to accept its idea ( Critchley: 4). Language always prevents the
other from becoming his own master. Language does not accept the other as autonomous
self
Therefore Levinas suggests 'the revelation of the other, the restoration of autonomy of the
other'. In other words, Levinas gives autonomy to the other with the self 'In this
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revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted.' ( Levinas:73). For
Levinas the other called upon is not something represented, is not given, through one side
already open to generalization. In this way, 'language, ·far from presupposing universality
and generality, first makes [the other] possible.' In this restoration of autonomy of the
other 'language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality,' because there are no more
oppressors of the other. Rather the ethics is in 'incalculable responsibility to and for the
other/Other' (Ward 1996: 156).
The other no longer participates in universality. From this the ethics begin. By Critchley ( :
5 ) 'the Same is called into question by the other; or, to use Levinas's word, the "alterity"
of that which cannot be reduced to the Same, that which escapes the cognitive powers of
the knowing subject.' In this revelation of the other, the work of language is entirely
different from modern language. It consists in entering into relationship with a nudity
disengaged from every form ( Levinas :74). For Levinas such a nudity is the face of the
other. The nakedness of the face of the other is not what is presented to me because I
disclose it, not what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my perceptions
in a light exterior to it ( :74-75).
Levinas' opinion takes away the universal rules from each person and gives them freedom.
From this nakedness of human persons he starts his ethics.
( ii ) Ethics and the face
For Levinas ( :195) the ethical relationship which produces the discourse is not a kind of
consciousness whose rays emanate from the I. Instead it puts the I in question. This
putting in question emanates from the other. The ego never reduces to- 'the Same' that is
identified with unique and universal norm or rule. Therefore 'the presence of a being not
entering into the sphere of the same determines its "status" as infinite' ( :195). For
Levinas every man has his own authority without any obligation, there is only the face of
the other. Therefore, the facing position can be only as a moral summons. Levinas defines
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ethics as 'the putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other' ( : 43).
Critchley ( :5) says that 'ethics, for Levinas, is critique; it is the critical question of the
liberty, spontaneity, and cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to
itself. '
( iii) Sensibility
Levinasian ethics start from the critique of the philosophical tradition ( Critchley: 5).
Levinas, even though he deconstructs modern universality of ethics, never denies any
ethical aspect. Instead new ethical life starts from the other. 'The other' includes the weak,
the widows, the orphans. But this ethics is never reduced to any norm or rules. Therefore,
human subjectivity signifies 'the one-in-the-place-of-another,' (Levinas: 14) the
relationship between the self and the other but in the priority of the other. Levinas calls it
substitution. In Levinas's major work, Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence ( 1981),
substitution is the most important conception in order to constitute his ethics (Ford 1996:
21). Let us consider Levinas's ideas more closely in order to understand clearly the term
of substitution. He ( 1981: 119) states:
But communication would be impossible if it should have to begin in the ego,
a free subject, to whom every other would be only a limitation that invites war,
domination, precaution and information. To communicate is indeed to open
oneself, but the openness is not in opening to spectacle of or the recognition of
the other, but in becoming a responsibility for the other to the point of
substitution, where the for-the-other proper to disclosure, to monstration to
the other, turns into the for-the-other proper to responsibility.
Ford ( :21) sees Levinas's substitution in terms of closely related ideas such as 'being a
hostage, expiation for the other, responsibility for the freedom of the other, responsibility
for the persecutor, and the gratuity of sacrifice, as his culminating expression of radical
responsibility.' In Levinas's substitution, the concept of 'essence' and 'identity' must be
49
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ignored. Because when we use words such as 'essence' and 'identity' they always signify
universality and it oppresses the other to agree with the self who has the universal law.
When we use 'essence' and 'identity' we cannot substitute for the other. In substitution
we can recognize the otherness oj the other. Therefore the breakup of essence is ethics.
This break-up of identity, this changing of being into substitution, is the subject's
subjectivity, or its subjection to everything Through the break-up of identity the pure I
who is curbed by any external authorities, either the self or the other, can subject itself to
everything. For Levinas what the human self must be subjected to is not any external
moral norms or any external authorities but the other person himself.
And for Levinas since the human self is subject to the other person, he is nothing but
susceptible and vulnerable. The self must be subjected to the other. He has given up all
power. Therefore he is susceptible and vulnerable. This is the subject's or the self's
sensibility (Levinas 1979:14).
Furthermore, since the other is prior to the self, in Levinas' exceptional concept, the one is
in the place of another, the subject comes to pass as a passivity more passive than all
passivity. The other is the starting point of all ethical life. In modern times the self who
produced the universal norms treated the other from his own perspectives. Therefore there
was always separation and oppression. The modern self synthesized history and memory
for his own sake. But 'to the diachronic past, which cannot be recuperated by
representation effected by memory or history, that is, incommensurable with the present,
corresponds or answers the unassumable passivity of the self.' ( : 14) Therefore, for
Levinas ( :14), 'to come to pass' is for us a precious expression in which the self figures as
in a past that bypasses itself, as in aging without 'active synthesis'. We cannot idealize any
event. We cannot make any universal norms and rules. And we cannot suppress the other
by these rules. We only meet the other. Our response to the other is, therefore,
responsibility.
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For Levinas when we must be responsible, it means that we must not treat the other by
any moral rules. Levinas expresses it thus: 'Responsibility for the other is a passivity more
passive than all passivity, an exposure to the other without this exposure being assumed,
an exposure without holding back.' Responsibility for the other depends on the other and
not on universal rules. This exposure is frank and sincere. For Levinas the other is the
person who has never been curbed by external ideas, norms and rules. In this responsibility
suffering is inevitably needed because the self cannot dominate the other by any external
rules. Instead the self should be 'a subjectivity which is so radically passive that it is not
possible to conceive of a time when it was not under an absolute obligation.' (Ford: 25).
( iv ) Proximity
Proximity relates to a new paradigm in which the other is his own master. As in the
modern paradigm, if external authority offers universal norms, there is no difference
between the self and the other. All things must be the same. Culture, life styles, etc. must
be the same. Homogeneity does not allow any heterogeneity. This paradigm presupposes
contiguity itself that can never accept a difference between the self and the other. If we
remove all universal norms, we find that differences exists between the self and the other.
In these differences of the other we can understand the alternative concept, 'the proximity,
to contiguity' ( Levinas:82). Ward (: 157) says that the self cannot master the other
because he has no rule to control the other, and he is proximate to the world and to the
face of another person.
Since there is no external authority between the self and the other, 'proximity is not a
state, a repose, but, a restlessness' ( Levinas:82). This means that nobody can rule the
other by any authority and norm. My neighbour is totally different from me. My neighbour
is his own subject. Therefore I must approach my neighbour not by my reason but by his
own value. This is the moral proximity of Levin as.
(v) Eros
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For Levinas ( : 256 ) 'love aims at the Other; it aims at him in his frailty' But for him
frailty does not mean the inferior degree of any attribute, the relative deficiency of a
determination common to me and the other. This frailty had been ignored or accepted as
humanity in modernism. Therefore in modernism all erotic dimensions which were
identified with human frailty were disdained.
In postmodernism all the illusions of the idea of love must be taken away. Postmodernism
reveals the nudity of the human person. As we are free from all artificial projections which
were made by human reason, the commandment of love, being-for-the-other must not
suggest any finality and not imply the antecedent positing or valorization of any value ( :
261). To be for the other is to be good. To love is not identified with artificial projections
such as 'you must love your neighbor' but to be good. Love is my goodness.
In this point Levinas says, extraordinarily, that 'Love does not lead toward the Thou' (
:264). Love has been understood as 'you must love your neighbor, the Thou' But for
Levinas ( :266) 'I love fully only if the other loves me, not because I need the recognition
of the other, but because my voluptuosity delights in voluptuosity, because in this
unparalleled conjuncture of identification, in this trans-substantiation, the same and the
other are not united but precisely--beyond every possible project, beyond every
meaningful--engender the child.' This is Eros. Eros means that I love the other in his frailty
and the other loves me in my frailty.
If to love is to love the other and the other loves me, to love is also to love oneself, and
thus to return to oneself ( :266). Love is not a transcendental idea but it is complacent, it is
pleasure, it is dual egoism ( :266). Levinas's thinking is dynamic or paradoxical. For him
dynamic principle is the always same-- 'the Spirit that inspires, the desire for the absolute
which can never be satisfied, whose economy lies outside the economy of exchange, the
market economy of need and satifisation of need.' ( Ward: 158). According to Ward (
:158), on a physiological and psychological level 'Levinas locates this desire "within
eroticism and the libido.'" This 'nature of desire transforms the erotic relation into a love
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which does not and cannot possess its object, a love that stretches out towards the Wholly
Other.' (: 159). Levinas brought egoism into Love. For him our relationship with the other
is eros rather than love.
Generally, Levinas' ethics can be called the ethics of deconstruction based on the concept
of 'the other' ( Critchley 1992 )
2.2.3.2. Jacques Derrida
Like Levinas's ethics, Derrida's ethics, also, can be called ethics of deconstruction ( see
Simon Critchley, The ethics of deconstruction). Firstly we are going to survey his ethics of
deconstruction in his opinion on drugs ( see his book Points ..... :Interviews) and on
sacrifice and death ( see his book The gift of death) because in these two cases we
encounter fully his ethics of deconstruction.
( i ) Drugs
In the case of drugs he suggests the ethical attitudes of the people of the postmodern
world. Let us first consider his deconstruction of words relating to ethical attitudes.
For Derrida all words are not neutral, innocently philosophical, logical or speculative.
Therefore, he ( 1995: 229 ) says, 'Nor is it for the same reasons, nor in the same manner
that one might note, just as correctly, that such and such a plant, root, or substance is also
for us a concept, a "thing" apprehended through the name of a concept and the device of
an interpretation.' For Derrida there is no difference in the case of 'drugs'.
When we say 'drug addiction' in our society, it is conceptualized by an instituted and an
institutional definition. 'A history, a culture, conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire
network of interwined discourses, a rhetoric' are required to understand the concept of
drugs. Always the rhetorical dimension influences the concept of drugs. For Derrida,
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therefore, we must not think that there exists any objective, scientific, physical, or
naturalistic definition in the concept of drug. The moral or political evaluation institutes
the concept of drug. So such a norm or prohibition as 'drug addiction is evil' or 'drugs
must be prohibited' is established.
According to Derrida ( :229), 'As soon as one utters the word "drugs," even before any
"addiction," a perspective or normative "diction" is already at work, performatively,
whether one likes it or not.' The concept of drug-addiction is inevitably an ethico-political
norm. Therefore, Derrida's main premise in treating the drug addiction is the opposition of
institution. He actually would like to take away the institutional norm from our human self.
If the same premises are taken, he would not mind what kinds of opinion are held to solve
the drug addiction. He particularly introduces two kinds of opinions. The first is the
naturalist opinion. For Derrida ( :230) the naturalist opinion is thus:
'Since drugs and drug addiction are nothing but normative concepts,
institutional evaluations or prescriptions, this artifice must be reduced. Let us
return to true natural freedom. Natural law dictates that each of us be left the
freedom to do as we will with our desire, our soul, and our body, as well as
with that stuff known as drugs. Let us finally do away with this law which the
history of conventions and of ethical norms has so deeply inscribed in the
concept of drugs; let's get rid of this suppression or repression; let's return to
nature.'
In this naturalist opinion which Derrida also takes, the main premise is the contradiction to
ethico-political conclusion as well as perfect freedom of the human self from all external
obligation.
Derrida ( :230) introduces another opinion on drug addiction. This opinion can be called
the laxist decree. This opinion, however, is based on the same premise as the naturalist.
According to Derrida, such people will say,
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We recognize that this concept of drugs is an instituted norm. Its origin and its
history are obscure. Such a norm does not follow analytically from any
scientific concept of natural toxicity, nor, despite all our best efforts to
establish it in this sense, will it ever do so. Nonetheless, by entirely assuming
the logic of this prescriptive and repressive convention, we believe that our
society, our culture, our conventions require this interdiction. Let us deploy it
consistently. At stake here are the health, security, productivity, and the
orderly functioning of these very institutions. By means of this law, at once
supplementary and fundamental, these institutions protect the very possibility
of the law in general, for by prohibiting drugs we assure the integrity and
responsibility of the regal subject, of the citizens, and so forth. There can be no
law without the conscious, vigilant, and normal subject, master of his or her
intentions or desires. This interdiction and this law are thus not just artifacts
like any other: they are the very condition of possibility of a respect for the law
in general in our society. An interdiction is not necessarily bad, nor must it
necessarily assume brutal forms; the paths it follows may be twisted and
symbolically overdetermined, but no one can deny that the survival of our
culture originarily comprises this interdiction. It belongs to the very concept of
our culture, and so forth.
In this opinion while interdiction and law are needed, it is not because ethico-political
norm commands them but because our society, our culture, our convention require them.
Therefore no outer being and universal ethico-political norm repress our society, our
culture, our convention.
In the above two cases, Derrida would like to take away all ethical norms from the
individual. In the first case by deconstruction of the ethico-political norms or universal
laws Derrida shows that postmodern ethics must embody perfect freedom. In the second
case Derrida shows that postmodern ethics are identified with the requirements of the
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
society and conventions which affect each person. This means that the human self is his
own master. Derrida envisages the mastership of each person.
( ii ) Sacrifice
Derrida explains at length how universal norms were produced and maintained historically
in his book The gift of death( 1995). We, therefore, can understand clearly the core point
of his ethics of deconstruction by investigating his view of sacrifice in The gift of death.
According to Derrida 'the history to be acknowledged' was 'the relation between two
conversations, [incorporation and repression] and three mysteries [Orgiastic, Platonic,
and Christian],. In this history orgiastic mystery is repeated. He ( 1995 : 11 ) explained the
repetition of orgiastic demonic power through the example of the Greek paradigm: 'The
incorporation by means of which Platonic responsibility triumphs over orgiastic mystery is
the movement by which the immortality of the individual soul is affirmed--it is also the
death given to Socrates, the death that he is given and that he accepts, in other words, the
death that he in a way gives himself when in the Phaedo he develops a whole discourse to
give sense to his death and as it were to take the responsibility for it upon himself. What
Derrida would like to explain is that any human effort for overcoming previous evil will
result in another evil, an oppressive universal rule.
According to Derrida ( : 13-14), the orgiastic power was used in ancient society. Even in
the platonic discipline that incorporated responsibility for society, the orgiastic secret lived
again. Derrida recognized that Plato, ironically, incorporated the orgiastic secret in order
to force people to be responsible for the other's life. This means that Plato conceived of
the soul as immortal and this concept of the immortal soul brought again the recession to
the orgiastic myth. Plato's idea that 'you must sacrifice your mortal self because you have
immortal soul' forces people to lose their life. For Derrida it was just another orgiastic
myth.
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Derrida holds that the acceptance of death in Socrates and the lack of complaint about
dying, that Plato takes as moral norms, further epitomizes orgiastic power when those
things become uniform moral rule. He maintains that the orgiastic myth of Socrates and
Plato forced people to be sacrificed and take life from the other. In sum, Derrida would
like to show that the totalisation of the idea of sacrifices can produce a new orgiastic
myth.
Actually, for Derrida, the perpetuation of the orgiastic myth in Plato came from when the
responsibility for the life of the other became a universal norm.
Derrida (: 15) explains repetition of orgiastic power throughout history which is, in fact, a
history of orgiastic mythology, namely the power of death. In other words, history was a
process of self-sufficient orgiastic power in which the power of the demon ceaselessly lives
as the 'new mythology' (:19, cited from Patocka 1981). In other words, the demonic
power was resurrected in every age. Even in periods when people attempted to remove
the orgiastic and demonic mythology, the power of the demonic was resurrected.
Why is this orgiastic mystery repeated in history? According to Derrida, this repetition of
all orgiastic power originates from 'the psyche as life, as breath of life, as [living]
pneuma,' which 'only appears out of the anticipation of dying'. Patocka rightly speaks of
the reason why the living pneuma became the orgiastic myth; because the living pneuma
returns to itself, reduces to itself, that is, to the individual immortality of soul or eternality
of the selfs life. The self-sacrifice of Socrates returns to the extreme eternality of life of
the self. This living pneuma was generated by totalization and brought about the demonic
power.
Patocka ( cited in Derrida: 19 ) states that, 'there is born a new and shining mythology of
the soul, founded on the duality of the authentictprave) and responsible, on the one hand,
and of the extraordinary and orgiastic on the other. The orgiastic is not eliminated but
disciplined, enslaved (neni odstraneo, ale zkazneo a ucineno sluzebnym )'.
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Actually, modernism sought to destroy the demonic or orgiastic structure of
premodernism. The modern mind destroyed premodern orgiastic ( Derrida ) structures,
such as, authoritarianism. Modern people were liberated from all premodern authoritarian
obligation. Therefore, they could participate in a new life. Pippen ( 1991 : 4 ) states,
'modernity is characterized by the view that human life after the political and intellectual
revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is fundamentally better than before,
and most likely will, thanks to such revolutions, be better still'. Modernism distroyed
premodern orgiastic power and it brought freedom, wealth and improvement of life to the
human self. Dumont ( 1977 : 76 ) described also the modern perspective which 'focuses
on gain, wealth, material prosperity, as the core of social life. ' Modern people could enjoy
their lives because they were freed from all religious restriction.
Ironically, this modern paradigm, even though it destroyed the premodern orgiastic
paradigm, such as, authoritarianism, again produces the orgiastic mythology, namely
rationalism, that singularized all people's characters.
Modernism can be characterized as the orgiastic paradigm that reflects the metanarrative
of the self. Lyotard states that the modern metanarrative was undertaken in a speculative
spirit. This 'speculation' is the name given to the scientific discourse (Lyotard 1984: 33 ).
In this speculation of scientific discourse some conceive that 'philosophy must restore
unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in
university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences
together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a
rational narration, or rather metanarration'. This totalization of knowledge in philosophy
means constructing the world paradigm by discourse, a world paradigm that will dominate
the lives of all human beings. The new orgiastic power, rationalism, dominated the modern
world. And modern man colonized the other.
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The idealization and totalization as work of the living soul or the self was a typical
modem trend. And this kind of orgiastic power was correlated with the hope of modem
man who desired to become his own master, forcing the other.
Postmodernism is a historical idea that seeks to destroy this modem orgiastic power. In
the postmodern age nobody can have 'recourse to the grand narrative', to rationalism; 'we
can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a
validation for postmodern scientific discourse' ( Lyotard: 60). Therefore, Derrida's focal
point is in deconstruction of universal norms, 'orgiastic mythology' in his terms.
Derrida deconstructed all modem universal norms. When he took away the external norm,
he emphasized the differance of the self and the other. In this opinion on sacrifice he said
that 'no one can either give me death or take it from me' (Derrida: 44).
There is no absolute responsibility to universal norms that you must sacrifice for the other
without sacrificing duty to another. For example, Abraham had to discharge his duty
towards his son, even though he loved him, by following the duty to God who commanded
him to sacrifice his son. In Derrida's words, 'There is no language, no reason, no
generality or mediation to justify this ultimate responsibility which leads me to absolute
sacrifice; the sacrifice of the most imperative duty in favor of another absolutely
imperative duty binding me to every other.' ( :71 ). When Abraham received the
commandment of God to sacrifice his son, why was he silent? In other words, why did
Abraham keep the secret from his family, even from his son? The reason is that 'Ifhe were
to speak a common or translatable language, if he were to become intelligible by giving his
reasons in a convincing manner, he would be giving in to the temptation of ethical
generality.' ( :74 ). As there is no ethical generality, Abraham's silence and secrecy must
be an analogy for us. Therefore, when Derrida speaks about ethical issues, he would like
to embrace a perfect freedom of the human person from all external norms. For Derrida,
justice is an important political element, because all norms that have oppressed the other
must be taken away and the self must not force the other by any universal ethico-political
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norms. Each one has his own freedom whether he sacrifices for the other or not,
recognising the difference between the self and the other.
Assembling some ethical points of Derrida, we 'observe that he concentrated on
deconstruction of the realism of the dominant Western intellectual tradition, in his words,
'Metaphysics of presence' (Grenz 1996: 141; Middleton & Walshl995: 136 ). The
concept of a 'presence' that Derrida would like to deconstruct implies a 'given' truth
which exists prior to language and prior to thought but which we have adequately grasped
by our language and thought ( : 136). Modern Western intellectual tradition claims that
human language and reason can reflect and represent the 'given' truth or the prelinguistic
'reality' ( Grenz : 141-142). Modern philosophers offer a variety of labels of the
prelinguistic 'reality' --the Idea, the World Spirit, the Self ( :142). Such prelinguistic
'reality' can be accessed through an infinitely creative subjectivity or reason of the human
self ( Megill 1985: 157-162).
Therefore, the human self of modernism has an impulse to master the world once and for
all ( Flax 1990: 34). 'By granting an aura of universal truth to our local conventions, the
Western intellectual commitment to realism serves ideologically to legitimate Western
conquest and political superiority.' (Middleton & Walsh: 137) Derrida ( 1978: 91 )
expresses it thus: 'the entire philosophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would
like to make common cause with oppression. '
For Derrida the metaphysics of presence in the Western intellectual tradition was a
metaphysics of violence ( Middleton & Walsh: 137). James Olthuis (1990: 351) also
explains that the 'unity of truth' of modernism is 'purchased only at the cost of violence,
by erasing the memory of those who have questioned it'. This modern realism expressed in
metaphysics of violence, therefore, was a 'self-centered totalistic thinking that organizes
men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other people.' (
Wild 1979 : 17).
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Derrida denies this modern homogeneous totality, since it seeks to reduce the
heterogeneous diversity to a system which the self can grasp ( Middleton & Walsh: 137).
Derrida deconstructed the homogeneous totality or homogeneous unity of modernism and
reconstructed the heterogeneous difference ( : 137). He liberated the other from the self.
The postmodern ethics that was established on the heterogeneous difference of the other
holds out the promise of 'boundless liberty'( Lundin 1995: 37).
2.2.3.3. The applied postmodern ethics
The postmodern ethics were applied in many issues of the 20th and 21st centuries. But we
are going to cite only two examples, the case of gender and nature.
Firstly, the applied postmodern ethics in issues of gender can be called the ethics of
feminism. The feminist movement of the 20th and 21st centuries is a representative
movement of postmodernism. Therefore we are going to investigate the feminist ethics.
The feminist movement found expression m the 1970s and 1980s as a theology of
liberation. Inheriting much of the enduring agenda of the nineteenth-century feminist
movement, theologians Rosemary Radford Ruether, Dorothee SolIe, and Mary Daly
sought to understand Christian theology as expressing and requiring the liberation of
women (Wogaman 1993: 254).
Some feminist theologians=Ruether and Solle--give considerable weight to economic
oppression, but the feminist's main concern is the distinctiveness of oppression in gender
relationship. One of the points of distinctiveness is the degree to which the oppression of
women enters into everyday speech ( : 254). Language conveying male dominance is
deeply embedded in every culture, blatantly so in most. Such linguistic male dominance is
especially interesting to feminist theologians because so much of the symbolism of the
divine in Christianity is male. Therefore, feminist theologians deconstruct the linguistic
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male dominance. In this respect the feminist IS one of the typical postmodern
deconstructionists.
Deconstructing and challenging this linguistic male dominance, Mary Daly entitles a book
Beyond God the Father, and Rosemary Ruether seeks a new term, 'God/ess,' to convey
equally male and female attributes to the deity ( Ruether 1983: 46, 68-71).
According to Wogaman (: 255) Mary Daly ultimately concluded that Christianity is
irretrievably committed to male dominance through its theological language and church
structures and, hence, that religion is not consistent with feminist liberation. Ruether is
also critical of the enormous weight of male dominance in the history of Christian thought
Ruether regards this male dominant language as an expression of idolatry, not as the
essential witness of the church: 'If all language for God/ess is analogy, if taking a
particular human image literally is idolatry, then male language for the divine must lose its
privileged place. '(Ruether: 68-69).
Ruether deconstructed the patriarchy. Then language about God/ess drawn from kingship
and hierarchical power must lose its privileged place (: 69). And she envisaged 'a new
community of equals', that is, a fully self-realized community. For this new society, images
of God/ess must be drawn from the activities of peasants and working people, people at
the bottom of society. Most of all, images of God/ess must be transformative, pointing us
back to our authentic potential and forward to new redeemed possibilities (: 69).
Most postmodern feminist theologians have sought the new model of society in which
equality and heterogeneity replace the modern, western, male-dominant society.
This feminist paradigm has sought to make common cause with the victims of all forms of
human oppression. The point has been underscored in a special way by 'womanist'
theology and ethics, contributed by black women theologians and ethicists who are able to
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write out of the experience of the double oppression of being black and being women (
Wogaman: 255).
In this respect the feminist ethics and the black theologian's ethics are totally different
from modern male-dominant ethics. Both envisage a world without moral codes and
duties, and above all, without rulers ( Bauman 1995: 27). They are also grounded in
heterogeneity, ambivalence and uncertainty rather than in homogeneity, certainty and
universality, a foundation which is associated with the predominantly male stance.
In postmodernism the feminist theory of theology is quite right in its eschewal of male
domination. Male self-centrism oppressed not only the other, the female, but also the
whole world. Feminists are involved in dispelling 'the mind/spiritfbody pollution that has
been produced from artificial myths, language, rituals, atrocities, and meta-rituals such as
scholarship that erases the very selves of the female' (Meyer-Wilmes 1995:98)
Rosemary Radford Ruether, a feminist theologian, separated Jesus from Christ in order to
explain the liberation from male dominated paradigm. For her Jesus was 'a first-century
rabbi ...who became a prophet and critic of established religious authority' (Ruether 1987:
146). Therefore, 'not only in the context of interreligious discussion, but also in the
context of Christianity, Jesus [who wore the male form] is not the last of revelation'.
(Young 1995: 38). For Ruether, 'Christianity should not concentrate on Jesus but on
"Christ"'(: 38). Christ is the liberated humanity (Ruether 1983: 138) 'As vine and branches
Christie personhood continues in our sisters and brothers'(Ruether: 138). 'In the language
of early Christian prophetism, we can encounter Christ in the form of our sister.' (: 138)
Therefore, 'redemptive humanity goes ahead of us, calling us to yet uncompleted
dimensions of human liberation' (: 138). The Christ as 'the goal of Christianity is liberating
activity, and in particular, liberating activity on behalf of women' ( Young: 38). In other
words, Christ is the redemptive human being, especially for women.
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In feminist ethics the focal point is liberation of women from male dominated social
structure. Liberty and freedom are the main subjects offeminist ethics.
Secondly, as we saw in section 2.2.2, "Postmodernism and its character of holism",
postmodernism is a movement from dualism to holism based on discovery of 'the other'.
Nature was recognized as a 'the other'. On this ideological basis Marietta describes the
relationship between ethics and the holism as follows.
Holism sees humanity as an inseparable part of nature and not as a spiritual entity apart
from nature or even as a priviliged part of nature. Marietta ( 1995 :31)takes 'the person-
planetary perspective' on the relationship between human being and nature.
This perspective does not play down the worth of individual people or the worth of human
culture ( :31). In other words, it recognizes the value of persons as well as the value of the
natural environment in which they live. Therefore when we use anthropocentrism, firstly,
we can avoid disregarding humanity. Secondly, we may be able to make environmental
philosophy much more accessible to people who are not professional philosophers.
From this perspective we can consider new environmental ethics and a new approach
towards the biosphere. From this holistic approach to the relationship between humanity
and nature we can support environmental ethics: as AIdo Leopold states, 'A thing is right
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise' ( 1949: 224).
This holism rejects any universal morality. This holism rejects a strict dichotomy between
fact and value. Therefore this holism supports contextualism that can be defined thus 'The
rightness and wrongness of the action is affected by the context, all the aspects of the
situation that can have moral relevance.' (Marietta: 141). The benefit of contextualism is
that it makes morals less abstract ( :144).
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With this contextualism, holism takes the concept of multiple sources of moral insight.
Marietta cites the inadequacy of utilitarian and deontological theory for environmental
ethics and advocates 'ethical polymorphism,' with a variety of moral principles that fit
different situations ( :155).
But Marietta rejects any hard contextualism and pluralism. Therefore, for him, the use of
pluralistic ethics requires a responsible approach that provides justification for using the
principle or principles employed at any time (: 157). In this way the pluralistic
contexturalist does not require a wholesale abandonment of the basic moral principles that
guided humanistic ethics for generations ( :186). He does not abandon rational decision.
For him the human is a free moral agent. A man cannot escape the responsibility that goes
with his freedom. He has vision; people can use moral principles, nevertheless, each moral
principle must be appropriate in each context. There is no one moral principle that can
serve in all contexts and for all our ethical activities (: 191). The reason must decide. What
are these principles? Marietta names non-maleficence, utility, justice and so on.
Pluralistic contexturalists stand on moral uncertainty and moral disagreement. However,
Marietta suggests that we must make reasonable decisions. His ethical approach does not
provide moral absolutes that can be applied to all situations ( :208). He does not pursue
moral certainty. His humanistic holism is not ready to sacrifice freedom or intellectual
integrity for a sense of certainty ( :209) And he also does not accept an ethical approach
that is not morally adequate. But his main idea stands on postmodem moral uncertainty
and pluralism ( :209).
In addition, 'deep ecologists' have four ethical points. Firstly, they reject 'man-in-
environment' images for a 'relational, total- field image,' which stresses the
interdependence of individual members of the biosphere (Marietta:34). Secondly, for them
all forms of life should have the right to live. Thirdly, they support the principles of
diversity and symbiosis. Fourthly, they have a principle that is an anticlass posture, in
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human social relations and ecologically. They oppose exploitation and suppression of any
kind, whether between social groups, nations, or species.
2.3. The this-wordly self-life centrism as a myth of modernism and postmodernism
Modernism and postmodernism and their ethics were described in the previous section.
Modem ethics established on the concept of 'the self or self-centrism. Postmodernism
deconstructed the modem totalization and rationalism based on 'the self or self-centrism.
Postmodernism and its ethics, therefore, established the concept of 'the other'.
Postmodem ethics can be called as the ethics of deconstruction.
In order to focus on the goal of this research, however, we should ask :Has
postmodernism and postmodem holism overcome the modem dualistic world-view, and
self-centrism"; Have postmodernism overcome the modem problem?; Have modernism
and postmodernism a common element? If there is a common element, what is it? We
shall attempt to answer this question in this section.
From postmodernism and holism some theologians have gained some important insights.
Grenz recognizes the religious and spiritual dimension of postmodern holism. Grenz (
1996 : 14 ) explains postmodern holism in all realms, nature as well as human community
and religion, as follows:
The quest for a cooperative model and appreciation of non-rational dimensions
of truth lend a holistic dimension to the postmodern consciousness.
Postmodem holism entails a rejection of the Enlightenment ideal of the
dispassionate, autonomous, rational individual. Postmodernists do not 'seek to
be wholly self-directed individuals but rather 'whole' persons.
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Postmodern holism entails an integration of all the dimensions of personal life -
affective and intuitive as well as cognitive. Wholeness also entails a
consciousness of the indelible and delicate connection to what lies beyond
ourselves, in which our personal existence is embodied and from which it is
nurtured. This wider realm includes 'nature' (the ecosystem), of course.
But in addition it involves the community of humans in which we participate.
Postmodernism is keenly conscious of the importance of community and of the
social dimension of existence. And the postmodern conception of wholeness
also extends to the religious or spiritual aspect of life. Indeed, postmodernism
affirms that personal existence may transpire within the context of a divine
reality.
It was seen in the previous section that postmodernists deemed the relationship with the
other to be an important role for the spiritual person. To some extent it can be said that
postmodernism replaced the self-centric paradigm of modernism with the other-centric
paradigm. Postmodern holism also introduced the philosophical concept of the
interrelationship between God and man and nature. We can, thus, gain some insight from
postmodern holism.
At this point, the meaning or the identity of 'the other' needs to be investigated.
'The other' of postmodernism represents the opposite concept of 'the self in modernism.
In short, 'the other' of postmodernism includes the neighbour, other people, the
marginalized in a community as well as the emotions as part of the whole person. It
comprehends cosmic nature as well.
The question needs to be asked: what is the common ground of 'the self of modernism
and 'the other' of postmodernism? To answer this, an examination of the relationship
between the enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, which is similar to the relationship
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between modernism and postmodernism, can help us. Pacini ( 1988: 48-49) describes the
common ground between the enlightenment and counter-enlightenment as follows:
The products of human creation mUSIC, law, poetry, mathematics --
although imbued with the effects of the finite encounter with the infinite, are
nonetheless thoroughly intelligible, because they are the products of human
mind. When viewed together in just this way, the enlightenment conception of
history and the Kantian view of religion exhibit common beliefs about social
development, just as do the counter-enlightenment conception of history and
the expressionist view of religion. Social development, they thought, was a
matter of human progression that depends upon unquestioning faith in the
main features of a framework that weaves the threads of political, social,
economic, and religious institutions into the fabric of the languages, ideals,
modes of feeling, and habits that function to promote the welfare of people.
The wellbeingness was the main point of enlightenment and counter-
enlightenment. Where the enlightenment-Kantian view differed from the
counter-enlightenment-expressionist view, of course, was in its assessment of
what characteristics made such a framework adequate.
From the above, we understand that the well-beingness was the main subject of both the
enlightenment and the counter-enlightenment. This subject dominated modernism and
postmodem holism.
The wholeness that was described by Cobb was strongly identified with human well-being.
Postmodem wholeness and well-beingness dominates whole areas of the world of thought
even in the spiritual and religious areas. In this sense, postmodernism shares a common
view with modernism.
It would seem, then, that the aim of postmodern holism is human wellbeing. When Cobb
spoke of 'wholeness', he recognized it as the way of achieving human well-being. He
68
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(1988 : 239-40 ) said, 'Insofar as wholeness means the cultivation of all our potentialities,
there is no limit to how far spirit-centered wholeness can go'.
The entire holistic approach pursues the improvement or developmental process of the
whole personality and cosmological community. Introducing six dimensions of wholeness
Clinebell(1988:9-10) includes the wholeness of our physical organism, the wholeness of
minds, the wholeness of our network of significant relationships, the wholeness of our
interaction with those wider social systems - organizations, institutions, the wholeness of
our relationship with the ecosystem, and the wholeness of our spiritual lives, our 'higher
Selves'. He insists that all this wholeness is for the well-being of humanity ( : 9-21 ).
In his words (: 9-10 ), 'The fundamental dimension of wholeness is the wholeness of our
physical organism. The degree of wholeness in this dimension, as in the other five, is on a
continuum from debilitating pathology to high-level wellness'.
Although modernism also served human wellbeing and has long been recommended for
human wellbeing, ironically, it has destroyed the life of the other. Therefore,
postmodernism revolts against modern metanarratives. It aims to destroy the modern
metanarrative, the visible substitute for the invisible God of human well-being.
Modernity has been under attack at least since Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900 ) raised
the first criticism against it late in the nineteenth century, but the major attack did not
begin until the 1970s. 'The immediate intellectual impulse for the dismantling of the
enlightenment project came from the rise of deconstruction as a literary theory, which
influenced a new movement in philosophy' ( Grenz: 5 ).
The revolt of postmodernism actually shares common ground with the modern paradigm
in that both paradigms liberated the visible species, man and nature from the invisible
metaphysical beings. The well-being of the cosmological community ( including all species,
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races, and all dimensions ), liberating themselves from all restrictions, is the character of
postmodernism.
For example, let us examine the postmodern deconstructionist's (or poststructuralist's)
philosophy. It rejects the tenet of structuralism. According to postmodern
poststructuralists, meaning is not inherent in a text itself but emerges only as the
interpreter enters into dialogue with it. Because the meaning of a text is dependent on the
perspective of the one who enters into dialogue with it, it has as many meanings as it has
readers ( or readings) ( Grenz: 6 ).
Thus postmodern philosophers applied the theories of the literary deconstructionists to the
world as a whole: just as a text will be read differently by each reader, so reality will be
'read' differently by each knowing self that encounters it. This means that there is no one
meaning of the world, no transcendent centre to reality as a whole (: 6 ). All readers
become the subject of their lives. In this process, they never become the object for the
other. They each become the subject for themselves. This is the fate of postmodernism.
Furthermore, Cornel du Toit ( 1988 : 84) said: 'God is text. This text is, like most texts,
crisscrossed with other texts, full of traces of other traditions, never complete, but always
open to reinterpretation of existing interpretations'. For Van Aarde (1994:611),
'wandering in the maze of the text, the reader is, as a result of the deconstructive reading
act - according to De Beer (1986 :462) - free to break away from the rigid restrictions of
methods and question, to rethink and redefine accepted philosophical-metaphysical
concepts of God, truth, authority, subject, sin, meaning, etcetera'.
In this postmodern philosophical paradigm, individuals encourage themselves to be
perfect selves for their well-being: Therefore the postmodern 'the other' is the fully
liberated self that has been ignored in modernism. Postmodern society aims at a
cosmological community offully self-contained individuals for well-being. But postmodern
well-being is also related to personal control.
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Modernism's meta-self was privatized in postmodernism to fully accomplish the well-
being. The authority of reason was handed over to the individual's authority. The
universalization of reason became localized in individual authority. In other words,
postmodernism pursued the same human well-being in the fully liberated self. Bauman (
1992: 35) states:
It is this new cultural expenence, ...., which has been distilled in the
postmodern view of the world as a self-constituting and self propelling
process, determined by nothing but its own momentum, subject to no overall
plan of the 'movement toward the Second Coming', 'universalization of
human condition', 'rationalization of human action' or 'civilization of human
interaction' type. Postmodernity is marked by a view of the human world as
irreducibly and irrevocably pluralistic, split into a multitude of sovereign units
and sites of authority, with no horizontal or vertical order, either in actuality or
in potency.
Therefore, surprisingly, postmodernism never reconstructs a real 'the other' even in its
denial of universalized rationalism. On the contrary, it produces a multiplicity of 'self for
well-being.
According to Snyder ( 1995 : 221-2 ), postmodernism has a strong self-character for
human wellbeing. Postmodernism'sfocus on the individual and the particular is a further
expression of the same tendency of modernism. Postmodernism explores 'the individual
person, motif, artefact, or subculture as the proper focus of attention'.
From the proof given above so far concerrung the postmodern self and wellbeing,
postmodernism can be characterized by its self-reference and present life-centrism. The
aspect of self-reference and life-centrism are key elements of postmodernism. Actually,
with the awareness of the impossibility of objectivity, the postmodernist celebrates
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subjectivity, frankly and perhaps playfully acknowledging his or her presence in the activity
or the work produced.
It is quite clear, as expressed by the postmodern theologies themselves, that present life
centrism is their subject. The present life was the essence that postmodernism could not
give up.
As a postmodern textualist, Cupitt ( 1986 : 87 ) explicitly says that the self and present life
are the subject of the postmodern paradigm, introducing Nietzsche's idea thus: 'Nietzsche
rejects idealism of every kind and urges us to be frankly egoistic, because when it is a
matter of our moral assessment of our lives, no other standpoint than our own is morally
relevant to us'. Postmodernism bluntly says that the ego and present life are best.
Bauman (1992 : xxi ) also stresses postmodernism' s life-centrism and describes how it
maintains it. Postmodernism simply accepts the other. In premodern and modern times the
other was the slave or the oppressed. But in postmodern times the other is the other who
becomes his own master. The other claims his own interests. He claims his own rights. He
claims his own life. Therefore, the postmodern other is just another ego. Postmodernism,
therefore, is the expression of another self-life centrism. According to Bauman (: xxi-xxii
), in his correct interpretation of postmodernism, the self-life dimensional mind has given
rise to communities and dialogue :
The fact remains that the postmodern privatization of fears has prompted and
will prompt a furious search for communal shelters. Tolerance reaches its full
potential only when it offers more than the acceptance of diversity and
coexistence; when it calls for the emphatic admission of the equivalence of
knowledge-producing discourses; when it calls for a dialogue, vigilantly
protected against monologistic temptations, when it acknowledges not just the
otherness of the other, but the legitimacy of the other's interests and the
other's right to have such interests respected and, if possible, gratified.
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Postmodernism has indeed given extreme expression to the dimension of the human self-
life dimension.
But, due to this self-life dimension of humanity, in order to reduce the fear of uncertainty
and risk-taking (: xxiii) postmodern people, including Christians, tend to focus on mutual
responsibility in communities. This responsibility was considered security for self-interest
or self-life: for this reason, according to Bauman (: 36 ), 'the postmodern view shifts the
focus on to the agency of community; more precisely, the focus shifts to
communities .If the concept of society was a device to "erase" the "outside" and
reduce it at best to the status of environment ( i.e. the "goal-achievement" territory, and
object, but not a subject of action), the concept of community as it appears in the
postmodern discourse derives its essential meaning from the co-presence of other
communities, all seen as agencies. '
The attempt of postmodernism to protest against modern totalization is simply another
form of self-life centrism. Originally this concept of community in postmodernism came
from the fact that people really wanted to remove the fears of uncertainty in society. In
other words, it was for human self-confidence or human well-being.
Postmodern ecologist, Devall, who postulated ecological togetherness, envisaged
communities experiencing well-being. Devall (1985: 67) said, 'No one is saved until we
are all saved,' where the phrase 'one' includes not only me, an individual human, but all
humans, whales, grizzly bears, whole rain forest ecosystems, mountains and rivers, the
tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on.' Actually, postmodernism pursues the fulfilment of
self-life centrism by including all the other species. It purposes the realization of the
organic world which has merit in itself
This is the self-life centrism of postmodernism. In terms of holism, all identities of the self
are alive as names of the other. This is the deception of holism. The spirit of the Western
world deceives humanity concerning' the giving up of selj through self-externalization' (
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Welker 1994: 281 ). '[The spirit of the Western world] includes this moment of [the
giving up of the seij] only as a point of transition on the way to heightened self-
development' ( : 281 )
In heterogeneity, the others and the otherness of the other(Levinas 1998: 149), the
postmodern spirit pursues the paradigm shift from the self to the other in order to produce
the perfect 'itself of the self. ( Welker: 282 ) Postmodernism encouraged the individual,
the local, to be the perfect self for well-being. Whether we define postmodernism in terms
of holism or heterogeneity, it is still limited to human self-life centrism.
2.4. Summary
As we investigated, the modem ethics are established on the concept of 'the self or self-
centrism. Modem ethics are identified with universal law which is based on the
autonomous self in Kant's case. Human autonomous self has intrinsic ability to find the
rule of morality. Therefore, this modem autonomous self totalized and colonized the
other. And modem ethics was human self-centric ethics so that it purposed liberty,
reasonableness and the benevolence of the human himself.
Postmodern ethics are based on the concept of 'the other'. Postmodernism discovered the
otherness of the other so that its ethics start from the difference between the self and the
other. From this postmodern emphasis on the other all moral norms were deconstructed.
Therefore its ethics can be characterized as ethics of deconstruction. Postmodern ethical
characters can be expressed in a boundless liberation and moral uncertainty, proximity, and
responsibility.
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Even though modern ethics and postmodern ethics are established on different concepts,
they have a common ethical paradigm. This common paradigm is the this-worldly life
centrism.
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Chapter 3 The Christ-centric ethic
In the previous chapter we investigated the modern and postmodern ethics. In this chapter
our research problem is to contemplate the nature of Christian ethics. To begin with, we
are going to investigate the ethics of the New Testament.
3.1. The origin and model of Christian ethics: the kingdom of God
Actually Jesus was not just a teacher of ethics. Instead Jesus used significantly the
eschatological language of God's kingdom ( Jones 1994:27). The centrality of Jesus'
proclamation was the Kingdom, and his proclamation called his hearers to repent their sins
in the face of God's imminent action (Matt. 4:17; Chilton & McDonald 1988:5).
Jesus told many parables--which largely concern the Kingdom--to warn his hearers about a
situation of eschatological crisis ( Chilton & McDonald: 5) in Matt. 13:3-9IMark 4:2-
9ILuke 8:5-8; Mark 4:26-9; Matt. 13:24-30, 47-50; Matt 13:31-2IMark 4:30-2ILuke
13:18-19; Matt. 13:33ILuke 13:20-1; Matt. 13:44-5; Matt.21:33-46! Mark 12:1-12ILuke
20:9-19; Matt. 22: 1-14ILukeI4: 16-24.
And in Matt. 5:3,6,10. Jesus said that the kingdom of heaven would be bestowed upon the
poor in spirit; those who hunger and thirst for righteousness will be filled; those who are
persecuted in the pursuit of righteousness will possess the kingdom of heaven ( Jones :26).
Jesus who proclaimed the eschatological God's Kingdom asserted to his disciples that they
would receive the highest good. Jesus said, 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his
righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you' ( Matt. 6:33). Jesus connected
the kingdom of God with the highest good and with a different way of life from the secular
world. Martin Franzmann (1961: 58) comments:
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[Jesus] thereby makes the blessing bestowed in the first Beatitude the
imperative force in their lives. The Kingdom is given to the poor in spirit, to
men [and women ] who stand before God unhindered and undeceived by the
security of things, in the need of their bare humanity. The gift of the Beatitude
has become the dynamic of their existence: they seek the first gift. Likewise
the blessing of the fourth Beatitude has become the imperative that shapes
their lives. God gives His righteousness to men who hunger and thirst for it,
who see in their need for righteousness the supreme need, the need which must
be met if they are to live, a need before which the need for things
recedes so that it becomes a footnote on the page whereon is written: 'The
Lord is our righteousness.'
God's kingdom comes as he exercises his sovereignty in a world of apostasy and restores
the sins of humankind in Christ ( Jones: 27). The righteousness of God will be recovered
in the coming of the kingdom. Therefore, those who listen to Jesus' proclamation
encountered a moral or ethical challenge ( Matera 1996: 15 ). Actually in repentance the
coming event and the ethical reform are united immediately ( Wilder 1978 :74). Schrage (
1988 :28) also connected the eschatological message of Jesus and human ethical conduct.
Bultmann ( 1977: 20) also attempted to reconcile the eschatological and ethical aspects of
Jesus; he, however, gives a priority to dominical ethics, rather than to dominical
eschatology ( Chilton & McDonald: 6). This was Bultmann's weakness, the reason that
Albert Schweitzer reacted against his attempt. Schweitzer, in his turn, did not concentrate
on Jesus' ethical statements due to his exclusive focus on Jesus' vision of the future ( :7).
Neither of the two opinions fully understood both aspects of 'not yet' and 'already' of
God's kingdom. When we see the kingdom of God that has already been established in this
world, even though it will only be fully realized in the future, we can understand this
reconciliation between the eschatological and ethical aspects of Jesus' preaching ( :9).
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Therefore, 'to enter the kingdom of God is to live under God's rule, be it in the present or
in the future' (Matera: 19-20). Let us consider the characteristics of the kingdom of God.
( I ) Discipleship, freedom, obedience and community
Jesus never separated his extraordinary claims of the kingdom of God from the calling of
disciples to him ( Wilder: 165). God's rule will recover the vice of this world. But this
kingdom of God has come upon men in Jesus and he identified with the kingdom of God (
:164). Jesus is not only the Lord who brought the rule of God over the vice of this world
but also the model of the people of God's kingdom. Therefore Jesus called his disciples to
follow him (Mark 1:16; Verhey 1984:75).
The relationship between Jesus and his disciples in the claims of discipleship is totally
different from the relationship of student and teacher because in the rabbi tradition of
Judaism the student succeeds the teacher through the formal educational process of the
group and the appropriate examinations ( Schrage: 47). But nobody can become Jesus'
disciples by his own free will and choice or the formal educational process of law but by
virtue of the word that evokes discipleship ( :47). Nobody can become Jesus' disciple by
virtue of Greek philosophy ( Crook 1994: 71). Only when one responds to the calling of
Jesus who identified himself with the kingdom of God, can one become Jesus'disciple.
To follow Jesus is to live in the kingdom of God. At Mark 8:34 Jesus said what is to
follow him: 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross
and follow me'. Therefore, to become Jesus' disciple is to suffer with Jesus (Verhey :75).
From this perspective of ethics of discipleship based on the kingdom of God we should
consider the meaning of liberation. According to Chilton and McDonald ( :92 ) liberation
is not only liberation from law and destructive social structure but also liberation for
discipleship.
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Luther also identifies two aspects of Christian freedom. To Christians two theses are
essential for their identity. They are the freedom and the bondage of the Spirit. A Christian
is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. But a Christian is also a perfectly dutiful
servant of all, subject to all ( 1979: 343). Luther defends the harmony of two aspects, the
doctrine of justification by faith alone and its applications for Christian life ( Jones :39)
Calvin also said that Christian freedom is not only freedom from the law but also freedom
to obey God's will ( Calvin 1989: III. 19.4; Jones: 39-40). In chapter 20 of the
Westerminster Confession of Faith Christian liberty was well defined:
The liberty which Christ hath purchased for believers under the Gospel
consists in their freedom from the guilt of sin, the condemning wrath of God,
the curse of the moral law; and, in their being delivered from this present evil
world, bondage to Satan, and dominion of sin; from the evil of afflictions, the
sting of death, the victory of the grave, and everlasting damnation; as also, in
their free access to God, and their yielding obedience unto him, not out of
slavish fear, but a child-like love and willing mind.
To be free from the law and from sin is to be free to follow Jesus who indentified himself
with the kingdom for God. Freedom to experience child-like servantship is an important
teaching of Jesus, concerning the kingdom of God ( Matt. 18:1-5; Mark 9:33-37; Luke
9:46-48; Chilton and McDonald :81)
Above all freedom for discipleship necessarily comprehends the new obedience which the
kingdom of God requires ( Chilton and McDonald:92). The Christian must love God and
his neighbour 'with all his heart', 'with all his soul' and 'with all his mind' in the kingdom
of God. Just so, Jesus loves God and his people with all his heart. Jesus has shown how
the believers should love God and their neighbours. Therefore, he says, 'I have set you an
example, that you should do as I have done to you.' ( John 13:15). To follow Christ is to
share in the model he has provided (Manson 1960: 59).
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To love one's neighbour entails involvement with the community. The believers are one in
Christ Jesus. Those who live in the kingdom of God form one community because they are
included in Christ (Tannehill 1967: 20). This is the inclusive unity as the body of Christ
which the Christians enter ( : 20). Furthermore, this inclusive unity which the Christians
enter is Christ himself. Christian community is the community of those who follow Christ.
Chilton and McDonald ( :90) describe this community thus: 'the fellowship of disciples
rested on the fact that all its members had received a call or commission which entailed
leaving their former way of life and mode of subsistence.' As Jesus did not distinguish
between tax callectors, sinners and women, this community is open to all people.
Therefore, Christian comunity is the fellowship of disciples and the context wherein
Christians learn the Christ-like life and live as his disciples ( Crook :44).
To sum up, we can say that to become people of the kingdom of God is to be like Christ,
the image of God ( Jones :40).
3.2. The goal of Christian ethics: The image of Christ
God created the heaven and earth to glorify himself. God is God of glory. He is the Father
of glory ( Eph 1:17). He is the Son, the Lord of glory ( I Cor. 2:8). He is the Spirit of
glory ( I Pet 2:8 ) ( Jones 1994:21 ). Jonathan Edward ( 1989: 433) says that God created
the world to declare his 'glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness of good
ad extra [outside himself]. ,
This glory of God in creation is expressed in damnation of the wicked and in the salvation
of the chosen. Jones (:22 ) said, 'The glory of God's justice in the damnation of the
wicked is radically subordinate to God's supreme and ultimate end in creating the world,
the glory of God's goodness in the salvation of the elect.' God ultimately called us to 'his
eternal glory in Christ' ( I Pet 5:10). Therefore, the believers should do everything, eating,
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drinking, or whatsoever, for the glory of God ( I Cor. 10: 31). Actually Jesus is not only
the glory of God but also the model of how the believers should glorify God. John asserts
that the glory of God is manifested in Jesus (John 1:14). Jesus enjoyed a position of glory
before Incarnation and subsequently returned to it ( Barret 1978: 166 ). And the glory of
Jesus is dependent upon both his essential relation with God and his obedience ( : 166 ).
The believers were called in Christ to glorify God so that the imitation of Christ, the image
of Christ, is the supreme expression of the glory of God ( Jones: 24). Apostle Paul says in
Romans 8: 28-30 (KJV), 'And we know that all things work together for good to those
who love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did
foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might
be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also
called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also
glorified.' In I Cor. 15: 49 ( NRSV ). The goal of God's purpose was expressed thus: 'just
as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the image of the man of
heaven.' When the believers become the image of Christ, they can glorify God, because
God's open secret is Christ in them, 'the hope of glory'( Col. 1:27; Jones:24).
The believers 'are being transformed into likeness with ever-increasing glory' ( 2 Cor.
3: 18). Christ who dwells in us must be the final goal of the personality of the believers (
Gal. 4: 19). Baptism is the ceremony of union with Christ. Baptism means union with the
death and resurrection of Jesus.
In Rom 6: 1-11 the Apostle Paul says that what takes place in baptism is founded upon
what has taken place in Christ's death ( Tannehill 1967: 30). This foundation is expressed
in Rom 6:6. There Paul explains that 'Christ's cross puts an end to dominion of sin, and so
to the "old man"'. But Christ's cross is 'an inclusive event, for the existence of men was
bound up with the old aeon, and what puts an end to it also puts an end to them as men of
the old aeon' ( :30).
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When Paul speaks of dying and rising with Christ as the essence of baptism, and associates
it with the end of the old dominion and the foundation of the new, it is clear that he is
thinking of the death and resurrection of Christ as eschatological events(: 30). Baptism
means dying to the old dominion and rising with the new dominion. Jesus Christ's cross
and resurrection were the inclusive event which brought a total change of paradigm.
As the glory of Jesus is in the death of Jesus (John 7: 39; 12:16,23; 13:31f); Jesus dies as
Son of God and as an obedient Servant; he is thereby lifted up on the Cross and elevated
to heaven ( Barret: 166 ), we should glorify God through following the Cross of Jesus.
Jesus resurrection revealed that his obedience to God up to the Cross was the right way to
glorify God.
To sum up, the image of Christ is the goal of Christian ethics.
3.3. The deliverer of Christian ethics: the Holy Spirit
In the previous section we studied the origin and goal of Christian ethics. Now we are
going to investigate how the Christ-life is embodied in the human self.
As we have seen, Christians must live a Christ-like life. Though Christians live in thi.s
world they must be dominated by heaven (Welker 1994:134). Christians tend to think of
the doctrine of the Christ-centric life as far away from what the secular environment can,
in general, imagine as circumstances within the realm of truth and reality ( : 134 ). When
Welker speaks of the 'heaven', he does not mean a conceptual or empty thing which is not
related to our human life. Welker ( :139) defines it thus: 'Heaven is the domain of reality
that is relatively inaccessible to us, which we cannot manipulate, but which exercises a
determinative and even definitive influence on life here and now.'
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How, then, does this heaven dominate our human life? In the early Church the presence of
the Holy Spirit was the living context of the believers and the Church: in other words, he
was the ambience in which they lived (McIntyre 1997:71). In the early Church the Holy
Spirit was active in the early Christian's life.
The Holy Spirit brings us the domain of heaven. This means, in other words, that the Holy
Spirit can dominate our human life. The Holy Spirit dominates nature, social spheres,
history and the future ( Welker: 139). Certainly this heaven extends beyond peoples,
cultures, climates and times through the Holy Spirit ( : 141 ). We can call the domain of
heaven which the Holy Spirit brings into this world, the pneumato!ogica! context.
Actually our salvation that is accomplished in Christ is embodied in the human self through
the Holy Spirit. To understand our salvation in Christ we must contemplate the Holy
Spirit, because he brings the salvation and sanctifies us in Christ.
3.3.1. The early Christian life and the Pneumatological context
Early Christians lived in a pneumatological context and we too should live in this
pneumatological context. In this section we are going to survey what constituted the lives
of early christians who lived in the Holy Spirit.
We can see what must be early Christian life in the Holy Spirit in Acts 1: 8, 'But you will
receive power when the Holy Spirit comes on you; and you will be my witnesses in
Jerusalem, and in Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth.' The phrase 'the Holy
Spirit comes on you' has two meanings. Firstly, it means that Jesus' disciples will receive
the Pentecost miracle, but not human power, in advance. This phrase teaches them that
they will live by the Holy Spirit, and not by their reason. Secondly, it means that this
baptism of the Holy Spirit makes them remember Jesus' own baptism by the Holy Spirit.
The phrase 'the Holy Spirit comes on you', in other words, teaches the disciples what their
life must be in the Holy Spirit ( Lenski 1961: 31 ).
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This phrase indicates that the real power of disciples is the Holy Spirit. Just as Jesus
received the Holy Spirit for his work, disciples must receive the Holy Spirit. That means
just as Jesus did his work in the Holy Spirit, his disciples also must do their work for
Gospel.
While the Holy Spirit came to Jesus' individual body when he was baptized in water by
John the Baptist, Pentecost was the global corning of the Holy Spirit. From the two events
the same movement followed. Jesus started his public life to bring the rule of the kingdom
of God. He enacted God's work that he had experienced in the Trinity. From the day of
Pentecost the disciples of Jesus repeated God's work as Jesus did. The Holy Spirit
empowered the disciples to repeat God's work.
The Holy Spirit who descended like a dove and alighted on Jesus came from heaven like
the sound of the blowing of a violent wind and tongues of fire. This power like the
blowing of a violent wind and tongues of fire is symbolic of the extension of Christ's life
which began with the coming of the Spirit upon Jesus like a dove. The symbol of the dove
means that 'a new covenantal people started from Jesus' ( Hawthorne 1991: 126). The
symbols of the violent wind and tongues of fire imply that the new life rapidly and strongly
spread throughout the world via the Holy Spirit.
This indicated that the reality of life to be given to anybody who believes in him is
globalized because the wind can be generated from any situation and anywhere and the fire
can limitlessly divide itself to make new fire. 'The promise--or "gift" or "baptism" --of the
Spirit was for the disciples, and for their spiritual descendants in the next and subsequent
generations, indeed for all whom the Lord our God will call' (Stott 1990: 78). The Holy
Spirit makes the messianic community which is fully visualized in the Christ-like life (: 79).
The coming of the Holy Spirit to Jesus' disciples can be identified with Jesus' receiving of
the Holy Spirit. From these two anointings of the Holy Spirit God's thing was proclaimed
to the whole world by Jesus Christ as well as to his followers. Now God's work in the
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disciples is for them to become the witness of Christ. Stott (:61) says that 'Pentecost is the
inauguration of the new era of the Spirit and he equipes the Apostles to be the primary
witness of Christ. '
But this coming of the Holy Spirit is not just a coming of 'the other'. The Holy Spirit
comes to disciples, just as the second person become flesh. The third person physically
inspirits the believers. The Holy Spirit is the power of God within the human self ( Dunn
1996:11). The human self cannot accomplish the work for the Gospel. Therefore, 'The
impact of the Spirit is, therefore, characteristically, one of transformation, of enabling what
would be impossible in human strength alone.' ( :11). Without him, they could not live and
speak in such a way as bears witness to the risen Christ.
The disciples will be witnesses of Christ 'everywhere' ( Johnson 1992: 27). But without
the Holy Spirit they cannot be witnesses of Christ. By the coming of the Holy Spirit the
disciples receive the power of God and then they go forth into the world. When the
disciples receive the Holy Spirit they can live in the invisible pneumatological context in
the world. And then they become the witness of Christ.
From Pentecost Jesus' disciples became witnesses of Christ as proved in Acts. Now we
must understand that to become the witness of Christ is not only to testify to the name of
Christ but also to live the Christ-like life. From Pentecost, Jesus' crucificial death was fully
embodied in the Christian body. After Pentecost, Jesus' crucificial death became the model
for Christian life in the world.
The Holy Spirit enabled the Incarnation to extend beyond Jesus. Stott (: 81) puts it thus:
'What happened at Pentecost was that the remnant of God's people became the Spirit-
filled body of Christ.' The Holy Spirit made of Jesus' disciples Christ-like persons.
Through the Holy Spirit, God creates Jesus-like disciples who reflect the true image of
God.
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This way was shown even in the Old Testament in the vision of the valley of dry bones.
Here God asked Ezekiel, 'Son of man, can these bones live?' (Ezekiel 37:3). And Ezekiel
said, '0 Sovereign Lord, you alone know.' And God commanded to him to prophesy,
'Thus says the Lord God to these bones, "Behold, I will cause breath to enter you that you
may come to life..... '" (Ezek. 37:4-5). God also commanded him, 'Prophesy to the breath
[wind/spirit/Spirit], prophesy, son of man, and say to the breath', thus says the Lord God,
'Come from the four winds, 0 breath, and breathe ( emphyseson ) on these slain that they
may live' (Ezek. 37:9) (Hawthorne: 235 ).
The reason why the author of John's gospel ( 20: 22) chose to quote Ezekiel is that 'the
Gospel of John intended to make it obvious to everybody that just as a lump of clay
fashioned from the earth or a pile of bones bleaching in a valley were caused to spring to
life by the breath of God then, so now the followers of Jesus are being given the
opportunity to spring to life with a new spiritual vitality by that same breath of God' ( :
236). Furthermore, the prophet prophesied to the breath [wind/spirit/Spirit] according to
God's commandment. When the prophet came alive by the breath of God, he was
commanded by God to prophesy on behalf of God. The prophet led by God does not just
hear God's word. He does not just become an outside witness to the resurrection. Rather
the prophet is commissioned to speak God's promise of life into the death that leads back
into chaos(Welker 1994: 179). The prophet proclaims the spirit in the midst of chaos.
Just as Ezekiel prophesied, Jesus said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit' ( John 20:22). Ridderbos
states (1991 :643): 'This breathing on the disciples recalls texts like Genesis 2:7 and
Ezekiel 37:5f, that mention God's life-giving breath'. And then Jesus gave to his disciples
the authority of the messianic ministry. Receiving the Holy Spirit and prophesying to the
Holy Spirit are two aspects of one reality. Without the Holy Spirit nobody can become the
image of God.
In the redemption Jesus breathed into the disciples and they became Christ-like persons,
so that Jesus said to them, 'If you forgive anyone his sins, they are forgiven; if you do not
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forgive them, they are not forgiven.' ( John 20: 23 ). Jesus gives them his own authority
and power. In early days disciples become the Christ-like person in the Holy Spirit.
Therefore, disciples proclaim and declare, and, empowered by the Spirit, live by the
message of their own proclamation. When they proclaim the Gospel on behalf of Christ
God effectively forgives or retains the sin ( Carson 1991: 656 ). Thus a disciple's ministry
is a continuation of Jesus' ministry: 'through the gift of the Spirit the authority that Jesus
exercises in, say, John 9, is repeated in their lives' (:656).
Actually Jesus' sending his disciples to the world is a repetition of God's sending him to
the world ( John 20: 21 ). This is the repetition of Jesus's work through his Spirit, the
Holy Spirit. Therefore, God's work in Jesus continues in the body of the disciples. The
disciples are full of the life of Christ in order to be able to do what Jesus said, namely, to
have the authority of Christ to forgive any other. The disciples know the mind of God and
they can accomplish the will of God and they have the authority to forgive any other
through the Holy Spirit.
Let us contemplate the nature of a disciple's life in the Holy Spirit as shown in other
biblical texts. In Matthew 26: 26-29, Jesus said 'Take and eat; this is my body' 'Drink
from it, all of you. This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the
forgiveness of sins'. The Lord's Supper was an entirely new form of Passover ( Lenski
1943: 1023 ). The eating and drinking of the Old Testament meant thanksgiving. Old types
of ritual eating and drinking were participated in by Jews who were chosen by God. But
although the Lord's Supper has the same ritual of eating and drinking, only disciples who
have received the Holy Spirit can participate in it. While the Lord's Supper has its
thanksgiving, this thanksgiving refers directly to Christ's sacrificial body and his blood and
to their saving effect ( : 1023 ). In the new type of thanksgiving the disciples face Jesus'
sacrificial death and they embody Jesus' life in their life through the Holy Spirit. Ford
states that: 'The moment of the Last Supper, therefore, is one in which Jesus, facing death,
draws his disciples into identification with his movement towards death' in the new
spiritual life.
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This Lord's Supper was the expression of the climax of his sacrificial life for disciples and
all believers. The giving of his body and his blood is the climax of his love. Therefore,
Barret says that 'the Lord's Supper must be understood as having taken place in the
immediate context of the crucifixion' (Barret 1968: 266 ). Thus this sacrament is linked to
the crucifixion of Jesus ( Lenski 1943: 1025). This sacrament is also the response of his
disciples in identifying with Jesus' body, so that they should follow" Jesus' suffering and
crucifixion. The miracle of the sacrament is not that Christ makes us partakers of his
glorified body and blood but of the body given and of the blood shed for us on the cross.
The sacrament draws on Calvary, not on heaven ( : 1031 )
Jesus said, 'This is my body, which is for you; do this as my memorial.' Jesus's words are
present in the body ( at the Last Supper) ( Barret: 266 ). Jesus gave us his body and we
live in his body. And we live as his body that suffered. As the passover to the Jews was the
sacrifice of the Lamb and festival of God's deliverance, Christ, the crucified, by his death,
has effected our deliverance by God from our sin, and this is represented in the Supper ( :
267 ). Christ, resurrected from the dead, finally called his disciples to live in his body that
continues to suffer for his people who still remain in the evil world. The shedding of his
blood is the founding of the new covenant in which men's sins are forgiven and knowledge
of God is conveyed. Therefore the drinking of the cup is to enter into 'covenant
established in Christ's blood' ( :269). The drinking of the cup connects with what is said in
I Cor. 10:17 about the eating of the loaf which constitutes the one body in which believers
joined. This means that those who enter into covenant with the Lord naturally enter at the
same time into covenant with one another, and a covenant community which still must
endure suffering with Christ is thereby established.
In the words of the Apostle Paul says, 'For whenever you eat this bread and drink this
cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes' (1 Corinthians 11: 26). How can we
proclaim his death, his sacrifice? The Corinthian Christians made a serious mistake.
Thinking, perhaps, that the separation of the heavenly figure of Christ from Jesus might be
necessary, they allowed their lives to become very religious and distanced from Jesus'life
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of sacrificial service. Thus they did not know the meaning of sacrament. So they became
exclusive, considering themselves as those who have no shame. This was terrible sin. They
did not have Christ. They actually attacked the body of Christ. But 'the self-manifestation
of Christ calls men to obedience to his words' (Barret: 272 ).
Therefore, 'if we eat and drink unworthily, if we do not recognize the purpose of Christ's
self-offering and the Spirit who is a reality in our body, if we do not understand that our
body is the house of the Holy Spirit, we are exposing ourselves to the power of demons,
who were taken to be the cause of physical disease' ( : 272 ). So Paul said 'That is why
many among you are weak and sick, and a number of you have fallen asleep' (1
Corinthians 11:30). This sacrament must be celebration of union with Jesus' life, suffering,
and crucifixion. Then it will be true that the sacrament is the remembrance of Jesus (1
Corinthians 11: 24-25).
This sacrament must be extended to Jesus' crucifixion. The disciples, when they broke
bread, would think especially of the Eucharist-Agape, the representation of the Last
Supper of Jesus with his disciples, when he had broken bread to give them his broken body
(Williams 1964: 72). Some of them, like Stephen, were killed as Jesus had been crucified.
When Stephen proclaimed the Gospel, the crowd gnashed their teeth at him. Then Stephen
saw the glory of God and Jesus who was standing at the right hand of God. 'While they
were stoning him Stephen prayed, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit". Then he fell on his
knees and cried out, "Lord, do not hold this sin against them'" (Acts 7: 59-60). He prayed
like Jesus. This prayer for the other, for forgiveness for the other's sin can be the prayer of
believers through the Christ-like suffering. In this Christ-like dying Stephen was an image
of Christ.
From the Lord's holy communion to his crucifixion to his resurrection to Stephen, Peter,
Paul, Christ-like sacrificial life is one of the subjects of the Gospel. Stephen's prayer,
'Lord, do not hold this sin against them', shows that our sacrificial life is permeated by
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forgiveness and compassion as recursive action of Jesus. Most striking to the discples is
the way that 'the martyrdom of Stephen is deliberately modelled on the death of Jesus.' (
Williams:99 ). When we contemplate the life of Stephen, we can see the pattern of Christ.
Firstly the rejection of the prophets which climaxed in the rejection of Jesus Christ is
continued in the frenzied rejection of Stephen himself ( Acts 7:57-58 ). Secondly Stephen
in his final utterance before the counsel, 'full of the Holy Spirit', identifies himself with
Jesus as the 'Son of Man' at God's right hand, vindicated after his suffering ( Acts 7:55-56
). Thirdly, his final utterances are prayers which echo those attributed to Jesus in Luke 23:
24and 46 ( Dunn: 99).
Luke identified Stephen with Jesus in his Christ-like actions. In particular, Luke designated
that Jesus is 'the Son of Man' ( Acts 7:56 ) which had been customary in early tradition
but which failed to become established in later traditions ( Dunn: 99). Jesus was the
essential figure of humanity. In Stephen's case Luke shows us a martyr's own dying as
another microcosm of Christ's life that was shown in Jesus Christ and even in resurrection
in which the resurrected Jesus still suffers with his followers (: 99)
3.3.2. The Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit
In the above section we saw that in the early days of Christianity disciples had lived in the
Holy Spirit. They had lived in the pneumatological context. Their life was a totally Christ-
centric life. In this section we are going to find out how Christians can embody the life of
Christ in themselves. We must live in the pneumatological context just as the first disciples
did. This does not mean that we must leave this world. What we mean is that we must
pursue the Christ-centric life which the Holy Spirit brought to us. This life is not easy but
we must live therein through the Holy Spirit. We can embody the life of Christ through the
Holy Spirit in us.
3.3.2.1. Setting the concept of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit
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The reality of the human being's life is God's Spirit. According to Welker, God gives
fleshly, perishable, concrete creatures a share in God's "breath" and thus in God's Spirit
This God's 'breathing' grants to human beings the 'breath of life' (Gen. 2:7). God's
breathing is God's Spirit. God's Spirit takes effect in human beings and in other creatures
as the breath of life (Welker 1994: 159). Riiah-breath of the Old Testament is incarnate.
The Holy Spirit is what animates the body (Congar 1983: 3). God's breath was the 'living-
being' of the flesh in creation. God's breath make the dead a living being. This living being
means not just to live alone but also to live with other living beings. To be alive thus
means: through God's rtiah, to bind in a substantial pattern of interconnection, to have a
part in 'a medium that is both individually enlivening and common to all that is creaturely'
(Welker: 160). God's breath is the essence of individual human life and community. The
Spirit of God was in 'reality God, the vital God, infusing vitality into his creation, God
present and operative in his world, and especially in the world of human beings' (
Hawthorne 1991: 21-22).
Actually in creation the Holy Spirit was the life and power of the world. Therefore, the
taking back of the ruah leads to death and decay of the human being and creature (Welker
1994: 160). The Spirit, on the other hand, animates and enlivens the believers' lives
(Thusing 1980: 100). Therefore, we must not imagine that we had in mind some
secondary cause, something wholly separate and distinct from the Spirit of God (
Hawthorne: 14). Therefore, Fee (1994: 136) could claim that: 'God does not dwell among
his people, but is himself present, by his Spirit, within his people, sanctifying their present
earthly existence and stamping it with his own eternity'
The Holy Spirit is the life itself of people so that 'whoever blasphemes against the Holy
Spirit never receives forgiveness' (Mark3:28-30;cf Matt. 12: 31-32; Luke 11:14-15,17-
23; 12: 10). This is because he denies his life itself. Without the Holy Spirit there is not just
spiritual death but also death of the body. Somebody who blasphemes against the Holy
Spirit is like a Pharisee who insults the origin of life, the Spirit, that Jesus brought through
his work. Therefore, if somebody blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, it is simply that
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somebody hostile to Jesus has deliberately attributed the life he lived through the power of
the Holy Spirit to the power of the Evil One (Welker: 172). Such people who are on the
verge of becoming incapable of repentance and even attribute God's attestation of Jesus to
the devil, can be counted in the unforgivable category (Keener 1997: 107). Evil power
always brings human life back to death. Therefore to blaspheme against the Holy Spirit is
to come back to evil, to death.
The renewal of creation by the Spirit does not remove fleshness but removes the Evil
Power who had usurped the essence of creation. Indeed, the renewal of creation goes
hand in hand with 'a renewal of and change injleshness' (Welker: 164). We can see this
Spirit within fleshness or substantiality in the Old Testament.
I will gather you from the peoples, and assemble you out of the countries
where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land ofIsrael....... I will
give them one heart, and put a new Spirit within them; I will remove the heart
of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of jlesh, so that they may
follow my statutes and keep my ordinances and obey them. Then they shall be
my people and I will be their God. (Ezek. 11: 17b, 19-20)
A new heart I will give you, and a new Spirit I will put within you; and I will
remove from your body the heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. I will
put my Spirit within you, and make you follow my statutes and be careful to
observe my ordinances. Then you shall live in the land that I gave to your
ancestors; and you shall be my people, and I will be your God. ( Ezek. 36: 26-
28)
From the above two similiar verses we can illuminate what concretely happens with the
people touched by the Spirit's action (Welker: 164-165). The Holy Spirit always works in
our concrete life. Therefore he removes the evil at work in our concrete lives. In this
passage we can understand that 'God would creatively endow Israel with new wills and
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new minds that were to be sensitive rather than stony and hard in their reactions to God's
commandments' (Allen 1990: 179). To borrow the words of Welker (: 165), 'The granting
of the Spirit, of the "new Spirit," of the Spirit of God, is attended by an exchange oj
hearts. In particular, the heart of stone is replaced by a heart of flesh'. God would re-make
our human nature which had hard hearts of stone (Allen: 179). That the heart of stone is
replaced by the heart of flesh means the Holy Spirit's substantial or structural dwelling in
our body.
Therefore the Holy Spirit is not an external appendix to our body but the substance of our
body in that if the Holy Spirit withdraws from the body, our body is just like stone or soil.
Actually the Holy Spirit becomes hypostasized.
God in us through the Holy Spirit is a continuing pattern of the incarnation ( Marriage
1989 : 89 ). For this reason Welker dares to see the believers as the 'messianic bearer of
the Holy Spirit'. We refer to it here as hypostasis oj the Holy Spirit in human self. Let us
develop this concept.
This hypostasis oj the Holy Spirit is not merely the extension of the incarnation of the
second person because the Holy Spirit operates in the world today by his own autonomy
just as the Son is incarnate by his own autonomy ( McIntyre 1997: 205 ). The historicity
of the Spirit has a christological basis ( Lull 1980: 154). But a difference between Christ
and his Spirit exists within their identity (: 155)
Hendrikus Berkhof described the Holy Spirit in the sense of the extensional incarnation
(Berkhof 1964: 115 ). Hendrikus Berkhof understands that the exalted Christ becomes the
life-giving Spirit. Therefore, for Berkhofthe Holy Spirit is the exalted Christ. Accordingly
the coming of the Holy Spirit is an extentional incarnation (McIntyre: 205). Berkhof
clearly emphasizes that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, but he ignores the autonomy
of the Holy Spirit as one of the Trinitarian personalities. Berkhofs opinion is that the Holy
Spirit as one of the Trinitarian personalities does not inspire the believers by his own
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autonomy. In other words, the Holy Spirit is not 'another Helper'. He is, rather, the power
of Christ. Therefore, Berkhof s understanding of the Holy Spirit as the extension of the
incarnation could incur the charge of docetism (: 205 ).
Therefore, McIntyre suggests an alternative concept of' definitional substantive model' on
the indwelling of Holy Spirit. McIntyre's 'definitional substantive model' which images
the Spirit as acting in the world as "an autonomous substance" can give us a clear
definition of the Jleshly dwelling of the Holy Spirit in human self
In order to overcome docetic pneumatology we can borrow the concept of the opus ad
extra of the Word. We make use of the advantage which christology has over
pneumatology finding there a word to designate the opus ad extra of the Word of God,
namely, incarnation of ensarkosis ( :207). If pneumatology follows docetic christology,
the Holy Spirit can never give the reality of salvation and make people Christ-like
believers. McIntyre (: 208 ), therefore, avoids the docetism of pneumatology by means of
'such neologisms as empneumatosis, or "inspiriting", the Holy Spirit informing the spirit,
heart, mind and will of human beings, with whom he is thus in touch as never before.' The
Holy Spirit dwells in the concrete human self who believes in Jesus Christ. John of
Damascus said: 'We do not conceive the Spirit as an unhypostatic breath ..., but as
substantial power, self-related in his own individuating hypostasis ... ' ( The orthodox faith
7. 14-21)
McIntyre claimed hypostasis and physis as the terminology of the doctrinal statements
concerning the Holy Spirit (McIntyre: 237). Using the same meaning as McIntyre and not
implying the extension of the incarnation of the Son of God, we use here the hypostasis of
the Holy Spirit.
In this hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit does not nullify the human spirit but
rather imbues the human spirit with autonomy in order to continue the work of Christ. The
Holy Spirit makes us the image of Christ. The Holy Spirit makes us the sons of God. The
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Holy Spirit brings, through the witness that he bears ( Rom 8:16), the experience of
huiothesia or 'adoption of sons' to our pneuma. (Thusing 1980: 100). The Holy Spirit is
God himself identifying himself with his creatures and his creation ( McIntyre: 182 ).
Therefore, God willingly accepts the believers as his sons, because these sons have the
same Spirit. In other words, the expression of the pneuma of God, the bearer of this
experience from God, and 'our spirit are indissolubly united' ( Thusing: 100). Just as
God's unique Son Jesus Christ has the Holy Spirit, the adopted sons also have the Holy
Spirit. The pneuma of God unite with our spirit. Now we can understand the Holy Spirit
fully embodies Christ's character and power in our body. The Holy Spirit also unifies
Christ-life with the believer's life. The Holy Spirit changes our sinful nature to Christ-
centric life. The Holy Spirit makes the believers as new born beings. The Holy Spirit is the
new context of human life.
The Spirit is a historically 'new mode of God-in-the-world' (Lull: 159) and God-in-our-
spirit. In Galatians 4:4-6 the Apostle Paul described how, in the Spirit, 'the new mode of
divine immanence, the believers continue Christ's presence and activity as imitators'
(Lull: 159).
Therefore, McIntyre (: 243 ) commented that 'no account of the doctrine of the atonement
is complete unless it lays a proper emphasis upon the part which the Holy Spirit plays in
the effective completion of the salvation process and that this role which the Spirit plays in
the fulfilment of the work of Christ is in no sense an afterthought requiring to be
implemented after the event of the death of Christ, to obviate God's purpose being
nullified through the sinfulness of human kind.' On the contrary, it was an integral part of
that divine design which centred around Christ. The hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is the
fulfilment of opera ad extra Trinitatis begun from the beginning of the world and
completed in Christ.
3.3.2.2. The hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in the believers
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God's immanent dwelling among his people and transforming them to holiness was the
purpose of the Old Testament. The consummation of this immanence was found in Christ,
the One who is anointed with the Spirit's presence and power. And the consequence of his
work is 'the giving of the Spirit to indwell believers' (Ferguson 1996: 176). Ferguson
explains that the relationship between the Holy Spirit and his people is more than that of a
mere divine influence. As Christ gave the Holy Spirit to dwell in believers, it is not just a
divine influence on the human being.
The divine-human engagement in the Holy Spirit is an analogy of the Incarnation of God
in Jesus Christ ( : 176 ). And this divine-human indwelling in each other is also an analogy
of Trinitarian relationship. The analogy is that the mutual indwelling of Christ and the
believer is shaped according to the pattern of inner-Trinitarian relationships. Just as there
is a mutual indwelling of Father and Son revealed by the Holy Spirit, so, by the indwelling
of the same Spirit, Christ and the believer are united ( : 176; John 14: 20)
In the Holy Spirit's hypostatic dwelling in the believers, the action of Christ must be
continued in the human self and community who believe in Jesus Christ. In the hypostasis
of the Holy Spirit the personality of Christ is resurrected in the believers. Jesus' life
continues through the believers.
How is the life of the Christ perceived by human beings after we "no longer know Christ
according to the flesh" ( 2 Cor. 5: 16) ? Concerning this question we should consider
Jesus' injunction of silence. Jesus commanded a man with a shrivelled hand 'not to tell
who he was' ( Matthew 12: 16) as Isaiah had prophecied in Isaiah 42:1-4. And this
injunction of silence was initially directed at the demons. Demons recognized that Jesus
was 'the Holy One of God' (Mark 1:24; Luke 4:34 ), the 'Son of God' ( Mark 3:11;
Matthew 8: 29; Luke 4:41), the 'Son of the Most High God' (Mark 5:7; Luke 8: 28), the
'Messiah' (Luke 4: 41 ). But Jesus commanded 'Be silent' (Mark 1: 25) so as 'not to
make him known' (Mark 3:12).
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Why did Jesus not publicize his name? We can answer this when we think about Jesus'
words to the healed Gerasene. Jesus (Mark 5:19; Luke 8:39) said to him : 'Go home to
your family and tell how much the Lord has done for you, and how he has had mercy on
you'. Jesus wanted only someone who had personal experience of suffering and of
liberation to publicly testify to who he was and not those whose hearts had not
experienced Jesus' suffering (Welker 1994: 208).
Furthermore, Jesus did not want to make his messiahship public knowledge until his
crucifixion. Only on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the cross and the
resurrection of Christ is it possible to publicize the identity of Jesus ( : 209). In other
words, when we experience Jesus's cross and when we share in Jesus' sacrifice the
messiahship of Jesus can be undersood publicly. And only at that time is our function as
microcosms of the messianic bearer of the Holy Spirit realized.
The Holy Spirit definitely unifies us with the historical Jesus and transforms us into Christ-
like persons. The Holy Spirit empowers us to become microcosms of the Servant Son. For
this reason we can say that the Holy Spirit is a hypostasis of Christ in the believers.
3.3.3. Christ, the Holy Spirit and the human self
The Holy Spirit who worked in Jesus is the same as that given to the followers of Jesus.
Jesus was led by the Holy Spirit even when the devil tempted him ( Mat. 4: 1; Mark l.12;
Luke 4:1). Jesus must be tested because only 'when tested and proven and the covenant
confirmed by his unwavering obedience to the Father can Jesus go forth in his work as
Son and Servant for others' ( cf. Heb. 5:8-9) (Hawthorne 1991: 139). Israel was tested
likewise, in order to be the sons and servants for others. Actually this temptation of Jesus
recalls Deut.6-8. Just as the Lord God led Israel, his 'son', ( cf. Exod. 4:22-23; Jer. 31:9;
Hos. 11:1) in the wilderness for forty years to test and to discipline him ( Deut. 8:2-5 ), so
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Jesus as the supreme Son of God is led by the Spirit for forty days to be tested at this very
point, at the point of his sonship (Matt. 4:3,6) (Hawthorne: 138).
The reason why God had made a covenant with Israel and constantly tested Israel was in
order to make them faithful sons of God but they had failed the test by rebelling against
God (cf. Acts 7:36,39; Heb. 3:8-9) (Hawthorne: 138-139). Therefore, now in the testing
of Jesus the new covenant has been introduced and the New Israel is tested ( : 139).
The Son of God, the beginner of the new Israel, Jesus, returned to Galilee in the power of
the Spirit ( Luke 4:14), proclaimed the Gospel by the Holy Spirit, ( Luke 4: 18) and
brought the salvation. The Spirit was always with Jesus. 'The Spirit is upon Jesus by
reason of his baptismal anointing. His [messianic] anointing signs appointment and
empowering to be the Isaianic messiah who heralds and brings salvation' (Nolland 1989
:202 ). Similarly, the believers have been made sons of God in the Holy Spirit. Hawthorne
( :237) explains it thus: 'In a similar way the followers of Jesus, who have received the gift
of the Spirit, are thus anointed by God with that same Holy Spirit and so become God's
contemporary "christs," so that they might know the mind of God and be authorized to
carry out his will in this day and age ( cf. 1 John 2:20,27).'
Through the Holy Spirit we are joined to the Anointed One so that God has anointed us as
well (Fee 1994: 292). The Apostle Paul taught the Corinthians two aspects of the
hypostasis oj the Holy Spirit, one of which applies to Jesus and the other to his followers.
(Hawthorne: 237) 'Now He who establishes us with you in Christ ( Christon ) and
anointed ( chrisas ) us is God' (2 Cor. 1:21 NASB ), i.e., 'the one who establishes us in
the Anointed One and anointed (christon kai chrisas) us is God.' (: 237). In other words,
'in putting us into Christ, God christed us' (Fee: 291). God anointed us as he anointed
Christ.
Therefore, just as Jesus said of himself, 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has
anointed me .. ' ( Luke 4:18), and as Peter said to Cornelius, 'God anointed Jesus of
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Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power...' (Acts 10:38), just so in this same way
Christians are now spoken of as anointed ones because they, too, have received the Holy
Spirit and are thus set apart to serve God, authorized to act in his behalf ( Hawthorne:
237).
Jesus' words in John 20: 23 are tremendously difficult for the teachers of law, as well as
for us, to accept. Even when Jesus said to the paralytic, 'Son, your sins are forgiven' (
Mark 2:5), the teachers oflaw thought, 'Why does this fellow say that? He's blaspheming!
Who can forgive sins but God alone?' Thus the fact that the believers also have the
authority to forgive any other will definitely present a problem to the teachers of law, as
will all of us who believe in Jesus.
But when we are called we too have this authority. Where does it come from? It comes
from the Holy Spirit. Because Jesus' authority comes from the Holy Spirit, Hawthorne
(:157-158) can say that 'Jesus' authority to forgive sins was not his intrinsic authority but
a delegated authority, not one inherent in him by virtue of his own divine nature, but one
given him by God.' 'This authority was his by virtue of a prophetic gift bestowed on him (
cf. John 5:19,27,30; see also 2 Sam.12: 13; John 20: 22, 23).' The believers received the
same Spirit. In 1 Pet 1:23 the apostle Peter described this authority in terms of anointing
faith. According to Congar ( 1983: 102), Peter implies that the anointing faith is the work
of the Spirit and that it is an extension and a communication to believers of the prophetic
and messianic anointing that Jesus received from the Holy Spirit at his baptism.
This 'pneumatic-prophetic authority' ( exousia ) of Hawthorne and Congar can be seen
prominently in the event of the cleansing of the Temple ( Markll:15-17, 27-33/Matt.
21:12-13, 23-271Luke 19: 45-46; 20:1-8) ( Hawthorne: 158). In the hypostasis of the
Holy Spirit this authority also belongs to the believers (: 238), since they are the witness of
Christ ( Luke 24: 48) in the Holy Spirit. Jesus' Sonhood and human sonhood are identified
with each other in the Holy spirit.
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3.4. 'Never-;Lord,' the this-worldly life paradigm as the demonic myth
The Bible teaches us that there is a totally different paradigm of the human self from that
which Christ and the Holy Spirit has shown us. Even Jesus' disciples lived in this
paradigm. They actually could not follow Jesus. We can say that they could not become
Christ-like people before Pentecost. We can overcome this paradigm by the Holy Spirit.
But we must recognize it.
We are going to investigate the main human prejudice that made the believers fail to be
Christ-like person. The human prejudice was shown in Mark's Gospel ( 8:27-38):
Jesus and his disciples went on to the villages around Caesarea Philippi. On the
way he asked them, 'Who do people say I am?' They replied, 'Some say John
the Baptist; Others say Elijah; and still others, one of the prophets.' 'But what
about you?' he asked. 'Who do you say I am?' Peter answered, 'You are the
Christ.' Jesus warned them not to tell anyone about him. He then began to
teach them that the son of man must suffer many things and be rejected by the
elders, chief priests and teachers of the law, and that he must be killed and
after three days rise again. He spoke plainly about this, and Peter took him
aside and began to rebuke him. But when Jesus turned and looked at his
disciples, he rebuked Peter. 'Get behind me, Satan!' He said. 'You do not
have in mind the things of God, but the things of men.' Then he called the
crowd to him along with his disciples and said: 'If anyone would come after
me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever
wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for me and for the
gospel will save it. What good is it for a man to gain the whole world, yet
forfeit his soul? If anyone is ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous
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and sinful generation, the Son of Man will be ashamed of him when he comes
in his father's glory with the holy angels.'
This section is paralleled in Matthew 16: 13-28 and Luke 9: 18-27.
When Jesus asked them 'Who do people say I am?', the disciples gave various answers,
viz., John the Baptist, Elijah, one of the prophets. All recognized him as a holy man, as
their religious leader. But Peter identified Jesus as the messiah, the Christ and the Son of
the living God. At that time Jesus said to Peter, 'Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah, for
this was not revealed to you by man, but by my Father in heaven.' (Matthew 16: 17)
Jesus is not just one of many religious heroes, but the apocalyptic liberator. Peter
recognized this. Even more, he recognized Jesus as the son of the living God. Peter
answered somewhat more than correctly: you are the living God. This was the real secret
that nobody could know. This sonship of the living God closely relates to his death on the
cross.
Even though Peter could not know at this point--so that he was rebuked by Jesus-she
confessed the secret of God. So Jesus said to him, 'And I tell you that you are Peter, and
on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it.' (
Matthew 16: 18 ).
Jesus would build his church on this rock of Peter's faith. According to Garland ( 1993 :
171 ), 'the rock upon which Christ's church is built is the confession, revealed by the
Father, that Jesus is Christ, the son of the living God. The answers of the others to the
question of who Jesus is offer him nothing on which to build'. Actually, Jesus identified
Peter's confession with his church.
Amazingly Jesus blessed him thus: 'I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven;
whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will
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be loosed in heaven.' ( Matthew 16: 19 ). This means that Jesus gave Peter the same
authority as himself to hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven. This implies, surely, that
Jesus identified his own authority, even the kingdom of God beyond the church, with his
disciples' authority because Peter knew the secret of Jesus.
Gundry ( 1994 : 335 ) said that 'God will not ratify at the last judgement what Peter does
in the present age, but Peter does in the present age what God has already determined.' In
other words, Peter has received authority from God for his scribal activity. Put differently,
this means that to become the believer is to perform Christ-like action in individual and
communal life.
But when Peter thought that this worldly life and prosperity could be all for him, he could
not fully understand Christ. When Peter did not overcome the this-worldly life paradigm,
he became Satan. When Jesus said that He must go to Jerusalem and suffer at the hands
of the elders, priests, and teachers, and must be killed and be raised to life, Peter said,
'Never, Lord!' 'This shall never happen to you!'.
Even though he appeared to know the secret of Jesus as the real Son of God, actually
Peter did not know what to be Christ really is. He knew Christ only in the this-worldly life
paradigm. He understood Jesus as the Messiah Christ, the apocalyptic liberator, who could
never be killed.
This negative reaction of Peter is historically comprehensible ( Hare 1993 : 194 ) because
the Jewish Messiah was expected to inflict suffering and death on Israel's enemies and on
the wicked within Israel, not to experience it himself ( Hare: 194 ). This concept of the
Messiah comes from the life-centrism. The Messiah Christ can never be killed and death
must be destroyed. This was the original fear of religion, even of Christianity.
This fear compnses the 'soteriotype' of the this-worldly life paradigm. When Peter
remains in this paradigm, he is frightened that Jesus must be killed.
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The paradigm that Peter was obsessed by was the extreme fear of death, fear of giving up
the self perfectness, immortal soul, that created life-centrism. This life-centrism has
dominated men and women since 'the first man, Adam, became a living being [ soul ]'(1
Cor. 15: 4Sf) after his sin. We call it the this-worldly-life paradigm.
This-worldly life-centrism was the dominant paradigm of the whole world. Even God was
seen as the self-life paradigmatic Divine Being. The divinity was endowed with self-
centrism and self-glorification. It was enclosed in the self-life paradigm of humanity.
In this way, the this-worldly life-centrism created a total separation of Christology and
soteriology, a schism between Jesus' vicarious death and a Jesus-like life, because it
brought the impossibility of union between the heavenly and the earthly.
In the this-world life paradigm Christ and Jesus were separated from each other, because
while Christ is an eternal divine supreme being, Jesus is a mortal being. The Christ of
christology, must be defined as a heavenly thing. By making a heavenly figure of Christ
people hope to expiate the fear of death. In other words, people want to establish the
immortality of life of self and eternity according to self-life.
This reflects the actual demonic power paradigm. Peter's separation of Christ from Jesus'
death and from his own death is demonic and Satanic; in other words, this separation in
the this-wordly life paradigm's fear of death is demonic and satanic. The real satanic
power is the desperate fear of death. This desperate fear of death characterizes physical
death as belonging to Hell.
Peter's exclamation, 'Never, Lord!' is the human representation of the demonic myth. The
reaction, 'Never, Lord!', reveals a demonic fear of death reflecting the this-wordly life
paradigm. In this fearful utterance of 'Never, Lord!' there is the distortion of salvation.
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Certainly, then, if we remain in the this-worldly life paradigm then physical death is a
demonic power, and we cannot actually understand the Christ. Peter remained in this self-
life paradigm. So Jesus said to Peter, 'Get behind me, Satan!' (Mathew 16: 23; Mark, 8:
33). Peter became identified with Satan.
Jesus's words show that the this-worldly view of death as demonic is not God's 'thing'.
Rather, the this-worldly life paradigm is of the 'things' of men, even more, of Satan. Jesus
said, 'You are a stumbling block to me; you do not have in mind the things of God, but the
things of men' (Mathew 16: 23; Mark 10: 33 ).
Peter's defence, 'Never, Lord!' is representative of men's 'things'. God's 'thing' is that
Jesus must suffer and be killed and be raised.
Jesus must be killed. Jesus must die. This was one of contents of Gospel. Even while Jesus
as a human being had a horror of death, yet he did not desperately fear death. In Matthew,
Mark and Luke, Jesus reveals that he must be killed. In other words, Jesus is not in the
this-worldly life paradigm of humans. He accepts suffering and physical death.
When Jesus said to Peter that he would give him the keys of the kingdom of God, Jesus
authorized Peter to perform the same work as himself Christ's work and Peter's work
cannot be separated in accomplishing the 'things' of God. Jesus will build his church on
the rock of Peter.
Jesus said, 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross
and follow me. For whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life
for me will find it.' ( Matthew 16:24-25; Mark 8: 34-35 ) Jesus' suffering, his death, are
not only limited to Jesus' own self but also include his followers.
Hagner ( 1995 : 487 ), in his Matthew commentary, writes, 'The path of discipleship is the
path of the cross for everyone who would follow Jesus. Paradoxically, it is the one who
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gives up his or her life in discipleship to Jesus who will truly find life, both in the present
and in the future, while the one who seeks to have life on his or her own terms will in
effect lose it. This self-denial means a new set of priorities that will look foolish to the
world'. He also said, 'This dying-to-self makes possible the radical love and service that
are the essence of discipleship' ( : 487 ).
Jesus said to his followers, 'Take up [your] cross'. Such action would reflect Jesus' life in
each follower. This is the Christ-like life. Peter's plea discloses not only his own
misconception but also that of all people concerning the self-life paradigm of humanity.
But Jesus strongly commands his disciples and his future disciples to take up their crosses.
In order to do so we should overcome the this-worldly life paradigm, and the desperate
fear of death.
According to Hare (: 193 ), this passage ( Mark 16: 13-28 ) is Jesus' preparation of the
disciples for his death. Hare ( : 193 ) said, 'in terms of the theological message, however,
the announcement serves as the occasion for important instru~tion concerning what Jesus'
death means for the life-style of his followers'.
The death on the cross of Jesus as Christ and the denying of, the losing of self, for Jesus
and for the Gospel are the action which unifies Jesus and the believers. In Jesus'
commandment physical death for his sake is a testimony of discipleship. When the
believers overcome the this-worldy life paradigm, they can become the image of Christ,
the Christ-like person.
3.5. The life-giving love as the essence of Christian humanity
Peter's response can be seen as representative of all people, the whole human race, male
as well as female. From this self-life paradigm there arises the need for a transformation of
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history, almost like being born again; a perspective totally different from this world
paradigm.
,
Therefore, Christians must have a different view of life from this-worldly life paradigm.
To contemplate our new Christian life we need to reflect on the doctrines of trinity,
creation and redemption.
3.5.1. James D.J. Dunn's opinion
James D. G. Dunn explained 1 Cor. 15: 45 in terms of the believer's new life as 'life-giving
spirit'. He ( 1975: 322 ) interpreted that verse thus: 'By "life-giving spirit" Paul is just as
obviously speaking in terms of the religious experience of believers; the "life-giving spirit"
is that power which believers experience as a new life, liberating life, life from the dead' (
Rom. 8.2; II Cor. 3.6ff ). The point for us to note in 1 Cor. 15 : 45 is that 'Paul equates
the risen Jesus with the spirit who makes alive.' Jesus becomes the life-giving spirit as the
representative of all people, that is, just as under Adam, all people became the self-
centrism, in Jesus all people become the life-giving spirit.
The Apostle Paul deliberately says that Jesus, by his resurrection, becomes the life-giving
Spirit which believers experience as the source and power of the new life and new
relationship with God. From his resurrection Jesus may be known by men only as the life-
giving Spirit (: 322 ). This Spirit is also essentially the Spirit of the Father so that the Spirit
of God can be more precisely recognized as the Spirit of Jesus's own relationship with the
Father and as the Spirit, which brings about the same relationship for believers and makes
it existentially real (: 320 ). Dunn continues, in this 'life-giving Spirit' 'suffering and death
are the necessary complement to life. For Paul, the christian life is a continuing experience
of death as well as of [new] life' (Rom 7: 24; 8: 10,13 )
For Dunn (: 327 ), Paul was living as 'a member of the last Adam' as belonging to Christ
through the Spirit, but at the same time, Paul was dying because he is still 'a member of
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the first Adam', belonging to the world as flesh. So this dying is a necessary process for
the believers.
This dying as a member of the first Adam belongs to all believers. Dunn continues:
Suffering and dying was something all believers experienced--an unavoidable part of the
believers' lot--an aspect of experience as Christians, which his converts shared with Paul
(Rom 5: 3 'we'; 8: 17f 'we' ). Furthermore, '[suffering] is the inevitable consequence of
the life of the Spirit having to express itself through the body of death'. This thinking of
Paul is clearly expressed in II Cor. 4: 11. 'While still alive, we are continually being handed
over to death for Jesus' sake, so that ( iva ) the life of Jesus also may be revealed in our
mortal flesh'. Explaining this verse and following Paul's line of reasoning, Dunn (: 327-
328) unified two thoughts as follows:
First, that the experience of suffering is the experience of the power of death,
continually asserting itself over its continuing domain, the flesh, the mortal
body. Second, that if the life of Jesus is to achieve visible expression in the
believer's life that can only be through the body--but that means through this
body, the body offlesh, the body of death.
Thus Dunn ( 327-328 ) continues
Now notice how Paul links these two thoughts--by iva; death must have its say
in the believer's experience in order that the life of Jesus may come to visible
expression. Also, the life of Jesus manifests itself precisely in and through the
dying of the body; life and death are two sides of the one process. So in II Cor
4: 16--'Though our outward humanity is wasting away, yet day by day we are
being inwardly renewed' There is no dualism here.
The Christian always lives a life of tension, that is, 'the tension of belonging to two
opposed worlds simultaneously, of knowing the life of the Spirit but having to express it
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through the body of death' (: 338 ). How can we escape from this tension? Dunn said that
there is no abstract experience which exempts the believer from the reality of his divided
state; as man of Spirit and man of flesh ( :339 ). There are only two ways of escape, and
both are ways of life-giving dying: 'One is the way forward-so engage in the Spiritlflesh
conflict till its end in physical death; the other is the way backward-so abandon the
conflict, to retreat into a life lived on the level of the flesh, the level where death alone
reigns, the way of death' ( :339)
These two ways represent the life-giving spirit and the this worldly life-centrism
respectively. But the only way of escape from the tension is death=either the death of the
body, or the death of the whole man, in sum, life-giving dying ( : 339 ). The only way of
escape from the tension is to become the life-giving being by the Spirit following Jesus.
This death is the Christian life-giving paradigm. 'Death is part of the present experience of
life' (II Cor. 4: 1Off; Dunn: 339).
Only in the life-giving spirit can we overcome both the dualism implicit in the knowing of
Christ and in the following of Christ, and life and death.
Let us examine the meaning of the life-giving spirit regarding the trinity, creation and
redemption.
3.5.2. Suffering and the sacrificing God
Through Jesus' death the divinity of God has fully been revealed. In fact, Jesus' death is
already intimated in the Trinity.
3.5.2.1. Trinity and the sacrificing God
Howard A. Snyder ( 1995 : 244-5) explained the Trinity in this way:
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In the christian tradition, philosophers and theologians have dealt with the
issue of meaning and relationship in part through the doctrine of the Trinity.
Whatever or whoever God is, God is not only one. God is three-in-one. The
Trinity is one way of describing the complexity and multidimensionality of
God's self-awareness. The unity - perhaps the meaning - of God is found in
the indivisible, ever-intercommunicating relationship of one-in-two, two-in-
three, three-in-one. In the christian view, meaning is therefore trinitarian and
relational. God is Trinity - a personal unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,
bound together in loving intercommunion. So profound is this relatedness in
the being of God that it constitutes Trinitive personhood: three persons in one
(not two persons united by some impersonal energy or spirit). The doctrine of
Trinity is itself, therefore, an intriguing intimation of the essential twoness and
threeness of oneness of meaning. Increasingly, it is actually an ecological
conception, not a mechanical and certainly not a hierarchical one.
How well Snyder explained the character of the Trinity' The intercommunal, divine being.
In the Trinity, the relatedness of three persons is an intercommunicating relationship.
Furthermore, when we look at the doctrine of the Trinity from the point of view of the
life-giving-spirit paradigm, the real meaning of intercommunion in the Trinity is the life-
giving communion, the invisible new communion rather than the benefits of one or the
other.
The personal character of each member of the Trinity, ie. the paternitas of the Father, the
filiatio of the Son, theprocessio of the Holy Spirit, is revealed in the Trinity via life-giving
communion with each other; the Son is in the Father in a self-giving body of love, the
Father is in the Son in the self-giving of the Word, the Holy Spirit is in the Father and the
Son in a total self-giving of power and knowledge.
The triune God is the relational God who knows suffering, self-giving and transformation
within God's own life ( Inbody 1997: 168). God and suffering are not contradictions
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within a christological perspective, for God's being is in suffering and life-giving, and the
suffering is in God's being itself, because God is love ( : 171 ).
In the Trinity, the life-giving divinity is the principle of the divine being. Therein, one
God, but three personalities are established. Geddes McGregor (1973) thinks that God's
being should be understood in the light of God's work of sacrificial love. According to
kenotic theology God is always and in all aspects self-humbling, self-giving, and self-
limiting, not simply in the second person ( Inbody: 175 ). Therefore, revelation derives
from the other's sacrifice and is in the sacrificefor the other.
God's essence is in the perfect self-sacrifice in the Trinity, not just in himself alone. In this
interpretation God must necessarily be a triune being. In other words, the life-giving
character of God inevitably generates the Trinity 'of three persons in one Divine essence'.
The life-giving is the lifestyle of the Trinity.
3.5.2.2. Creation and the sacrificing God
The immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity and the economic Trinity is the immanent
Trinity (Inbody 1997 : 168-9). In other words, the pattern of divine life in the Trinity is
revealed in creation and redemption. The Trinity who abides in creation is the Trinity who
works in creation and redemption according to the Trinitarian pattern of life. Thus the
immanent and economic doctrines of the Trinity together show that interrelationship exists
not only within the divine life but between God and man ( :169). Let us look at the pattern
of life expressed in creation.
The Nicaeo-Constantinopo!itan Creed ( 381 ) shows us that the Father and the Son has
one essence, homoousios. The Creed ( cited in Torrance 1981: 58-59 ) states as follows:
We believe in one God ..... and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God,
begotten of the Father as unique ( monogenes ), that is from the ousia of the
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Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not
made, homoosios with the Father, through whom all things were made .
The Father and the Son are one essence. Therefore, the creation of God was the Father's
creation through His Son. In other words, creation was God's self-giving through His
Son.
Jesus' uniqueness is Christianity's uniqueness. What is different from other religions is the
self-giving love that comes from God's sacrificial action. In all other religions there is the
concept that the Divine Supreme Being cannot suffer, without a divine personality who
has performed the self-giving himself. The uniqueness of Christianity which is different
from other religions is in God's self-giving action.
Actually we can say that God gave himself for us from the time of his Creation. The saying
of His Word can be indentified with a giving of himself, because the Word was God. God
said himself: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God. He was with God in the beginning'( John 1: 1). The Word was God who came
to earth in the person of Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified.
When God created the world, God did not actually create from nothing. His creation was
his giving and sending of his Word as his essence. The creation was a creation from
himself. The creatio ex nihilo is only a wonderful expression of God's sending of himself.
In other words, God created the world by his self-giving, without any external materials.
The creation was God's perfect self-giving.
From the point of creation, God began his self-giving towards the other. Thus God's
personality and the life-giving spirit paradigm, were never separate even from the
beginning. In this self-giving, paradoxically, God glorified himself. In this, the Father's
self-giving to creation, was the foundation of creation.
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Actually, from the creation Jesus Christ was slain as the slain Lamb in Rev. 13: 8. NIV
has this verse, 'All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast--all whose names have
not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation
of the world.' AVI KN render it, 'And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him [
the beast], whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the
foundation of the world.' AVINIV/KN connect the phrase 'the lamb' and the phrase
'from the creation ofthe world'.
But RSV associated the phrase 'before the foundation of the world' with the clause
'everyone whose name has not been written', thus separating the phrase 'the Lamb slain'
from the phrase 'before the foundation of the world' ( McIntyre 1992: 113-114 ). But,
following McIntyre ( :114 ), in fact, in the Greek original, the text separated the phrase
apo kataboles kosmou from the phrase gegraptai ( written ). Therefore, the RSV is an
erroneous translation from the Greek original.
According to NIV/AV/KJV the Lamb, Jesus Christ was slain 'from the creation of the
world', 'from the foundation of the world' in order to forgive men and women. In other
words, 'the suffering and the anguish of the cross were foundational elements in those
attributes of God' ( : 114).
Clearly we can understand that before the falling into sin of human beings, the life-giving
life-style was the fundamental attribute of God and man as shown in Revelation 13.8.
Consequently, when God is presented in the Old Testament as forgiving, he does so
because of a life-giving love which is already endemic to his nature [ in the Trinity as well
as the Creation ], even though it still has to be overtly fulfilled in the life of Jesus Christ ( :
114 ). In creation as well as in the Old Testament the life-giving sacrifice was the principle
of the creation and the sacrifice of the Old Testament altar.
Extentionally, this sacrificial love, life-giving love was the life style of the first human
beings of creation. The life-giving love and its concommitent sacrificial love were included
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in God's creation. According to McIntyre ( : 114) God's essential natures ( the mercy and
the forgiveness) that are rooted in sacrificial love are 'the foundation of his whole
relationship to the created order of mankind and nature.' Men and women should follow
God's essential nature that comes from life-giving love ( : 117 ). God's essential nature
rooted in life-giving is the foundation and the possibility of the believer's christ-like action
within union with Jesus Christ ( : 117 ). Sin was humanity's resistance to the life-giving
and sacrificial love.
From this consideration of creation 'the theology of [vicarious] atonement [of Christ] and
the components of soteriology and the actual ways in which atonement and redemption are
implemented in the lives of men and women' ( McIntyre: 120 ) are interrelated with each
other.
The first Adam could not understand the meaning of the life and the reality of life. In
creation, God created man and woman, and gave them life. By this life man and woman
had to conform to the image of God and likeness of God that was already the divine life
style. The reality of the life-giving life was, even in creation, the life of the spiritual body
( 1 Corinthian 15: 44 ) in holy communion with God that overcomes the second death (
Rev. 20: 6).
As we see in Genesis 2: 7, 'The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living life'. In the
beginning God created a good creation, but the man became a bodily nature who
concentrated upon the self in isolation from God, the Wholly Other. This became a serious
sin. Man became sinner as he became the self-centric bodily nature instead of the life-
giving spirit planned by the creator. So man really died.
From that time, death became the punishment. From this time death gives birth to fear for
life. It is the awareness of death which first generates fear for life, the fear of not getting
one's fair share, of not having enough from life, the fear that life will be cut short
113
(Molt mann 1996: 93). But Jesus overcame the this-worldly life-centrism which is the basis
of self-centrism. The Apostle Paul expressed the reality of Jesus' life as follows; 'the first
man Adam became a living being; the last Adam, a life-giving spirit' ( 1 Corinthians 15:
45).
The essence of creation was for man to become the life-giving spirit. In the beginning,
human beings had to pursue the real life, the 'fruit of life' through this life-giving spirit.
The purpose of creation was not the 'knowledge of good and evil' for one's own life's
sake. God created man and woman as living beings who, without a partner, had no real
life; God considered that being alone was not good ( Genesis 2: 18 ). Unfortunately the
first man and woman chose the knowledge of good and evil and love of self rather than
love for others.
In Genesis 1:27-28, God created man in his image. One of the meanings of the image of
God is the sonship of Adam, when we refer to Genesis 5: 1-3 ( Adam fathered a 'son' in
his own 'likeness' and 'image' ) and Luke's Gospel 3: 38 ( Adam is 'the son of God' ) (
Mathews 1995: 168 ). This sonship imitated the Son of God who gave himself according
to God's will, when he created the world. This means that the human being was.God's
image which was revealed already when God created these creatures. The sacrifice for the
other was part of God's image. 'Man will not live until he loves, giving himself away to
another on his own level' ( Matthews: 213; Kidner 1967: 65 )
In obedience to God's image, they had to fill the earth with God's image. Verse 28 of
Genesis states, 'God blessed them and said to them: "be fruitful and increase in number;
fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over
every living creature that moves on the ground"'. This command of God to people is that
they should take God's image and make this world the society of God's image through the
human life-giving spirit.
114
The authority of man and woman to rule over the other creatures is conferred on them by
God when they fulfil the image of God. As they become the life-giving spirit and express
God's attributes, their domination over the other creatures would be rightly completed. If
they fail to take rightly the image of God, even in the family, a distortion in this ruling
relationship would begin. Although the first man become the bodily nature, the second
man, Jesus Christ, become the life-giving spirit.
5.2.2.3. Redemption and the sacrificing God
A. Incarnation of God
If we recap, all things were made through the Word. All things have their existential
ground in the Word's creative power: 'Through him all things were made; without him
nothing was made that has been made' ( John 1: 3 ). We must link this to John 1:14 (
Morris 1995: 67). When we link this verse to verse 14, the creation was God's self-giving
action. Morris ( : 70 ) said that 'the self-communication of God occurs first of all in
creation, and that is why creation and salvation are very closely connected in the New
Testament. Both of them have to do with God's self communication' This self-
communication of God is accomplished perfectly in the Incarnation.
Therefore, Barrett ( 1978: 61 ) said that 'the term Logos is seen to describe God in the
process of self-communication--not the communication of knowledge only, but in a self-
communication which inevitably includes the imparting of true knowledge.' In other
words, the knowledge that the Word brings is not merely information. It is life ( Morris:
67 ). So all things have their life in the life of the Word. Without the life of the Word there
is no life for anything. What is the meaning of: 'In him was life'? A person's life comes
from the self-giving of the Word.
Indeed, without his spoken word and gift of himself nothing was made. This gift of himself
was the light of men. In other words, the self-giving of the Word is the light of men.
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Without receiving the Word, no one can become a child of God. Without identification
with the self-giving Word nobody can become a child of God. Children of God are not
born of natural descent, of human decision or a physical father's will. But they are born of
God, and God's will. But the will of God is in the Word-giving love of God.
How can men receive the Word of God? This recervmg does not mean a physical
receiving. That would be a satanic sacrifice. To receive the Word is to become the Holy
Spirit centered person.
Therefore, Philiphians 2: 1-5 states: 'Your life in Christ makes you strong, and his love
comforts you. You have fellowship with the Spirit, and you have kindness and compassion
for one another. I urge you, then, to make me completely happy by having the same
thoughts, sharing the same love, and being one in soul and mind. Don't do anything from
selfish ambition or from a cheap desire to boast, but be humble towards one another,
always considering others better than yourselves. And look out for one another's interests,
not just for your own. The attitude you should have is the one that Christ Jesus had.'
In Jesus, God's action was not just sending any more, but becoming, identifying with
human beings. God became a human being. The Word became flesh. So Jesus' personality
and the life-giving love of humanity are never separated.
The incarnated Word produced the total identification of the self-giving of God with the
self-giving of men. The Incarnation is the perfect accomplishment of God's will in the
body; it is the embodiment of God's will. The Incarnation brought the reality of salvation,
that was in the trinity, to the world of human beings.
In brief, the Incarnation of God was the climax of God's self-giving divinity. The real
leadership and priority of God are found not in his almightiness as classical theology
confessed, but in his whole action of incarnation and suffering and crucifixion. This divine
paradigmatic incarnation in the flesh of man is the core of God's redemptive history ..
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B. Suffering and crucifixion of the Son of God
God's own life is 'shorthand for the significance of the death of Jesus Christ for the being
of God' (Inbody 1997: 168). The divine life has absorbed the death of Jesus into itself
(: 169).
The real suffering and death of Jesus must be to bring about the divine paradigm that is
revealed in the Trinity and through that which God created. This divinity of God is not a
metaphysical concept of the character of God.
In order to embody the paradigm that God created man, Jesus must perfectly express two
natures. This is Jesus' uniqueness. The true God can show true divinity, but true man can
receive the divinity.
The death of Jesus epitomizes the essential suffering of God for his creatures. In
Trinitarian terms, not only can the individual Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not exist
without communion with one another, but also in relationship with the world God
revealed himself through the death of Jesus.
All relationships, in Trinitarian terms, are validated by Jesus' suffering and death. In Jesus'
suffering and death God revealed the secret of his divinity. The concept of deity in a pagan
religion could not include this trinitarian secret. Therefore we must differentiate between
the concept of deity of the Pagan God and the concept of divinity of the God of
Christianity. The deity of God becomes the divinity of God through God's life-giving
action in Jesus.
Jesus' action was a total paradigm shift from the old to the new, from the this worldly-life
centrism to a life-giving spirit. He became not a self-centric being but a 'life-giving'
'Spirit'. With Jesus, even dying became a blessing for man. The dying became a blessing
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enabling the believers to be witnesses of Christ. The dying became God's blessing that
makes the believers' Christ-like function possible.
Jesus is the bearer of God's self-giving paradigm. Jesus is the bringer of the self-giving
paradigm. Jesus is the giver of the Trinitarian life-style.. This unique paradigm of humanity
and divinity was initiated by Jesus Christ. His crucifixion is the core of the life-giving
paradigm, the means by which his personality and this paradigm are united. The life-giving
paradigm expresses the uniqueness of Christianity. Christianity' uniqueness is that
salvation and Christian life have the same meaning. In this life-giving spirit, faith and a
Jesus-like life have the same meaning.
In Jesus' suffering and crucifixion God showed his divinity to his people in order that they
might know how they should live in this world. Thus the death of God is not just for the
liberation or emancipation of humanity, but for the divinity itself that was revealed in the
Trinity and creation. In other words, the divinity that God brought to this world is
suffering for the other and dying for the other. God's redemptive action incarnated this
paradigm into this world.
According to Hauerwas (1986: 48 ), Jesus' death is not just an accidental death but the
necessary outcome of his life and of his mission. Certainly, the death of Jesus is of decisive
significance, not because it alone wrought salvation for us, but because it was the end, and
fulfilment of his life (: 48).
The life-giving love was the means to real human life through creation and redemption. In
this sense, creation and redemption do not have different principles. In the life-giving
Spirit, the principles of creation and redemption will be unified with each other; in other
words, no different principle exists.
The suffering of God and the sacrifice of God in the triune being constitute the essential
divine character, the character of creation, the character of redemption and even of the
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resurrection. This self-giving paradigm of God runs through creation and redemption and
the resurrection as the reality of salvation. The first Adam was the living being, the self,
but the last Adam was the life-giving spirit, the subject, who gave his life for the other.
This led directly to the resurrection.
This life-giving spirit was the power that was able to bring about the resurrection. Actually
the resurrected Jesus or exalted Jesus was distinguished from the glory of God in some
early Christian traditions ( Dunn 1996 : 99 ). Luke shows us this fact in Acts 7 :55.
According to these traditions 'we are not yet developed into the christological reflection' (
: 99) of the later traditions. 'As in the echo ofIsaiah 52: 13 in Acts 3: 13, the thought is
still the basic one of the suffering Jesus having been vindicated by God' ( : 99).
Furthermore, life-giving love will continue to be the believer's eternal life style. In John
19:13 Jesus is called the "Word of God" (John 19: 13 ); and the skene of God is said to
be with men ( Revelation 21: 3 ), according to John 1:14 (Barrett 1978: 62). In both
books, Christ is the Lamb of God. In both, Christ has come to glory through suffering; he
summons the thirsty (Rev. 22: 17; John 7:37), and bids men keep his words or commands
(Rev. 3: 8,10; 12:17; 14:12;22:7,9; John 8: 51f; 14:15,21,23f; 15:10,20).
In his letter John writes, 'Dear friends, I am not writing you a new command but an old
one, which you have had since the beginning. The old command is the message you have
had' (1 John 2: 7). Actually this command has continued from the foundation of the world.
We can understand the paradigmatic life-style of the new heaven and earth not in terms of
the perfection of the immortal soul nor of the individual self-sufficiency but in terms of the
life-giving spirit.
Therefore, Christ's action IS not a creative act of liberation for humanity. It is a
representative act of the original paradigm of creation that God has given. Christ's action
was rather a total revelation of the original paradigm of creation. Christ's action revealed,
or more correctly, embodied, the divinity that God intended for his creation being
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incarnated into it so that the divinity comes true through dying for The Other and the
other, or through giving up the this-worldly life paradigm.
The real enemy of humanity is not natural deat~ itself but the desperate fear of death, the
fear of losing the self, the power of death ( Hebrews 2: 14-15). This fear of death is
another expression of the self-life centrism of humanity.
Thus, God revealed to his people that they must suffer and die for the other in order to
unify the pathos of God with the symphatheia of man. Jesus' death revealed the original
essence of death in creation, the original meaning of the human being's life. Dietrich
Bonhoeffer ( 1971: 360f) expresses it thus:
God lets himself be pushed out of the world on the cross. He is weak and
powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he
is with us and helps us. Matt. 8.17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not
because of his omnipotence, but because of his weakness and suffering .....
Only the suffering of God can help .... That is a reversal of what the religious
man expects from God. Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the
hands of a godless world.
To Bonhoeffer, suffering is clearly an essential part of the believer. This Christ-centric life
of human beings has been ignored in some Christian traditions. The reason for this is that
from ancient times men have had a prejudiced world-view steeped in self-life centrism.
When the self-life centrism became the essence of humanity, the desperate spiritual death
united with the death of the body. The physical dying becomes the death that is identified
with spiritual death. In this way, Jesus became a superstitious idol for the benefit of
humanity.
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Frequently we embrace the fallacious hypothesis that our salvation gives human beings
freedom from suffering and death. This mistake came from the this-worldly life centrism,
the desperate fear of death. In this spiritual fear of death, men could not recognize dying,
the weakness of humanity, and fragility as an essential part of themselves. Yet even though
the this-worldly life paradigm created a completely false understanding of God's love and
of Jesus' action, God ceaselessly shows us the real life that humans should live.
Indeed, Jesus' action destroyed the this-worldly life paradigm, the demonic power. He
brought the new way, strictly speaking, the original way of life. In this new way there are
no principles of law, no mortal fear of God's judgement. Jesus brought the 'love'
described in 1 John 4:18, 'There is no fear in love, but perfect love drives out fear'. 'In the
death of Christ on the cross one sees at once the destructive freedom of the human race in
the face of the divine, and a representation of exactly the message of the divine for the
human, namely, that human selflessness, self-abnegation, and the embrace of failure and
death are the way in which the world can be saved from and for itself ( Lakeland 1997:
109 ).
God's sufferings destroyed all hierarchical dualism between heaven and earth, life and
death. God's suffering made people humble. The salvation of humanity and of the whole
of creation is by the mercy and compassion of God. In Jesus the power of hell and the
demon was destroyed. God never wanted to exclude anyone from salvation and his grace.
We should overcome the power of hell by dwelling in God's suffering and mercy. Who has
created dualism, exclusion, separation, and division? Only human beings, themselves.
God is not just a metaphysical object since human beings can know him through
language. God is actor as well as knower. This action of God in the Trinity is seen in his
creation and his redemption as the Son of God. He did not only act as God who is unique
and distinct from human beings. He also revealed his character and attitudes to human
beings so that they would be able to know the image of God. God created the world as a
revelation of 'free self-withdrawal and self-giving for the benefit of other creatures' as
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'the condition of the psyche and the community'. (Welker 1994 : 248 ). Therefore, Jesus
is not only the unique Messiah, Christ, but also the expression of the soteriological aim.
3.6. Summary
We investigated the foundation of Christian ethics. The kingdom of God that Jesus
proclaimed closely relates to the repentance and new life of the believers. Those who were
called to the kingdom of God must be disciples. Jesus has called them to follow him,
because Jesus himself identified with the kingdom of God. Therefore, to live in the
kingdom of God is to become the image of Christ, the Christ-like person. All Christian
ethical dimensions are connected to Christ. Christ is the origin of Christian ethics. He is
the model of Christian ethics. He is the aim of Christian ethics.
As we contemplated in this chapter, the Holy Spirit accomplishes the Christ-like life in the
human self. The Holy Spirit uses our wisdom and reason but he himself renders our human
self into the Christ-like person.
We found that the Christ-like ethics that the Holy Spirit brings is the life-giving love or
life-giving dying and living with Christ. We based this on the doctrines of the Trinity,
creation and redemption.
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Chapter 4. Christian ethics in the modern and postmodern world
Thus far, we have seen that the modern and postmodern thoughts and ethics were founded
on self-life centrism. We also found that the life-giving love was an important point in the
doctrines of the Trinity, creation and redemption. Now we are going to apply this life-
giving love in the modern and postmodern context.
4.1. Rediscovering the pneumatological context in the modern and postmodern
world
In order to apply the life-giving love in the modern and postmodern world, it is necessary
to disclose the real context that Christians should live in, because when Christians know
the context that they should live in, they can apply ethics to the concrete context with
moral conviction, without, however, returning to moral totalization.
Modernism always uses the reason as a universal tool to make rules of morality. In
modernism the self was the subject of ethics. Postmodernism took away this universality of
morality and set the self and the other free from it. It brought an ethic of uncertainty.
Bauman ( 1994: 17) described the postmodern uncertainty in his book, Postmodern ethics.
In postmodern life all codes of conduct and guidelines are removed from our real selves (
:19). Here we are indeed 'ourselves', and thus we alone are responsible for our deeds. The
postmodern moral self takes away a unique form of authority. Therefore, the postmodern
self feels helpless. Postmodern times not only offer to us perfect freedom of moral choices
but also cast us into a state of moral uncertainty ( :21). Postmodern ethics still remain
foxed in this-worldly human self-centrism. In this self-centrism there exists moral
uncertainty. But in the previous chapter we disclosed that the Holy Spirit is the real
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subject of the human self. In the Holy Spirit there is no moral uncertainty but moral
conviction and confidence. We should have moral conviction in the Holy Spirit.
On the context that Christians should live in, Welker ( see 1994: 134-141) takes a different
perspective from modern and postmodern methodologies.
According to him, 'Heaven' cannot be recognized by modern and postmodern
methodologies without the Holy Spirit. Heaven does not belong to this world. But modern
and postmodern methodologies come from human reason or the human self which do
belong to this world. Therefore modern and postmodern methodologies cannot understand
the concept of heaven. And the salvation and ethics that the Holy Spirit brings cannot be
understood by modern and postmodern methodologies, because these modern and
postmodern methodologies were constituted on human self-centrism. Such methodologies
were established on the reason which was based in turn on the human self.
Yet, with the increase of the secular spirit in our times, we endanger ourselves by vacating
the realm of the Holy Spirit ( McIntyrel997: 72-73). The reason why in modern and
postmodern times we have vacated the realm of the Holy Spirit is to be found in the
illusion of modern and postmodern world views. The illusion of modern and postmodern
Christianity is that the salvation of Jesus can be found in critical, sociological, political,
ideological, and literary methodologies which belong to this-worldly self-centrism.
To understand our salvation and moral conviction we must withdraw from the modern and
postmodern methodologies which were based on human reason. This does not mean that
we must reject all rational thinking. What we must think is that the nature or the content of
our salvation cannot be identified with human rights and human freedoms which human
methodologies have developed.
To sum up, we can speak of the pneumatological context that the Christian should live in.
As mentioned above, early Christians were totally dominated by the domain of heaven.
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Early Christians were dominated by the Holy Spirit. They lived in a pneumatological
context that was very different from the modem social and political context, and the
postmodem deconstructed plural context (: 71 ). In other words, early Christians lived in a
pneumatological context that was very different from the social context which resulted
from self-centrism.
We should try, therefore, to rediscover the pneumatological context experienced before
the emergence of the modem and postmodem self paradigm which brought about the
false representation of the secular world in which we live and the danger of trivialising the
dimensions of life in the Spirit (: 73).
In this modem and postmodem self-paradigm the Holy Spirit is the context that the
believers should live in. When we live in the pneumatological context, we can have moral
conviction and apply the Christian ethic to the modem and postmodem world.
4.2. From the self-centrism of modernism to Christ-centrism
We found that modern ethics were established on self-centrism. Self-centrism connotes the
self-centrism of the self which dominated the thinking of modernism.
The self-centrism of the human self never lets the other become the self, because the self
always returns to the self. The self-centric self, therefore, generates the modern
totalization and rationalism. Self-centrism leads the Church and Christians to be
oppressors, conquerors and colonizers.
As we observed in chapter 2, self-sufficiency, self-reference and self-producing are the
language of self-centrism. In the self-centric spirit, 'the community and the world lose all
foreignness for the "I," which recognizes its own structures of life and knowledge' in
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'real, material processes of producing self and of becoming thematic to self( Welker
1994: 292 ).
The self-centrism of humanity can also be characterized as a matter of the quantitative and
visible realm rather than the qualitative and spiritual realm. This self-centrism cannot
understand the qualitative and spiritual realm of reality beyond quantitative and visible
methodology ( Johnson 1996: 140). It cannot recognize spiritual forces and realities
beyond the ken of strict historical, social or linguistic method ( : 140).
Therefore it follows that self-centrism brings about separation between knowing about the
truth of faith which belongs to the self and society, and the doing of the truth which is
realized only in 'something other than self-generation, self-attestation, perception of itself
(Welker: 295 ).
Therefore self-centrism has brought tension between Jesus' vicanous atonement and
human participation in salvation. In other words, in self-centrism we cannot establish the
individual's Christ-like ethics without sacrificing the uniqueness of Christ, because self-
centrism innately brings separation between the giver and the receiver of life which
represent both sides of humanity.
When the believers live with the other in Christ, we can overcome this self-centrism. In 1
Corinthians 3: 21-23 we read, 'So then, no more boasting about men! All things are yours.
Whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life and death or the present or the
future-vall are yours. And you are of Christ, and Christ is of God'. In Christianity there
should be no more dualism and distinction. All things are the believer's and believers are of
Christ, and Christ is of God.
In Ephesians 1:7-lOwe read, 'In him we have redemption through his blood, the
forgiveness of sins, in accordance with the riches of God's grace that he lavished on us
with all wisdom and understanding. And he made known to us the mystery of his will
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according to his good pleasure, which he purposed in Christ, to be put into effect when
times will have reached their fulfilment--to bring all things in heaven and on earth together
under one head, even Christ'. Jesus' life and his sacrifice destroyed all barriers, all
distinctions and brought all things under one head, Christ. Therefore, believers willingly
desire to be Christ-like in relation to the other. In connection with the other, the
soteriological commitment becomes real. God reveals himself not through human self-
knowledge, but in the suffering of/for the other. In this human suffering, the giving up of
the this-worldly paradigm is the necessary element in salvation.
This is the analogy of the life of Jesus. Jesus said this about his life: 'Just as the living
Father sent me and I live because of the Father, so the one who feeds on me will live
because of me' (John 6 : 57 ). Jesus lives because of the Father. Also we, believers, live
because of Jesus who has eternal life because of the Father. Furthermore, that the selfs
life will live because of the other is an analogy of the truth that the one who feeds on Jesus
will live because of Jesus. We, as self, do not merit the righteousness and the life, because
we can live onJy because of Jesus. Thus our life is our imitation of the Christ-life. Eating
the flesh of Jesus and drinking the blood of Jesus means two things. First, our life is
dependent on Jesus; second, we should live for Jesus as he lived for God (Morris 1995:
336 ). To eat the flesh of Jesus and to drink the blood of Jesus is to receive life from Jesus,
and at the same time to give our life for the other. This dependence on Jesus shows us that
our ontological life of the selfis inseparable from the life for the other.
In the beginning, man first needed the fruit of the life, the Divine Other. Therefore, in the
beginning the grace of God was absolutely needed for Adam's life. 'I' is not the subject as
the observer of the world, but the object as observed by God. 'I' cannot observe the world
from my perspective but 'I' can be observed from the other's perspective. 'The gaze of the
other, indeed, is that which confirms me in my personhood' (Lakeland 1997: 110). More
clearly, 'I' was created by the Wholly Other', God's self-giving in creation rather than that
'I' created myself. In other words, we are created by God. According to Lewis B. Smedes
( 1970 : 161 ) we can share in the life of Christ; however, this shared divine life is the life
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that we can live because of Jesus as the representative of the other. 'I am dependent on
the other, as the other is dependent on me'( Lakeland: 110).
To sum up, we must change the paradigm from the ethics of the self to the Christ-like
ethics. The believers must become Christ-like and move away from self-centrism.
4.2.1 From reason to Incarnation
In order to overcome hierarchical theocracy, modernism promoted rationalism. In
modernity, 'the abstract rationalism dominated, when reified, violates the axioms of
deterrninancy, concreteness, change, and relativity' ( Williams 1995: 82 ). According to
Zygmunt Bauman ( 1994: 8 ), 'modern ethical thought, in co-operation with modern
legislative practice, fought its way through to such a radical solution under the twin
banners of universality and foundation '. This modern rationalism generated the universal
norms. This road of rationalism comes from division of the body and the spirit.
In modern Christianity, by rationalism the body was divorced from the spirit. In this
modernism, God had to remain in the spiritual private area. In public, humans were
autonomous and absolute with a monolithic power of reason. In public life Christians
embraced capitalism and individualism which could not connect with Jesus' way, with
God's way.
4.2.1.1. Rationalism and Incarnation
John Rick( 1995: 100) criticised the old paradigm of incarnation based on premodern
theocracy and modern universal rationalism as follows:
Their causes lie in human greed, selfishness, acquisitiveness, cruelty and
prejudice. But the incarnation doctrine has been readily available to justify
those evils. In theory it would have been possible for christians to believe that
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Jesus was God incarnate and yet not to have felt justified in persecuting and
murdering Jesus; not to have used the lordship of Christ to justify colonial
annexations in India, Africa, North and South America, the Pacific Islands and
elsewhere; and not to have used christianity to reinforce and validate male
domination. If centuries of christian influence had sufficiently modified our
human greed, acquisitiveness and propensity to cruelty, the absoluteness of
Christ could not have operated to justify ruthless aggression and persecution.
But in fact human savagery has too often found christian dogma tailored for its
own self-justification. And this entire situation, consisting in the combination
of an absolute claim together with a moral powerlessness which belies that
claim, adds to the problematic character of the traditional dogma.
Although modernism took away the premodern hierarchical theocracy, it still remains
locked in self-centrism. Rationalism based on self-centrism becomes an instrument for the
oppressor. Even the dogma of incarnation was influenced by modern rationalism. At that
time the incarnated God was thought of as a perfect man as we saw in Schleiermacher.
But the Incarnation is not just a movement from a hierarchical God to perfect man; rather
it is the self-expression of the life-giving God.
The life-giving love will be accomplished not by modern rational life but by the
incarnational life of the human self. Only by life-giving love can we overcome global
oppression. The global community will be built beyond colonization through God's
Incarnation and sacrifice in Jesus, and man's sacrifice. Indeed, by the life-giving love
expressed in God's Incarnation we can overcome the premodern hierarchical theocracy
and modern colonization. As John Hick said, they come from the greed and selfishness of
the human self. The global community based on the life-giving love ushers in a totally
changed era in terms of overcoming the old dualism of the classical and the modern world
which was based on greed and selfishness of the human self.
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Furthermore, the aim of Incarnation is not only the salvation of the individual but also the
glorification of God through production of his image in the human self. This means that
the aim of God's Incarnation is the recovering of humanity for God's glorification due to
the very connection between human life and his glorification. So God's purpose in his
action is the translation of his essential love for the whole of humanity. The true humanity
that God intended is the humanity that will be accomplished in the practice of the life-
giving love. This life-giving love cannot be involved in the greed of the self. This life-
giving love is not involved in colonization. Rather it is involved in the service of the other.
But since this life giving love does not involve the self s own dignity as Kant pursued,
there is no impediment to serving the other.
Modernity ascribes high authority to scientific study and considers any deviation from
rational inquiry unthinkable. Such scientific and rational thinking always identified God's
image of humanity with the dignity of the self. This type of modem thinking influenced the
interpretation of the Bible. When biblical interpreters insist on rational, scientific
explanations of biblical events, or when they defy traditional interpretations in the name of
free scholarly inquiry, they show a debt to modernity ( Adam 1995: 3 ). Adam ( : 29 )
describes how modernity has used the above paradigms: 'The simplest way to construct
identity involves drawing an absolute and simple distinction (what structualists call a
"binary opposition"): male/female, animate/inanimate, white/black, truth/falsehood,
original/copy, center/margin, objectivity/subjectivity.' Modem rationalism, therefore, is
not able to understand the life-giving love that humanity can accomplish in the Holy Spirit.
Without the Incarnation of God, no person can escape from the dualistic world-view that
distinguishes between this world and the other world, and differentiates between man and
woman, and white and black.
Since modernism has such an evil character, people start to doubt the modern idea.
Therefore, according to Adam ( :3 ), 'Deconstructive thinkers note that these pairs always
tend to favor one of the members; the first members tend to be defined as normal or
normative, and the second members as not-the-first, or less-than-the-first.' This modern
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idea underlies the framework of ruling. The illusion of a self who would like to unify with
the other is really a projection of the self s overwhelming desire for his own life. This trend
of modernism can be called an anti-Incarnational life of humanity. This modern character
comes from fear of self-giving dying as in Peter's case. The 'Never Lord' myth totally
controlled the modern self. The Incarnation, on the other hand, was the historical field
where the material and spiritual, human and God, body and soul, master and slave, were
able to meet. How can we continue the incarnation in our body? Through life-giving dying
and living in the Holy Spirit we can overcome this dualism.
When we overcome the dualistic world, we can obtain salvation. The corning of the Holy
Spirit has accomplished salvation, because the Holy Spirit dwells in everybody and
overcomes dualism, "distinction" and "binary opposition". When we overcome self-
centrism, there is Incarnation. When we overcome life-centrism there is Incarnation.
This Incarnation of God totally changes the paradigm from reason to sacrificial love. It is
difficult for our human reason to understand why the self must serve the other. This
incarnation brings the love of God to fulfilment everywhere and anywhere the believer
practices. So this revelation of God in the concrete human self who willingly offers himself
as living sacrifice is not limited to a particular region, race, language, or culture. Without
the creaturely hypostasis of the Holy Spirit there is no visible revelation of God in
everyday life.
Faith cannot be experienced by word of mouth alone. Rather, faith is in the hypostasis of
the Holy Spirit in our human self in life-giving dying. In the embodiment of the Word in
body and in obedience our verbal confession of faith is actualized.
As Graham Ward ( 1996 : 162) has said, the necessary thing in ethics is the kenosis before
God through life-giving love.
4.2.1.2. Beyond capitalism
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Modern capitalism and the scientific world-view are connected to each other. With
modernity, a distinctive understanding of the nature of reality begins to emerge that is
rooted, in part, in the conjunction of scientific method and capitalism.
The successes of science and capitalism are possible on the basis of the interpretation of
reality as quantifiable. 'The twin engines that fuel an advanced industrial society, science
and capitalism, though for different reasons, share a belief that being is reducible to
quantity, that is, to thinghood' (Farley 1995: 25). Therefore, in modern society, then, 'the
dominant conceptions of market activity, capitalist production and bureaucratic
administration exclude the feelings, relationships and commitments which are
characteristic of familial, sexual and emotional life' (Poole 1991: 47). Actually modern
materialism controls all aspects of the human being.
In the modern industrial society, what is real for the scientist is what is quantifiable and
repeatable. By whatever strange coincidences that guide history, this methodological
abstraction parallels almost exactly the moral requirements of capitalist industrialization.
Reality is denuded of' aesthetic and ethical dimensions as these are banished to the private,
subjective, and "feminine" spheres. Cleansed of those features that would resist
commodification, reality ( persons, creatures, cultural artifacts, ecosystems) becomes both
materially and morally passive' ( Farley: 25 ).
Also, the artificially created plasticity of modern capitalistic industrialism allows all beings
to be transformed into whatever the industrial machine needs them to be. The flattening
out of reality into members creates ideal conditions for its domination. 'The complexity of
beings is rendered invisible so that they can be mastered by thought; the integrity and
intrinsic spiritual value of beings is dismissed as mere sentiment, freeing us from the ethical
resistance beings exert against their own domination' (: 25 ).
Even in Western religious circles, it is not sufficiently remarked on that 'the historical
enlightenment and the rise of bourgeois individualism and immorality, and anti-religious
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ethics, are profoundly linked to the rise of capitalism; and that it is in the nature of
capitalism to reduce everything without exception to a single monetary framework' (Lowe
1993: 6).
This modern paradigm has aroused a reaction. In order to be most effective, ethical
resistance must be mindful of its historical location at the end of modernity, in a post-
industrial, capitalist and moral wasteland. The deadly modern paradigm must be
overcome. This reaction to modernism was an effort to recover the moral and ethical
paradigm. Therefore Farley (:24) says, 'Reflection on this historical context ..... should
include also a more overtly ethical one that examines the ways in which the very categories
of ethical and religious existence are debased by our society.'
Christians must recover the ethics proclaimed by the Bible. Capitalism has created the idea
of noble and base cultures. Noble cultures supposedly had noble ethics. This noble ethic of
capitalism is very different from Jesus' message and action. Jesus does not require a high
ethical standard. If he had sought this, he could have maintained a friendship with the
noble class which kept the law and socio-economic power. But instead of moral
exclusivism, he expressed compassion, mercy, and sympathy towards everybody.
Furthermore, Jesus Christ never sought power for himself. In his compassionate mission,
God never responded to him by sending strong powers to support him. Instead of this,
Jesus had to feel isolation and loneliness. To be compassionate towards another is to lose
yourself, to be compassionate is to embrace nothingness. This nothingness is not nihilism
but a feeling of total dependence on God, without any desire for power of one's own. So
compassion and love and self-sacrifice are directly connected with the feeling of total
dependence on God.
The ideal nature of society is compassionate. Indeed there are no noble cultures and base
cultures in civilization itself, for every culture and society has its characteristic value and
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purpose. Civilization is not the real purpose of society. In civilized society there exists a
differentiation between material and spiritual.
Christianity moves ceaselessly towards a compassionate society. We should shift the
paradigm from civilization and economic improvement to a compassionate and
sympathetic society. Jesus Christ is not the saviour who is concerned with this human
position of civilization; he is ceaselessly compassionate. Accordingly, salvation is the
ceaseless forming of a compassionate community.
When seeking to overcome the modem paradigm, we should not restore the modem idea
of ethics based on capitalism. We need Christ-centric ethics. Even in capitalism we should
accomplish the life-giving love of humanity. Sometimes civilization in capitalism destroys
the pneumatological context that the Christian should live in. Sometimes its unlimited
growth and expansion and conquest alienates life-giving love from society and even from
the Church ( Rasmusson 1995: 123-4 ). As we found, this trend of modem capitalism
comes from self s life-centrism.
The human selfs desire for his own well-being creates the real death, and distances
humans from God who is the divine source of love and compassion. On the contrary, in
our original state, life-giving love ensures a good relationship with God. Thus the life-
giving love as well as infinite compassion might be able to save modem society from the
false ethics of civilization and false illusions of divinity.
Through limitless compassion, human beings are capable of unification with God who is
incomprehensible love and compassion. From this love and compassion, human beings
may acknowledge God as their real friend and meet Him. Jesus Christ has walked the way
of human nature and then proceeded to meet God through the doorway of life-giving love.
Yet, in fact, while he lived in endless compassion, he was meeting with God already.
Indeed, his action of healing the diseased, the blind, and the lame, was the action of
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healing a society accustomed to death, a society that marginalized some people with
diseases and physical and spiritual flaws.
In this world, materialism has always been correlated with the ungodly and the non-Holy
Spirit. Materialism has never been neutral but has always been strongly connected to the
self-life centric spirit.
In the thinking of modern times, the Spirit could not bring holiness to human society;
human society was ruled by process and utopian ideals. Human beings, having reason,
were the owners of nature. In modern times the human materialistic spirit replaced the
Holy Spirit.
Griffin ( 1988 : 4 ) defines modern spirituality as follows:
Modern spirituality is also distinguished from previous modes of human
existence through its relation to divinity or holiness. The divine reality for the
Middle Ages was both transcendent and immanent. Protestantism moved away
from divine immanence and toward pure transcendence--for example, by
reducing the number of sacraments, by rejecting icons, saints, and post-Biblical
miracles, and by rejecting infused grace in favor of imputed justification. Early
modern theological scientists (including Catholics such as Mersenne and
Descartes as well as Protestants such as Boyle and Newton) carried this
tendency to an extreme, so that God was wholly outside the world. The
mechanistic picture of nature, basic to the mind-and-nature dualism mentioned
above, was a denial of divine immanence in nature. But any natural immanence
of God in the human mind was also denied, mainly through the 'sensationist'
doctrine of experience, according to which nothing can be present in the mind
except what enters through the physical senses.
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Modern spirituality was identified with materiality without the immanence of God rather
than with the Holy Spirit who dwelt in the human person. Actually in modern times the
Spirit could not be the subject of the creation and redemption. The modern God was the
giver of prosperity to humans, so that in modern times, the spiritual dimension of salvation
was ignored by materialistic minds.
For Griffin, modern spirituality 'can also be discussed in terms of a new attitude toward
self-interest in relation to morality One of the unique features of modern spirituality
is that it has come to regard self-interest as an acceptable basis for at least one dimension
of life, that is, the economic dimension' (: 6 ). Therefore, '[modern] society that is
dominated by individual, national, economic, and cultural forms of egoism' could not
develop spirituality (Welker 1994: 2 ).
Total dualism existed because reason could not accept the Spirit who could make people
in God's image. 'The modern world has lost God and is seeking him.' This is the
judgement passed by the mathematician, natural scientist, and philosopher, Alfred North
Whitehead (: 4). They have lost the Holy Spirit, however, they still continue the useless
efforts to find God as 'an enterprise' ( :5 ). This is their judgement. 'Today in many
cultures common sense simply has difficulty reciprocating the friendship of the Holy Spirit
( : 6). And their' suspicion of so-called common sense that the Holy Spirit is a phantom is
strengthened by theologies and religious attitudes that emphasize the abstract
transcendence and otherworldliness, the naked supernaturalness, or the mysterious and
numinous character of the Holy Spirit' ( : 6 ). This was the .spirituality of modern normal
society. Modernism, at the last, pursued the anti-spiritual life that does not relate to the
Holy Spirit.
But Jesus had a very different lifestyle from 'normal' society, because he had a very
different idea of life from the normal religious economic and political point of view. Jesus
lived in the Holy Spirit. In other words, Jesus' lifestyle reflected the Spirit-centered
paradigm which contrasted with his society.
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In the Holy Spirit Jesus overcame temptation as the Servant Son and proclaims the Gospel
in the isolated region of Galilee. In this way Jesus accomplished his work only in the Holy
Spirit.
Therefore, the Christian life should be directed not towards materialism but towards
spirituality in the pneumatological context. This spirituality becomes embodied and
socialized in the neighbour who reflects the total image of God. If we do not live the
Spirit-centered life, normal society, that is, the family, the economic system and the
political system shrink into the ego and materialism.
We human beings are immeasurable beings connected with the incomprehensible God who
reflects himself in an uncountable dimension that is incapable of the objectifying
knowledge that modernism has attained. So if we draw human nature in one dimension of
egocentric materialism or capitalism, it is a totally distorted image of human nature, and
out of keeping with the image of God.
This egocentrism of modernism is the extreme evil and it distorts the nature of everything.
Salvation is freedom from this egocentrism. It is clear that in all historical situations the
structures and power hegemonies have expressed the multiple faces of egocentrism. When
we see that which is strange as non-human because of our egocentrism, the concept of
non-humanity as externally strange dominates all human interrelationships. When we see
other people as the outsiders, egocentrism appears in inter-human relationships. This
means that, if we see the other as alien, we will stumble over egocentrism and sin.
Today's economic and political system is correlated with this egocentrism. Jesus Christ
definitely counters this political and economic system, not in terms of sociological and
political revolution, but in terms of the life-giving love. Jesus brought the Holy Spirit to
dominate society.
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Thus Jesus reflects a completely negative response to the worldly power that made
humans serve this world. In Jesus' action we see that Jesus would like to oppose this
worldly system and yet, at the same time, he would not like to abandon this world.
The Christians are already freed from this economic and political system and materialism.
This does not mean that they have denied this world. This means, rather, that they live in
this world according to the Holy Spirit. This is perfect freedom from materialism.
Sometimes the people of God should resist the power of politics that is strongly connected
with human wellbeing, and egocentricity. Yet sometimes, politics does bring about justice
for other human beings because human beings belong to the power of this world. Our life-
giving love has a political dimension because it must resist any evil power that works in
people.
As we mentioned in 4.2.1 'From reason to incarnation', Western worshippers have
reached a spiritless vacuum. Humankind is caught in a profound spiritual crisis which
makes it very difficult to satisfy human spiritual needs for growth. The awareness of
transcendence as an energizing force has largely disappeared from the consciousness of
millions of thing-worshipping people in western cultures. This has left human beings in a
flat, boring, two-dimensional world of materialism with little transcendence or awareness
of meaning ( Clinebell 1988: 28 ). This transcendence comes true through life-giving
pneuma rather than through prosperity.
4.2.1.3. Beyond individualism
Modernity established its system on the concept of the self According to Georg Simmel (
1971 : 223 ), 'all relations with others are thus ultimately mere stations along the road by
which the ego arrives at its self.' This is true whether the ego feels itself to be basically
identical to these others because it still needs this supporting conviction as it stands alone
upon itself and its own powers, or whether it is strong enough to bear the loneliness of its
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own quality, the multitude being there only so that each individual can use the others as a
measure of his incomparability and the individuality of his world ( :223).
The egoism (not ego itself) of 'I', individualism, reproduces the dichotomy or dualism of
'you' and 'me' to be personalized globally and even to a cosmic extent. Also, 'the decay
of Christian society in the West--in continuation of the process of individualization that
began with the Reformation--has allowed the individual to become an ultimately
indissoluble mystery to others' ( Gadamer 1976: 98).
In contrast to modern individualism, Jesus never separated the individual from the social.
The life-giving spirit of humanity definitely put the individual self in emperichoresis with
the other. Therefore when Jesus healed the individual body, he was healing the social and
political body also by making society accept the isolated. Through his healing action, he
produced a holy community that harmonized the individual body and the social body, and
included nature. In other words, the crucified Jesus never accomplished redemption for
Christians in the sense of any spiritualization or individualization of salvation ( Moltmann
1974: 101).
Jesus destroyed the this-worldly power which had brought death into this world through
the human desire to be individualistic, and then he replaced divided society with holy
community that harmonized all races, genders, classes. Thus reconciliation and
compassion towards the other is the salvific ethics of Jesus. Hauerwas ( 1986 : 50 )
describes our salvific ethics in Jesus Christ thus;
The power that comes from trusting in truth is but a correlative of our learning
through Jesus to accept our life as a gift. In Jesus we have met the one who
has the authority and power to forgive our fevered search to gain security
through deception, coercion, and violence. To learn to follow Jesus means we
must learn to accept such forgiveness, and it is no easy thing to accept, as
acceptance requires recognition of our sin as well as vulnerability. But by
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learning to be forgiven we are enabled to view other lives not as threats but as
gifts. Thus in contrast to all societies built on shared resentments and fears,
Christian community is formed by a story that enables its members to trust the
otherness of the other as the very sign of the forgiving character of God's
kingdom.
Hauerwas ( : 49 ) also said that to be a disciple is to be part of a new community, a new
polity, which is formed on Jesus' obedience to the cross. The gospels are not just the
depiction of a man, they are manuals for the training necessary to be part of the new
community.
In this new community the believers take the new paradigm of self-giving for the other.
Therefore, Jesus commands us to give up everthing that we have. Jesus said' Any of you
who does not give up everything he has cannot be my disciple' ( Luke 14:33 ). By giving
up everything he becomes closely connected to the spiritually changed mind of life-giving
love. They can make use of the material sometimes for the other and at other times they
can give up everything they have for God's sake. This really means becoming the
righteous people of God by faith and not by law. Because faith means that Christians trust
in God rather than in anything they have. The law belongs to the self-centric, for the rich
young man did not give up everything he had, even though he had kept the law from his
youth.
The law cannot give a human being the total self-denial that Jesus demonstrated. In other
words, the law produces only religious hierarchy like that operative in Jesus' time. In such
a society there is no grace, and no compassion and no mercy, no obedience, but only
judgement. The Spirit alone can give us the power to live in a pneumatological context
and with life-giving love.
No human being can be a spiritual being without the other. In the salvific action and Jesus-
like love for the other, man becomes the Christ-like personality by the Holy Spirit.
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Jesus is the mediator for the person who gives up his/her everything. Jesus brings the
power of the Holy Spirit to him/her who gives up everything for a neighbour. So when we
give up everything we have, we can feel the power of the Holy Spirit.
The people of God are therefore correlated with one another. Thus the openness to the
other signifies the life of the individual human being. We can say that the openness to the
other is life. This means that my possibility of life and my existence depend on the other.
We need our neighbour in whom the Holy Spirit dwells. In the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit and the giving of life for the other is the only way of overcoming the modem myth,
individualism.
We can see God visually in our neighbour. We can approach the core of God's personality
in our neighbors. We can experience the eternal love of God in life-giving love for the
other. We can embrace the origin of humanity. My neighbour becomes part of me in the
Holy Spirit. At such a time we can feel that we are the centre of the cosmos; and
simultaneously, we are a necessary part of our neighbour.
This is the reality of the holy God-man community. In this community, my life relationship
with God is deeply connected with my relationship with the other person and with my
giving up of everything I have. In this way, my life relationship with God is connected with
Jesus' mediation, his guiding of me to God and his giving of the Holy Spirit. This is the
meaning of Christian freedom.
Christian freedom is a spiritual thing. God gave us his gifts to nourish us to live, not to
luxuriate. Calvin ( Book ii.xix.9) also warns against abuse of Christian freedom to have a
disregard for work. We should regard our neighbor's weakness. At this point our freedom
has its limitations. We must use freedom for the love and edification of our neighbors. We
have freedom but we must limit ourselves. Paul (I Cor. 10:23-24) says, 'All things are
lawful to me, but not all things are helpful. All things are lawful, but not all things build up.
Let no one seek his own good but another's.' We must use freedom according to love.
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Likewise, my life depends on the other, my salvation and my life depend on Jesus as
mediator. The believers are the receivers of life, peace and forgiveness and givers of life,
peace and forgiveness so that they live for the other and they die to the self.
4.2.2. Summary
No premodern or modern concept=neither the metaphysical tradition of the concepts of
God, nor Plato's brilliant defence of a World of Being beyond our own world of changing
and becoming, nor Descartes's systematic doubts about our knowledge of the external
world, nor the scepticism of Hume, nor Kant's transcendental ego as the timeless and
universal self--could give us a definition of the Christ-like life expressed as a soteriological
aim.
In modern times, philosophers tried to avoid the metaphysical, hierarchical theocracy, but
they still belonged to these metaphysical traditions. Theology went along with this
limitation of modern thought. Modernist theology emphasized the rational faith. In terms
of this faith, theology understood Jesus to be the perfect modern ideological man as seen
in Schleiermacher. ( Moltmann 1974 : 97).
Modern theology could not tolerate taking into account Jesus' abandonment by God to his
death on the cross ( : 97 ) and could not accept that this abandonment is a believer's
essential way to life, because modern theology ca~ot accept Jesus' weakness, owing to
its rationalism and speculative idealism.
Moltmann questioned this modern Jesus and rightly brought the death of Jesus on the
cross to the centre of theology. From the point of view of Jesus' death on the cross,
Moltman himself answered Jesus' question 'Who do you say that I am?' In short, the
answer implied a transition 'from life to death' ( : 105 ). Jesus recognized his personal
identity in his death for the other.
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We should follow Jesus. Jesus brought life-giving love. The life-giving love will cause a
change into a new world that has never been experienced in the self-life centrism which
dominated modern rationalism. This was the work of Jesus and is now the work of the
Holy Spirit.
To sum up, the self-life centrism generated modern rationalism, capitalism and
individualism. Even though modernity brought civilization, wealth and health, these gifts
of modernity are not the essence of life for humanity. In the modern era what we should
emphasize is the life-giving love.
4.3. From 'the other' of postmodernism to Christ
Levinas used the otherness of the other as the core concept of postmodern ethics.
Therefore, we can reach the goal of this research to expose the lack of Christian ethics in
postmodernism by critical evaluation of his opinion.
( i ) The otherness of the other and the Incarnation
Even though Levinas discovered the concept of the otherness of the other, his
understanding raises some problems.
Levinas's philosophy starts from the heterogeneity between the individual self and the
other. Levinas basically holds that the face-to-face dissymmetrical relationship, the
heterogeneity, is prior to any homogeneous unity. For Levinas, the other is just a stranger.
The other is an untouchable stranger, a stranger parallel with me. Therefore, Levinas's
God in Incarnation encounters the other as a stranger who keeps his distance and does not
identify with the other. In this case, God cannot be indentified with man, not even by his
death. If we follow Levinas, God's death is just inefficaciously his self-sacrifice for the
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other. In the heterogeneity between the self and the other the self s suffering and sacrifice
becomes a meaningless action for the other. Even Jesus' action becomes a meaningless
action for the world (Ford 1996: 37-38).
Therefore, Levinas ( Levinas 1981: 126) said that 'No one can substitute himself for me
who substitutes myself for all.' Levinas's words rule out Jesus's vicarious death (Ford: 33
). But in biblical opinion God identified with his creature, men and women, by his
Incarnation and death in Jesus. God's Incarnation and death, therefore, are the basis of the
salvation for human beings, for creation.
Of course Levinas refers to the dying for the other. But Levinas understands Heidegger's
concepts, being-to-death, without reducing it to a transcendental norm ( 1998: 209 ).
According to Levinas, Heidegger approached 'being to death' as a human duty, as a
transcendental norm. Levinas refuses Heidegger's term and uses a concept of 'dying
for.. .. ', or 'dying for another' ( :214). Without encountering the faces of the other,
without the death of the other signifying to the survivor more than funerary behaviour and
emotions, and memories, the concept of 'being-to-death' is nothing but a transcendental
norm. He also, therefore, uses 'dying together.' When he uses 'dying for,' 'dying
together', Levinas is not concerned with 'dying for' for any other life or after-life. He is
concerned with the human life in this world.
For Levinas, 'dying', whether it is the death of the other or my dying for the other, must
give meaning to the self in this world as survivor. 'The priority of the other over the I, by
which the human being-there is chosen and unique, is precisely the latter's response to the
nakedness of the face and its mortality.' ( :217). Even though he says 'Dying for another'
he is concerned with the self s response in claiming that I substitute myself for the other.
Therefore, Levinas's dying cannot come to God's Incarnation that substitutes the other for
the self. Only God's Incarnation that substitutes the other for the self can bring the eternal
life that the human self cannot attain to by himself. God was incarnated and identified with
humans in order to give eternal life.
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( ii ) The responsibility for the other and the dying of Jesus for the other
Levinas' concept of responsibility definitely contains an ethical attitude. According to
Levinas ( 1981 : 148 ), the ethical is the field outlined by 'the paradox of the Infinite in
relationship with the finite'. Ethics is 'the breakup of the original unity of transcendental
apperception'. For him, ethics violates the unity and divine salvation breaks all the unity as
an eschatological event.
Ward (: 161-62 ) explains Levinas's salvation in terms of eschatology, 'Hence, in time
made continually possible only beyond time, there is an eschatology rather than a
teleology. Eschatology because of the responsibility for an exteriority is more exterior than
the neighbour or the world of nourishments'. For Levinas 'the unappeasable responsibility
for the other' as an eschatological action of the self ( :163) is the essence of salvation.
Levinas identified salvation with the relationship of responsibility for the other.
Levinas ( : 148 ) continues, 'Witnessed, and not thematized, in the sign given to the
other, the Infinite signifies out of responsibility for the other, out of the-one-for-the-other,
a subject supporting everything, subject to everything, that is, suffering for everyone, but
charged with everything, without having had to decide for this taking charge, which is
gloriously amplified in the measure that it is imposed. Obedience precedes any hearing of
the command'. Thus in Levinas there is just a relationship of responsibility between the
self and the other. His world is a formless and aimless relationship of the self with the
other.
This is the postmodern paradigm ( Blanchot; Maurice; Lesstrup; M.M.Bakhtin; Cyorgy
Lukas had a similiar world view). This is also a general weakness in postmodern
deconstruction. Postmodern deconstruction claims that there are only two realities, the
modern self and the postmodern 'the other'. In postmodemism the main theme is the
endless encounter between the self and the other.
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We agree that we should have responsibility for the other. Of course, salvation
comprehends that the relationship between the self and the other has two kinds of
destinations: the individual in individualism and community in communitarianism. In
individualism, the freedom of the other as individual is the most important subject. In
communitarianism, the individual must be responsible to the other. Furthermore, we agree
that freedom and responsibility are important ethics. Levinas included the communitarian
perspective in the relationship between the self and the. other. Concerning the community
and the relationship between the self and the other in this salvation, Tina Chanter ( 1995:
184 ), a feminist, holds, like Levinas, that the only access of the self to God, the salvation,
the holistic, is through the face-to-face encounter with the other.
But neither fully express the meaning of salvation and its resultant ethics because they
originate entirely from relationship between the self and the other. In Levinas such
responsibility does not relate to God's goal beyond the relationship and responsibility for
the other.
In order to prove our argument, we need to study the reason why responsibility for the
other is emphasized in postmodern ethics.
It is clear that the uncritical celebration of the plurality of postmodernism, ironically
harbours a dangerous anti-humanism. We can end up with 'a form of tribalism (Derrida)
in which differences are deified and where there is a failure to seek out commonalities and
similarities' (Reader 1994: 95).
Therefore, Bauman ( 1994 : 185 ) suggests that the responsibility of postmodernism may
derive from commonalities or similarities.
Though ethically speaking, being for precedes being with, and the moment the
self enters into interaction with the other it is already responsible for the
other's weal and woe, the only space where the moral act can be performed is
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the social space of 'being with', continually buffeted by the criss-crossing
pressures of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings. In this space, the
possiblity to act on the promptings of moral responsiblity must be salvaged, or
recovered, or made anew; against odds--sometimes overwhelming odds--the
responsiblity must exchange its now invalidated or forgotten priority for the
superiority over technical-instrumental calculations; a superiority grounded, as
Vesttlen suggests, in the ongoing 'we-experience' without recognising the
revelation of God as universal norms.
Postmodernism teaches us that we should consider responsibility towards others. This
responsibility is a result of the postmodern search for the commonalities. The postmodern
world has been emancipated from the modern universalism with its focus on uniformity.
Therefore there exists only the autonomous individual. In this postmodern situation, there
are no guarantees for safety. Therefore postmodernism claims responsibility to each other
as security.
Postmodernists claim the responsibility for security of life of the self and the other as their
commonality. The responsibility of postmodernism is for the life of the self as well as for
the life of the other.
As we saw in the section, "'Never Lord' myth", the this-worldly life paradigm of the self is
the centre of postmodernism. Even for Levinas, salvation is responsibility for the other
based on the this-worldly life paradigm. The unlimited openness to the other and
responsibility for the other based on the this-worldly life paradigm, ironically, suggest that
God cannot thereby fully accomplish the salvation for the believers. Such salvation has no
place in the this-worldly life paradigm. In other words, the this-worldly life paradigm
always reduces the meaning of salvation to the relationship of responsibility between the
self and the other.
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Let us consider the words of Jesus who demands of his disciples to lose their lives jar my
sake (Mat. 10: 39; Mark 8: 35; Luke 9: 24 ); the meaning of jar my sake is not just for his
personal self. Jesus demands that his disciples' bear the cross as the cost of fearless loyalty
to his mission rather than to his physical person ( Filson 1960: 134). If Jesus' command
had meant that the disciples must lose their lives for himself as a self, he never would have
rebuked Peter. Therefore 'for the other' does not simply reflect a relationship of
responsibility between the self and the other of Levinas ..
Ward (: 162) argues that the salvation of Levin as is not personal integration, inner healing
that has been accomplished through the reconciliation between the I and God. This
salvation is not therefore the Protestant salvation. The salvation of Levinas is not union
with Christ. And for Levinas 'there is no messianic figure of the grand deliverer' ( : 166).
For Levinas each person is the messiah for every other, only as an ethical agent ( :166).
Finally in Levinas there is no reference to the self who can live only by God who dwells in
him. Levinas's salvation just enacts a pilgrimage from the non-ethical to the ethical ( :163).
We should distinguish between the postmodern ethics that come from the responsibility for
the other and the ethics that come from the uniqueness of Jesus' death for the other. The
ethics that come from Christ go beyond responsibility for the other based on the concept
that I substitute myself for the other.
The meaning of salvation and its ethics can be fully realised in both the relationship
between the self in Christ and Christ in the self. Therefore, the substitution of the other
for me cannot be separated from my substitution for the other ( Ford: 39) in the
Incarnation of God. This relationship of 'in' Christ involves the changing of the
personality.
Therefore Jungel says that 'it is decisive for the self-understanding of Christian theology
whether the story of Jesus Christ is conceived only ethically, as an example of right human
behaviour, only as exemplum, or beyond and behind that, as a history which effectively
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changes the being of humanity, as a sacrament.' ( Jungel 1995: 169) The Christian must
be transformed himself ( Gibb 1992: chapter 8, 10). This ontological change of the human
self is the aim of the Incarnation of God.
Jesus demanded that his disciples bear the cross in order to accomplish not just the
responsibility for the other but God's salvation. The salvation of the believers means that
God dwells in the believers. God's goal is that he should dwell in us. In other words,
divine life lives in me permanently. But this formation of the Christian self does not reduce
the self of modernism. The Christian must transform to a Christ-like being. In this
transformation of self in whom the other dwells we can understand why the believers are
required to render the praise, thanks, confession and intercession that are complexly
represented by the Psalms (Ford: 39).
Therefore, the Christian ethic means expression of the life of Christ who dwells in the
believers. Christian ethics are established on the salvation of God. Christian ethics must
begin with Christ. Our messianic action, the Christ-like action, comes from only the unique
Messiah Jesus Christ who dwells in us. It comes from God's Incarnation. Any ethics and
salvation must originate from there.
In other words, Christ is the ground of Christian ethics ( Jungell Sd). Jungel considered,
for example, that the prayer that Christ commanded comprises a Christian ethic ( Ford:
40). Postmodern ethics, however, including Levinas, could not comprehend this ethical
point. Even though Levinas's concept of prayer is that of "Prayer without Demand"
(Levinas 1994: 127ft), 'Levinas' s giving exclusively ethical content to theological language
is most extreme.' ( Ford: 40). For Levinas God is not 'You who can be identified with
"me'" but '''He'' who cannot substitute for me'. Therefore, For Levinas the imperative of
prayer is based on the human ethical action that 'I' must petition in prayer rather than on
what has already been done in Christ (: 40).
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Without God's self-giving, all face-to-face relationships are 'formless' and 'empty
darkness' (Genesis 1:2). Without Christ's life-giving love there are just formless ethical
illusions. The postmodern ethic is a formless illusion because there is no purpose in an
ethic without a goal.
Each person totally needs The Wholly Other's revelation in his self-giving. By this self-
giving or life-giving paradigm we can understand fully the meaning of salvation and
Christian ethics. By this self-giving or life-giving paradigm we can understand why
salvation necessitates that God dwells in the believers and why Christian ethics must be
established on Christ.
God's will is that we must accomplish the self-sacrificial love that comes from him. Then,
only, can we share the mode of Trinitarian life that has already been revealed in creation,
with God.
Thus life-giving love that Jesus brought in his crucifixion for the other is still needed
beyond responsibility as the ethics of postmodernism. This life-giving love enables the
believers to do everything for God's will, because life-giving love is not based on the self-
life centrism but on Christ. Jesus strongly commanded them to lose their lives for his sake.
This teaches us that Christian life is not for our security. Christian life should direct to
Christ. This means that Christian life must look beyond this-worldly life centrism. 'If I
value my life [ and the other's life ] in this world more than Jesus and the life of the next
world, I cannot be his disciple' (Keener 1997: 210). We should recognize the uniqueness
of Jesus' death, as it can reveal to us the core point of.Christian ethics, and as it embodies
God's own will.
God's perfect identification with man, his Incarnation, suffering, and crucifixion, in other
words the self-giving paradigm of divinity is the original ordering of creation. This original
ordering exists in the sacrificial love of the crucifixion, and generally in human dying and
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living with Christ who died for us and who dwells in us. Christian ethics involves
becoming the Christ-like person. The believers must follow Christ.
4.3.1. From postmodern linguistic trend to Christ-centrism
Put another way, at this time there remains just the self s power of language. Once
modernity's claims to universality and reality are dissolved, what remains is the
autonomous self and its power oflanguage (Phillipes & Okholm 1995: 13 ).
Phillipes & Okholm (: 13) express it thus:
The understanding of our (self-) reflective activity as a subject's relation to a
world of objects has been one of the main philosophical concerns of our
century. From Freud's undermining of the notion of an absolutely rational and
non-fragmented subjective world, to the later Wittgenstein's critique of a non-
situated philosophizing and Heidegger's rejection of Western metaphysics,
down to the poststructuralist liquidation of a conditioning and autonomous
subject, the focal point of criticism is one of the most deep-seated assumptions
of Western philosophy: the idea that an external reality is represented by
means of reflective thought in human consciousness ....The linguistic turn in its
various forms promotes a critique of the philosophy of consciousness and
instals language in its place. It offers the framework for a reformation of that
set of problems that was previously dealt with by means of a subject-centered
reason.
In this way, analytical philosophy on the one hand, and Saussurean linguistics on the other,
have inaugurated a new approach to problems concerning the constellation: thought,
signification and interpretation. Lyotard's theory of the incommensurability of the
language game, Derrida's differance, and Lacan's linguistic reformulation of Freudian
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psychoanalysis are considered to be the coup de grace to the sovereignty of the subject-
object model of thought ( :14).
However, endorsing the linguistic paradigm means, for some philosophers, a necessary
repudiation of revelation, truth, the autonomy of the Holy Spirit and, consequently,
authentic christ-like ethics. Such linguistic accounts--often idealist or ultra-nominalist--can
have some very negative implications.
Papastephanou contends that these kinds of linguistic theories have, ironically, turned anti-
humanist in that they lead to an unwarranted attack on knowledge and science, or to moral
scepticism, or to an intellectual abdication from all political struggles ( Papastephanou
1997: 42 )
But modern knowledge and science as well as postmodern linguistic trends could not
preach the revelation of God. Papastephanou has indicated the weakness of linguistic
theory, and even though this theory is in other ways satisfactory, the linguistic turn of
postmodernism can never give any confirmation to religious truth or religious ethics.
Let us consider the non-realistic textualist's failure. Cupitt ( 1980: 153-4 ) undertakes a
negative view against the God of Christian doctrine in terms of the 'only human' and
linguistic turn of postmodernism.
Cupitt thought that there was no God out there, but only humans. Cupitt (1990 : 123-8 )
says that only language and the human exist in the 'world, but nothing, 'out there'. If
humanity retains intersubjective communication ( 1986: 198 ), there will be endless chaos.
This chaos means that, as Cup itt (: 199) says 'Loss and again, life, death, life out of death,
death in the midst of life, a living death, a dying life, eternal life' of endless loss without
the eternal life.
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He also sees sacrifice and dying as the third element of life. (: 155), but in his view, these
actions also are performed by humans alone. This creates the human idol, human
absolutization. Even though Cupitt advocates, 'sacrificing, self-giving', his problem is that
he thinks that this 'sacrificing, self-giving' belongs to humanity. But it comes from outside
of the human being as we disclosed in chapter 3. If there are only signs and language,
people cannot escape from self-centrism because the human himself can become a god.
In postmodernism, therefore, the truth of God's revelation is limited by human perception
and 'socially produced' concepts. Thus truth and method and language are correlated
within the social situation. In the deconstructive postmodernism 'all knowledge is situated
within a culture.'( Spretnakl993: 14)
The deconstructive postmodernists insist that the mearung of every aspect of human
existence is culturally created and determined in particular, localized circumstances about
which no authentification can be made.( :13-14) 'Even particularized meaning, however, is
regarded as relative and temporary, a permutation within our invented language systems,
which many deconstructionists regard as merely indeterminant chains of words (signifiers)
referring endlessly to other signifiers.' ( : 14) If there is plurality and uncertainty of
language, there is no real truth and no one God. Only relative truth obtains; in other
words, only the human himself is there, according to Cupitt.
Michael Yeo (1992: 46) criticizes the linguistic turn of postmodernism thus: 'I should
never be able to learn anything. The text would be but an empty sign reminding me of
what in some sense I must already have known. I could get out of the text only what I put
into it. There would be nothing new, but rather, always more of the same. Communication
would be an illusion, and solipsism the order of the day'. This seems to us a valid criticism.
Indeed, the postmodernist would have us believe that the Scripture then is not God's word
and there is no longer any absolute truth. The written word is not God's revelation but just
the language of a particular Christian community. No God, no truth, no revelation. This is
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the pluralistic age of the 20th century. There is no ultimate truth, but just a story and the
narrative process of world, without Christ-metanarrative. There is only human.
Yet, living in the Holy Spirit does not mean that 'God frowns on intelligence or education,
or on people continuously pushing themselves to go beyond the supposed limits of their
abilities' ( Hawthorne 1991: 239). What God is concerned about is that the work of the
Holy Spirit never be done solely in a natural way, only with natural endowments ( : 239).
'Hence God wishes by the power of his Holy Spirit present and available, as in the life of
Jesus, to make it possible for the followers of Jesus to exceed the real limits of their
humanness and thus speak to the hearts of people with a life-creating, life-transforming
power' ( :239). Recall, 'the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life' ( 2 Cor. 3:6 NASB ).
In addition to all this, from the feminist theory and the liberalist theology we are aware
that women and the oppressed must be respected as the other. But what we want to say
here is that we must pursue God's aim which Jesus brought. Jesus was concerned about
the poor and the marginalised but was more deeply concerned about God's will. We must
move from human-centrism to Christ-centrism. The Holy Spirit offers Christ-like life-
giving love. Without life-giving love there exists only human centrism. Without Christ-
centrism the human centrism always recurs. Ironically, humans need Christ in order to
destroy the absolutism of the human self.
4.3.2. The homogenic life of the believers
Here we must distinguish between Derrida's concept of death and the life-giving love. The
point of difference between Derrida's concept of death and the life-giving-love paradigm
ensures a totally different content of salvation.
For Derrida, no ethico-political norms can force 'me' to sacrifice 'for the other. The
heterogeneity of the self and the other ensure that nobody can force sacrifice for and take
sacrifice from the other. The heterogeneity of the self, 'the uniqueness and irreplaceable
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singularity of the self (Derrida 1995: 41) connotes the impossibility of the substitution of
the death of individuals. Interpreting the case of Abraham, Derrida finds an example of the
impossibility of the substitution of the death of individuals, in the heterogeneity of the
death of individuals. Derrida states (: 58), the heterogeneity, therefore, 'refers to the
impossibility of substitution, the unsubstitutable; and then also to the substitution of an
animal for man; and finally, especially this, by means of this impossible substitution itself, it
refers to what links the sacred to sacrifice and sacrifice to secrecy'.
Derrida's statement is debatable because he does not consider the homogeneity of
Christian salvation between the self and the other. Christ who lives in the self and the other
is the basis of the homogeneity of the self and the other. The Holy Spirit who dwells in us
is the foundation of the homogeneity of all Christians. This means that in the Holy Spirit
the believers can share in the death and life of Christ. And in the Holy Spirit they can share
their dying and living with each other. In Christ the life of self is for the other. In Christ the
Christian can give his life to the other. We cannot share our life, dying and living, when the
self and the other claim their own mastership on life and death, but when we hand over our
lives to Christ, we can share life and death with each other in the Holy Spirit.
How is this possible? As Jesus shares his life with us in his suffering and crucifixion we can
share our dying and living with one another through self-giving love or life-giving love. If
there is a difference between the self and the other, it exists in the qualitative difference of
the individual experience of Jesus'life. In other words, no two people have an identical
experience in becoming Christ-like.
Thus salvation means becoming new people in the likeness and image of God which is the
common aim of all Christians. Because actually 'the love, the self-giving, which is at the
centre of Christian discipleship and obedience to God, and which is present in sinful
humanity through the quickening power of the Spirit, has its ultimate foundation in the
being and nature of God' (McIntyre 1997: 155 ). This homogeneity of the life-giving
paradigm and the heterogeneity ofDerrida's 'gift of death' are totally different concepts.
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Moore ( 1994: 40 ) criticizes Derrida as follows: 'I take all of this to mean that Derrida
has always aspired to a writing that would be "beyond" negative theology, while
recognizing that this might not be possible. After all, by his own admission, "differance"
remains a metaphysical name when all is unsaid and undone'. Derrida's mistake is
generated from his poststructural heterogeneity. This 'differance' always leads to chaos.
This 'differance' cannot allow humans the homo genic life with Christ.
This plurality encourages people who live in the postmodern world to enjoy 'boundless
liberty'. Postmodern 'differance' has taken away all restrictions from men and women.
The 'boundless liberty' based on postmodern heterogeneous difference must be restricted
by the homogeneous truth. The self s liberty must be restricted by the other and the other
must be restricted by the self In this restriction and obedience we find the homogeneous
truth. In this restriction we find that the self-giving or life-giving love is the Christian life.
Bonhoeffer provides us with guidance concerning how we should live in the postmodern
world (Lundin 1995: 38). Bonhoeffer ( 1971: 369-370) states: 'During the last year or so
I've come to know and understand more and more the profound this-worldliness of
Christianity.' But he continues, 'I do not mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of
the enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-
worldliness characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death and
resurrection' This means that, in this postmodern world, Christians must share in the
suffering of God, and the watching with Christ in Gethsemane (Lundin :38).
Christian freedom or liberty is accomplished in suffering and sacrifice with Christ in the
Holy Spirit. Therefore, Christian spirituality which the Holy Spirit brings should be very
different from postmodern spirituality based on 'the other' and' difference'.
4.3.3. From postmodern spirituality to Christ-centric spirituality
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In order to know the Christian spirituality we must investigate postmodern spirituality in
more detail. Postmodern spirituality differs from modern spirituality. David Ray Griffin (
1988 : 2 ) defines postmodern spirituality by comparing modern and premodern
spirituality:
Modern spirituality began as dualistic, supernaturalistic spirituality, and ended
as a pseudo- or anti spirituality; postmodernity involves a return to a genuine
spirituality that incorporates elements from modern spiritualities. Because
postmodern spirituality is not simply a return to a premodern spirituality,
however, the type of society it legitimates must be different from premodern as
well as from modern societies. Although this postmodern society will retain
and expand many features of the modern world, it will reverse modernity's
individualism and nationalism, its subordination of humanity to the machine, its
subordination of social, moral, aesthetic, religious, and ecological concerns to
econorruc interests, and it will transcend both of the modern economic
systems.
In postmodern times, people no longer considered reason, that produced individualism and
materialism, to be everything, and holding universal truths became impossible.
Postmodernism offered the space for 'the other' dimension that modernism discarded.
But a continuing problem is that postmodernism has no unique place for the Holy Spirit,
because of its pluralistic character that focuses on human needs. Postmodern pluralism
reduces everything to an unrealistic, abstract equality, reducing everything to 'the ego',
'the subject', the decision-maker, the consumer, or the payee. (Welker 1994: 21-22)
Even the spiritual dimension that is recognized is not that of the Holy Spirit, because this
spiritual dimension is adopted only for the merit and the well-being of people and nature.
In fact, postmodern spirituality emphasizes sensibility, eros and emotion.
157
So in this respect postmodern ethics are based on sensibility and eros. What is the
postmodern eros? Eros is 'a disposition towards others that no longer requires that other
beings function as parts of an alien system' ( Farley 1995: 30). This erotic responsibility
includes suffering according to postmodernists.
The eros of postmodernism is a passion for reality that allows the other to emerge from
the shadows and dreams of the modern self s domination and socially constructed
illusions. The other is not a thing, an object of use, or an anonymous, threatening power.
The other is 'beautiful, mysterious, and vulnerable'. But 'eros is always directed toward
concrete others and is therefore also knowledge of and towards these particular creatures,
threatened in particular ways, with unique capacities for suffering, resistence, and joy' (
Farley: 33).
Concerning this eros, however, we must look carefully at this postmodern spirituality.
Postmodern spirituality is based on sensibility and eros is also a result of the
postmodernist's efforts to find the source and meaning of salvation and ethics in human
nature, as modernist's efforts in reason. Therefore, postmodern spirituality is humanistic
and naturalistic, concentrating upon human 'individualism of the spirit' ( Welker: 22 ).
This postmodern humanistic and naturalistic spirituality have worked against the Holy
Spirit because the Holy Spirit revealed to us Jesus who suffered and died for the things of
God (John 15:26 ), not for the things of humanity.
In this postmodern spirituality based on the humanistic and the naturalistic world view,
martyrdom cannot be accepted and thus the Holy Spirit cannot be accepted. Furthermore
postmodernism is irrelevant to the non-social being, because postmodern thinking
intentionally does not recognize anything other than the social context. Therefore, there is
no space for the Holy Spirit. Indeed, even in these super-elements of postmodernism
spirituality basically cannot be harmonized with the Holy Spirit.
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In other words, even though in postmodern society the religious aspect was accepted in
the public area, this is nothing other than humanism. Clearly, then, the life of Christ cannot
be identified with the humanistic spirituality of postmodernism.
The only way in which humanity can identify with the Christ-life beyond the limitations of
postmodernism is through the Holy Spirit who worked within the Trinitarian union and
communion, at the creation. In the beginning, God planned that humans would share
God's character. 'The Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.' ( Genesis 1: 2) To
take the image of God is to share his divine life in his Spirit. In this sense we can say that
the image of God arises from the Holy Spirit.
The image of God and the likeness of God were not intrinsic to humanity; rather these
could become human attributes through the Holy Spirit. 'God created man in his own
image' ( Genesis 1: 27); people in obedience to God, are the reflection of God's image
towards the world (Genesis 1: 28). The image of God correlates with the Holy Spirit
within us.
This spiritual dimension of humanity means that the Holy Spirit is not only 'out there'
beyond humanity as God but also that the Holy Spirit is with the human person as divine
being. Nobody can possess the Holy Spirit unless at the same time, the Holy Spirit acts in
and on the believers. Therefore no believer can live his own life but the life of God lives in
his personality through the Holy Spirit.
What can Christian spirituality be beyond postmodern spirituality? Jesus became flesh to
reveal to us the things of God. When the Jews tried to kill Jesus, reasoning that Jesus
made himself equal with God, Jesus said to them: 'I tell you truly, the Son can do nothing
by himself; he can do only what he sees his Father doing, because whatever the Father
does the Son also does.' ( John 5: 20 ) The Son of God takes the essence of humanity in
order to do what he sees his Father doing. Jesus does not take the form of humanity to do
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human things. Jesus comes to the earth to accomplish heavenly things. In doing the
Father's things Jesus equalizes himself with God.
'The condescension of the grace of God is clearly indispensable to the realization of his
purpose with man' ( Hendry 1965:112. my emphasis ). But this indispensability of
Incarnation is for God's sake rather than our sake. Hendry (: 112 ) criticized Augustine
who 'made the mistake of equating indispensable with irresistible and also did not take
account of the other element which is present in the grace of the incarnation, viz., the
element of accommodation.' The grace of God is irresistible but our human body and spirit
are indispensable for our salvation. Augustine ignored this element of humanity's
indispensability. Therefore we need the indispensable elements in the believers.
Yet Hendry makes the mistake of confusing the Incarnation of God himself for God's
purpose, with humanity's own plan. God's accommodation of himself to our condition of
humanity, however, is not for human merit or human life itself. For God accommodated
himself to humanity for his glory. The grace of Incarnation is for God's glory and not for
the sake of humanity. Furthermore, God accommodated himself to create human beings in
his image in the Holy Spirit. Even though the Spirit works for the Father's gracious love
beyond the Christ to create a new salvific encounter between himself and man ( Rosato
1981: 165; Balthasar Spiritus Creator: 100), he never works for merely human
wellbeingness as envisaged in postmodern thinking.
Jesus comes to us to do God's business, not for- the sake of the believer's business.
Nevertheless Jesus' action paradoxically accomplishes salvation for the believers. Thus
Jesus' action must be our soteriologicallife model. Jesus is the soteriological 'fullfilment-
model' of the believers, but first, Jesus had to do the will of God without taking any merit
for his own being.
In doing God's things the sonship with the Father is opened to all humanity. In other
words, in doing God's work two hypostases in one personality are opened to all
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subsequent sons of God following the first born Son, Jesus. Therefore, the Christian
spirituality that the Holy spirit realizes comes from doing God's business rather than from
seeking the this-worldly life.
4.3.4. From deconstruction to life-giving love
Postmodern theologians have tried to liberate human beings regarding religious aspects of
humanity, not only in the public, but also in the private and emotional realms.
Postmodernism emphasized the sensibility, eros and moral uncertainty. In postmodernism,
holism and pluralism were also emphasized. But the Christ-centric life is not embodied in
the postmodern paradigm.
Postmodernism was also established on human self-centrism. Actually, in postmodernism,
the superiority of humanity and the self sufficiency of the human self is stressed more than
Christ and the Holy Spirit. There is an ideology of meaninglessness ( Spretnak 1993: 13-
17).
In order to counter modernism, with its totalitarianism, and colonization, philosophers and
theologians have introduced the notion of deconstruction. However, this deconstruction
also relates to the extreme human self-centric world we saw in chapter 2.
4.3.4.1. The cause of suffering
The idea of postmodernism contains no pre-coded logic of which it is the seed. 'Its
"logos" is non-teleological, non-grounding, and non-totalizing' ( Schroeder 1996: 75).
When the postmodernist rejects universality, postmodernism recognizes the difference
between the self and the other.
The work of Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty reflect what seems to have become the central
dictum of postmodern philosophy: 'all is difference'. This view sweeps aways the 'uni' of
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the 'universe' which was sought by the Enlightenment project. It abandons the quest for a
unified grasp of objective reality. It asserts that the world has 'no centre, only differing
viewpoints and perspectives' ( Grenz 1996: 7).
Therefore, the deconstruction of postmodernism is based on the idea of a non-substitute
self. Postmodernism is grounded in difference. Therefore, postmodern ethics relate to the
concept of proximity. In certain aspects, the concept of moral proximity provide the
insight that the world is a suffering world. This difference made people acknowledge the
fact that suffering is an essential part of humanity. From this postmodern world we are
experiencing the suffering of humanity beyond modem totalization.
Avoiding the modem totalization, we should therefore look upon the nature of human
beings as naturally beautiful and mysterious and fragile, for modem self-centrism did not
like to accept any fragility or weakness of humanity. Modem self-centrism also did not see
the otherness of the other. In postmodernism there is 'infinity' rather than modem totality.
At this point we as Christians must raise certain questions. What is next? There is relativity
itself. The idea of 'infinity' of postmodenism is not posited within the subject from
without, from the other; it arises within consciousness and signifies the radical absolute
difference that exists between the same and the other. This idea of 'infinity' is 'the trace of
an absolutely heteronomous past, unrecoverable in its totality by consciousness' (
Schroeder: 88). Postmodernism developed the heteronomous self in this way, then
produced relativism.
Grenz (: 15 ) also said that 'the relativistic pluralism of late modernity was highly
individualistic; it elevated personal taste and personal choice as the be-all and end-ali'. Its
maxims were: 'To each his/her own' and 'Everyone has a right to his /her own opinion'.
Postmodernism is definitely based on the concept of perfect self-realization. Some
postmodern consciousnesses, however, focuses on the group. In this kind of
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postmodernism human self-centrism still dominates. Some postmodernists live in self-
contained social groups, each of which has its own language, beliefs, and values.
Postmodernism's group egoism has replaced individual egoism.
In this self-centrism, postmodernism falls into the trap of hazardous 'cultural relativism' (
Cook 1999: 3; my emphasis). On the one hand, postmodernism has liberated people from
oppression based upon selfish desire, but on the other hand, it still remains rooted in the
dimension of self-centrism so that postmodernism also falls into the terrible relativism that
is interwoven with the dimension of self-centrism.
Postmodernism's localization and relativism leads to power games. Postmodernism
proposes to liberate the powerless from hegemonic power but, ironically, it is accepted by
the hegemonic powers themselves, because there is no absolute power or absolute truth.
All individuals and groups have their own power. Even though postmodernism has
destroyed the universalism of human reason based on human self-centrism, it encourages
the human being in self-centrism. This self-centrism is correlated with this-worldly life
centrism. This worldly life-centrism always concentrates on immanence and immediacy of
life.
In this world, the paradigm of the immanence and the immediacy of life, the preservation
of life without harmonizing with the transcend ant God, has dominated the whole of
humanity. This paradigm has been called the self-life paradigm in this thesis. Therefore,
ironically, postmodernism's self and other does not put their life, personality and glory in
God. They are their own master. In postmodernism both the self and the other are their
own master. Since each person has his own mastership there exist differences between the
self and the other.
In postmodernism the biblical concept that 'I have been crucified with Christ and I no
longer live, but Christ lives in me' ( Gal. 2:20) and that 'what is more, I consider
everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord,
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for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them rubbish, that I may gain Christ' (
Phil. 3:8) cannot come true. We, as Christians, do not live by ourselves but in Jesus, for
Jesus and of Jesus. Postmodernists do not understand this life-giving life.
Therefore we should overcome postmodern deconstruction itself, through suffering for the
glory of God in Christ. By offering their bodies to God the believers give up the self-
centric life and live Christ-centric lives. From this total shift from self-centrism to Christ-
centrism is derived the basis of the exhortation that 'they be not conformed to the fashion
of this world, but be transformed by renewal of their minds, so that they may prove what is
the will of God.' (Rom. 12:2). The suffering is caused from the faith that my life is not my
own. Calvin insists that we are not our own (Book III. vii. 1). We belong to God. We must
not seek for our own glory but the glory of God. We are God's. We must live in this
world for God and die for Him through the power of the Holy Spirit. In other words,
suffering comes from the Holy Spirit who brings us life-giving love. Each Christian must
bear his own cross (Matt. 16:24). The Christian life is often one of suffering.
4.3.4.2. Suffering as the way of life against the postmodern chaotic life
Jesus' suffering reveals that the believers should identify with this suffering. Salvation
begins with Jesus' suffering. The saved people of God also start their salvation from this
identification with suffering. This identification with suffering is like that of Jesus and is
the fruit of salvation and eternal life.
In Jesus Christ, the believers are freed from law and sin. But in this freedom of the
believers, our suffering originated ( McGrath 1995: 50). God makes space for us to make
mistakes in our freedom. God never blames our mistakes on Jesus Christ. But God
disciplines us to recognize that we must suffer in this world. Therefore, in this freedom,
we may see the origins of much of the tragic suffering of the world ( : 50).
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In Christianity, the life-giving love must be practised throughout the world wherever the
self paradigm and life paradigm still predominate. This life-giving love is not one which
denies human life. The life-giving love means that we see the Christ-life in us. Indeed it is a
paradigm that, ironically, shows the highest respect for human life.
When we see only our own life in our selves, the satanic power dominates human beings
by the fear of death. Thus this fear of death must be overcome by life-giving dying or
living for the other, by power of the Holy Spirit. Jesus detroyed this dimension of death.
Essentially, Jesus sacrificed himself as the essence of God's life. Without the salvation of
the other there is no more salvation. But this salvation is not safety. Rather it is freedom
from all fear of evil as well as fear of the other.
In the relationship with the other the suffering is necessary because we must not control
the other and indeed cannot control anything, including our fate (: 50). 'Suffering is
threatening because it is a reminder of our powerlessness to control our world' ( : 52).
The essentiality of the kingdom of God can be tasted through life-giving dying or living.
Ross Thomson (1990: 205) gives a coherent description of life-giving dying as the essence
of the suffering of the human self. The universe is dying in an unimaginably prolific and
creative act of generosity, a 'sacrificial' act in that through dying it generates a newer and
richer form, structure, in-form-action ( dare one say Spirit?), just like the wine that is
poured and the body that is shattered to become life and communion in us. There will
always be those for whom the whole pattern carries a single piece of overwhelming
information: for whom the world brings the Word of the cosmic Christ. The life-giving
spirit, the life-giving dying identified with love of God. In this love we can overcome the
fear of death, the 'heat death' (: 205 )
Ross Thomson ( : 264-265 ) says:
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It is perhaps our deepest fear that a darkness enfold the creation, that all
beauty and meaning will be swallowed up in chaos and nothingness, in the end
of individual life that is death and in the end of cosmic life that is heat death.
But if beyond that shadow there is this triune dance of eternal love, this well of
ever -communicating uncreated goodness upholding both the cosmic darkness
and cosmic light, we have nothing to fear from the abyss, for in the immortal
words of Deuteronomy(33 :27) 'Underneath are the everlasting arms'. And in
the Paschal mystery we see Christ pioneering a way for us through the
darkness of the tomb, falling through the abyss of nothingness to touch, on the
third day in the void of the tomb, the divine mainspring of life.
The very important distinction between christianity and paganism is in the life-giving dying
or living. Harvey ( 1991: 268 ) said that for the pagan the world is still glorious; for the
Christian, however, it is only a stage to the next life. The life-giving love hopes for the
next life beyond the this-worldly prosperity. This does not mean that Christians must be
ignorant in this world. This means that Christians must live in this world as God's people
who are called to follow Christ. In this world, the Christian must live in the Holy Spirit.
As Christians we pursue the next life, accomplishing the calling of God. For the next life,
Calvin ( Book lII.ix.l) uses radical language that postmodernism cannot understand. The
Christian must accustom himself to feel 'contempt for this present life' and to be aroused
thereby to meditate upon 'the future life'. The final goal of the Christian life is not this
present life. Rather Calvin encourages us Christians to be 'contemptuous of it'. Our goal is
the future life. This Christian belief disdains postmodernism. Postmodern thinking is not
concerned with anything outside the human self. It emphasizes the present.
'God pushes us into suffering, lest we cleave too tenaciously to love of this world'
(III. ix. 1). If God does not exercise us by tribulation to recognize 'the vanity of this world,
we become no better than brute beasts'. \Ve live in this world with 'a brutish desire'. Our
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plans, efforts and deeds concentrate upon 'self-satisfaction'. 'Our whole soul, enmeshed in
the allurements of the flesh, seeks its happiness on earth'.
Christians must meditate upon that eternal life to come. Paul, indeed, laments his lot and
sighs with fervent desire for redemption ( Rom. 7:24). For Calvin, 'Christians eagerly
hasten to death not because they want to be unclothed but because they long to be more
fully clothed' ( II Cor. 5:2-3). Postmodernism emphasizes the human self and its well-
being. Therefore they cannot think of an eternal life which is 'better than this one'. To
them death is a disaster and dissolution. In postmodernism some philosophers dare to
accept death, but they become captivated with 'the empty solace of this world', because
they do not believe that eternal life is better than this life.
Only through Jesus'Resurrection beyond the second death, and through self-giving dying
and identifiying with God, will we overcome this world's power. The life-giving dying and
sacrificing for the other with Christ are the crossroad where we decide whether to go the
way of the incomprehensible grace of God or towards the abyss that remains, the terrible
dimension of non-grace, of selfish conflict and of selfish chaotic postmodern life.
We can overcome the plural relativism in Postmodernism only through the life-giving
dying. The most important holy meaning of human life is not the survival of the self and
the self community or the survival of the human being but the sacrifice of the self for the
other and for the community or the unlimited openness for the other and the
incomprehensible mercy for the other in the Holy Spirit. So 'the man who gives his life for
his friends does not even enjoy the satisfaction of his future company' (McGrath: 55).
The real purpose of human life is the imitation of this divinity by the human being in the
Holy Spirit. This comes about through the life-giving love of God, the suffering of God in
Jesus Christ rather than through the infinite differences of postmodernism. We can see
God's giving up of himself for his people in the image of the dying Christ ( : 55).
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A way of sanctification comes true through life-giving love for the other. Karl Rahner
(1974: 201) puts it this way: 'Our death becomes the death of the imitate God himself.
4.4. From holistic community to Cod-man-creature holy communion
It is very necessary to apply the Christian ethic to the postmodern holistic community.
In John 15: 4 we read, 'I am the vine; you are the branches. If a man remains in me and I
in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do nothing.' As we are in Jesus and
as we live in life-giving love, we, the believers can bear fruit, for example, life, love, hope,
and so on. The believers can eat the fruit of 'the tree oflife' of Eden ( Genesis 2: 9 ), when
they enter into mutual indwelling with Christ. Not only was Jesus the first man who
partook of the fruit of 'the tree of life', but he was also the first fruit itself of 'the tree of
life' for his people, the other. Jesus was saviour and actor in his life-giving action. And we
also will bear fruit in union with Christ.
Furthermore, in John 17: 21-23 we read that the Father and Christ dwell in each other, and
at the same time, all believers dwell in Christ and Christ in us. The true communion that is
accomplished in the Trinity is revealed in the world. We call it here the God-man-creature
holy community. This community is not only the community in which the Father and
Christ dwell in believers and the believers dwell in Christ but also the community in which
the believers together live in each other. Therefore, in Ephesians 2:22 Paul said that 'In
union with him [Christ] you too are being built together with all the others into a place
where God lives through his Spirit.' The Holy Spirit builds community in Christ.
Therefore, each believer --individual as well as community--must· represent the body of
Christ in this world. This body of Christ relates to the self-giving of ourselves to one
another in the Holy Spirit. The believers are the bearers of the life-giving spirit. Therefore,
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the God-man-creature holy community will be characterized as Spirit-centered society.
This community is not just a community, either human or ecological, of well-being.
We should seek the eternal life beyond the this-worldly life. The Church also seeks the
holy world which the Holy Spirit fulfilled. Even though the Church is in this world and is
struggling to do God's will in this world, she must belong to the holy world, because 'the
Church is the spiritual house'( 1 Peter 2:5). Therefore, the 'In Holy Spirit, en pneumati of
Eph.2:22,' expresses the uniqueness of the new dwelling of God in relation to the old
temple' (Hanson 1963: 134). 'The Church is apostolic, holy, and pneumatic (: 134).
In Jesus' life-giving action, he went through the past, present and future to the God-man
community and built it. The apostle Paul said of Jesus that he is, ' ....far above all rule and
authority, power and domination, and every title that can be given, not only in the present
age but also in the one to come. And God placed all things under his feet and appointed
him to be head over everything for the church [ God-man-holy communion ], which is his
body, the fullness of him who fills everything in every way' ( Ephesians 2: 21-23). The
God-man-creature holy community is the community that Christ rules and indwells.
Therefore, for this community the believers must proclaim Christ and become Christ-like
people. This community is a mission community, proclaiming the Gospel as well as making
a world in which life-giving love overflows. Just as Jesus becomes the head of his body,
the Church, and every member of the Church, should accomplish the task of fulfilling the
life-giving love by 'the superior principle of agape' (Hanson: 131 ). Then the Church will
eschatologically taste the kingdom of God.
Jesus' death on the cross has already revealed to the believers that the original purpose of
life is sacrificial love. Our eschatological hope, too, is this love. The Apostle Paul
expressed this eschatological hope as follows; 'Now we see but a poor reflection as in a
mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as
I am fully known. And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of
these is love' ( 1 Corithians 13: 12-13 ). Both faith and hope will be accomplished in love.
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Paul simply makes the assertion that love is the greatest of the trio, that is, faith, hope and
love, but love is not the greatest because it outlasts faith and hope but because it outranks
these two ( Lenski 1963: 573 ). How does it outrank them? For Lenski (: 573) Bengel's
answer is best: Ac Deus non diciturfides aut spes absolute, amor dicitur ( cited in Lenski
: 573). Love alone makes us like God ( Lenski: 57~ ), 'for love comes from God ( or for
love is of God): and everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God' ( 1 John
4:7).
Also 1 John 4: 12 states: 'if we love one another, God lives in us and his love is made
complete in us'. Especially, 'God is love: and he that dwells in love dwells in God, and
God in him' ( 1 John 4: 16 ). Therefore, we can say clearly, 'it is faith's nature to receive,
but love gives; and giving is greater than receiving' ( Lenski: 574). 'Hope also looks
forward to receiving, but love is full possession and completed' (: 574). Here the hope is
not just political liberation but looking forward to love. 'And for every new joy which
hope receives in heaven love will be the response on our part. When we come to rest on
the bosom of God, it will be by love' (: 574).
Christian community must be fulfilled with this love. Life-giving love means that the
believers do not pursue only benevolence and utility as ecologists do. Rather it means that
the believers can give up benevolence and utility and can become the poor and the
marginalized. Life-giving love means that, sometimes, the community of Christ can
become the poor community in the Holy Spirit. This union with Christ through the Holy
Spirit is very different from postmodern community, because this community is Christ-
characterized community, whereas postmodern community is simply community based on
difference between the self and the other.
The God-man holy community is established on the holy ground of self-denial of each
individual and community in Christ through the Holy Spirit rather than on the social
ground of the self's own respectfor individuals and community.
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In Galatians 6:7-10, especially 6:8, the Apostle Paul teaches that the Spirit produces his
fruits, namely, love, joy, peace, etc. (Galatians 5:22,23) in the present life of the
pneumatikos just as he is the source of 'eternal life in the future ( Lull 1980: 173). The
Spirit creates community that is abundant with spiritual fruits which will be fulfilled in
eternal life in the future.
Therefore, the Christian life in the kingdom of God is very different from the this worldly
kingdom. Matthew 13:1-23 shows us the kingdom of God. The message about the
kingdom ironically contains two paradigms. On the one hand, the evils of the living soul,
the trouble and persecution, the worries of this life and the deceitfulness of wealth; on the
other hand, the fruits of the word and the life-giving love. The first remains, of course, 'a
dominant factor in modernism and [postmodernism] with its rampant materialism' (
Hagner 1993: 381). The second reminds us that the discipleship should undermine the
evils in the world ( : 381). The message of the kingdom encourages the believers to
overcome the this-worldly life paradigm (Matthew13: 1-23).
The kingdom of God is like a mustard seed. Even the smallest giving of our self-life will
generate a kingdom cosmologically wide and deep. The kingdom of God is like yeast.
Self-denial for the other will produce a holy community beyond the this-world community.
Rather, the mustard seed, the yeast, the life-giving love, is the kingdom ( 13:31-33).
Therefore, the parables of Jesus are 'the mysteries of the kingdom' ( 13: 11), things hidden
from the foundation of the world now being made known.
The kingdom of God is like the treasure and a fine pearl. A man sold all he had and bought
a field to get the treasure and the fine pearl. The kingdom of God means giving up this
world's things, all things, property, everything one has, even one's life, to get the reward (
13: 44, 45 ). 'Those who find the kingdom joyfully make it their one priority in life and
they seek first the kingdom, sacrificing all to it, but at the same time paradoxically finding
with the kingdom all they need' (Hagner: 397 ).
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Matthew strongly warns his readers of the reality of judgement on the people who value
this worldly life and hence stresses the importance of genuine discipleship ( : 400). The
kingdom is like a net, so the wicked cannot enter, because the structure of the kingdom
distinguishes between the wicked and the righteous. The kingdom of God is the
community of the life-giving love, so the this-worldly life centric people cannot enter it.
The kingdom of God is the community oflife-giving spirit who follow Jesus (Matthew 13:
24-30,36-43, 47-50).
The kingdom of God is totally different from this world's principles, from the this-worldly
life paradigm. The life-giving spiritual person does not depend on time and wealth because
the Holy Spirit who generates the Christ-like life is a non-temporal, and non-material
Spirit. People can enter the kingdom of God not by the duration of their belief nor by how
many things they have done but by whether they have become the life-giving spiritual
beings or not ( Matthew 20: 1-16 ). Matthew said that the disciples could be first but they
would be last 'if they did not rejoice in their hearts over the "little one" whom God calls,
in other words, if they cannot live as a community according to the principles inculcated in
chapter 18' ( Schweizer 1975:395). We must be child-like and humble, we must forgive
and be merciful, we must live the life-giving love. Jesus said, 'So the last will be first, and
the first will be last' ( Matthew 20: 16 ).
Like the eye of the needle, the kingdom of God is not a place that one can easily enter.
The kingdom of God is like God's wedding banquet for his Son. This banquet is totally
different from the lifestyle of this world where people must work and do business. The
Son's banquet is very different from this world's banquet. It is strange to the people of this
world who have a worldly lifestyle.
In the parable, therefore, people seized the King's servants, mistreated them and killed
them. The reason is that the Son's banquet celebrated his life-giving work and people who
practise this worldly lifestyle are not accepted at this banquet. If people do not live in the
life-giving Spirit, they cannot attend. Jesus said, 'But when the king came in to see the
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guests, he noticed a man there who was not wearing wedding clothes. Here 'the boor
without the clean wedding garment is the Christian who did not prepare for the kingdom
of God by total repentance and a life filled with the fruits of repentance' (Meir 1979: 153-
154 ) "Friend," he asked, "how did you get in here without wedding clothes?" The man
was speechless. Then the king told the attendants, "Tie him hand and foot, and throw him
outside into the darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matthew
22: 11-13). God invites all, but those who repent, that is, those who live in the life-giving
love through the Holy Spirit, are few (22:1-14).
Therefore, the God-man holy community is not the world of the human beings' highest
benevolence and utility, but the community of the life-giving love in Christ. The offering
and reconciliation and giving up of everything was the life of Jesus. More clearly, then, the
God-man holy community is not a community of immortal souls who pursue the this-
worldly life but the community of life-giving spirit.
4.5. Summary
In this thesis the fourth problem was how to apply the specific Christian ethics to the
modern and postmodern world. While considering how to apply the specific Christian
ethic we, at the same time, disclosed that the modern and postmodern paradigm caused
the believers to fall short of Christ-like ethics. We did not totally deny any world view but
critically constituted the Christian ethics beyond modern rationalism and postmodern
deconstructuralism. We proposed that Christians should pursue the reincarnationallife and
suffering of Jesus beyond reason, and the self-giving or life giving love beyond the
deconstruction for human self-wellbeingness.
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Chapter 5. Summary and conclusion
5.1. General summary
Major problems that have arisen in Christian ethics at the end of the 20th century might be
resolved from the way in which we critically overcome the modem rationalism and
postmodem uncertainty, and deconstructuralism.
In the introduction we cited the commandments of Christ from the Bible on the Christ-like
life of the believer. From Jesus' commandments we can understand that we, the believers,
still must accomplish the Christ-like life. We started this thesis from this essential
theological point. We had to examine world views to establish the Christ-like ethics.
Therefore, in this thesis, the main problem was how to establish the Christian postmodem
ethics, overcoming the ethics of modem rationalism and the ethics of postmodem
deconstruction.
The first step was to determine those ethical principles in modernism and postmodemism
which have caused the believers to fall short of the Christ-like life. From the influence of
world paradigms Christian ethics approximated either to moral duty or moral codes under
modem rationalism, and to responsibility under the ethics of deconstruction.
We investigated modem rationalism and postmodern deconstruction in chapter 2. From
this investigation we affirmed the first sub-hypothesis that the common ethical principle of
modernism is the self or self-centrism, and the postmodern ethical principle is the other.
We found that the common principle of modem and postmodem ethics is the this-worldly
life centrism.
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As our final purpose is to find the counter to postmodem ethics, our next business was to
find the Christian ethics which God initiated and to find how to embody these Christian
ethics in individuals. We investigated the Christian ethics in the Bible. In the Bible we
discovered that Christian ethics must originate from Christ and must be implemented for
Christ's sake. Christians must be Christ-like persons. They must follow Christ. We found,
too, that the Holy Spirit delivers the Christian ethics to us. In order to propose the way in
which the Holy Spirit delivers the Christian ethics to Christians we conceptualized the
pneumatological context and the hypostasis oj the Holy Spirit.
But the Bible shows us that Jesus' disciples have a certain mind-set that prevents them
from following Christ. They have this-worldly life centrism. By interpreting the doctrine of
Trinity, creation and redemption in Jesus Christ we found that the life-giving love is the
Christ-like ethic beyond the this-worldly life centrism.
In chapter 4, we addressed the problem of how to establish whether the Christian ethic is
the counter ethic to the modem and postmodem world ethical paradigm or not. And then
we argued that the specific Christian ethic needed in the modem and postmodem world is
life-giving love. Conversely, we found that modem and postmodern ethics cause the
believers to fall short of the Christ-like ethic.
From these three sub-hypotheses we affirmed the main hypothesis that the Christian ethic
in the modern and postmodern world is the Christ-centric ethic characterised by life-giving
love which includes incarnation and suffering.
5.2. Conclusion
We can now define the Christ-centric ethic in the modem and postmodem world.
175
5.2.1. From humanistic liberation to Christ-centric...liheration.
Modem philosophers and some theologians revolt against all external authority, whether
religious or socio-political. We agree that we should be free from all oppressive authority
What we would like to question concerning modem rational ethics or ethics of the
autonomous self is whether they took the right direction or not.
This question can be applied to postmodern ethics at the same time. Postmodern ethics
attempted to deconstruct all products of the autonomous human self, that is, metaphysics
of presence, androcentrism, anthropocentrism, totalization. Postmodern ethics were
established on the concept of 'the other'. Therefore they were based on human sensibility,
eros, feminism, homosexuality, and so on.
We agree that liberation is an important subject in the Bible. What we are proposing in this
thesis is that our liberation must be directed by Christ, not by the autonomous human self
and 'the other'.
5.2.2. From the this-worldly life centrism to life-giving centrism
As we discovered, modern and postmodern ethics are directed towards the perfect self-life
realization as their common aim. This perfect self-life realization was applied to the human
autonomous self in modern times. Therefore, postmodern philosophers and theologians
criticized this attitude of modernism. They applied this perfect self-realization to all areas
of humanity. In brief, the reason why modem and postmodern ethics are directed towards
human self-centric liberation and the other-centric liberation is that the human being
concentrates on the this-worldly life.
By contrast, Jesus taught us that we must pursue life-giving love. Therefore in the modern
and postmodern world the point that we should emphasize is life-giving love. Christian
ethics in the modern and postmodern world are very paradoxical. Christians obtain
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freedom by self-giving or life-giving for each other. Christian ethics is not for the self and
the other. When we are turned towards Christ and his eternal life, we can practise self-
giving or life-giving love for one another, without oppressing the other as if only 'I', as the
self, have validity and without focusing on external authority and oppressive structures.
5.2.3. Christ-centric ethics
Christ-centric ethics means that; firstly, Christ is the origin of Christian ethics; secondly,
Christ is still the model of Christian ethics. His life of incarnation, suffering and crucifixion
should remain as the model of our Christian ethics; thirdly, Christ's mission is the goal of
Christian ethics; fourthly, the specific Christ-centric ethic in the modern and postmodern
world is the life-giving love or self-giving love in both dying and living; fifthly, the Holy
Spirit regenerates this Christ-centric ethic in Christian life.
As Christ is the origin and model of Christian ethics, Christians should not only include all
'the other', women, the poor, the weak, the marginalized, the sinner, but also should
exclude the this-worldly sinful trends.
In Galatians 3:28 Paul said that 'So there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles,
between slaves and free men; between men and women; you are all one in union with
Christ.' Christians must identify with the other as God incarnated, identified with us. This
identification is not just to help the other to find a better life in this world. If we pursue the
good life in this world we cannot really identify with the other. This identification means
life-giving dying as Jesus demonstrated. This identification means becoming the poor, the
beggar. This identification, therefore, can mean social or physical death.
But Christians must be ruled by God's sovereinty. Christians must change their purpose
and direction. In Colossians 3: 1-4 Paul said, ,You have been raised to life with Christ, so
set your hearts on the things that are in heaven, where Christ sits on his throne at the right-
hand side of God. Keep your minds fixed on things there, not on things here on earth. For
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you have died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. Your real life is Christ and when
he appears, then you too will appear with him and share his glory.' Therefore we must live
a totally different life from the worldly life. Christians must reject the sinful power, the evil
power. Christians must fight against sin.
Paul continues in Colossians 3: 5-9, 'You must put to death, then, the earthly desires at
work in you, such as sexual immorality, indecency, lust, evil passions, and greed Do
not lie to one another, for you have taken off the old self with its habits and put on the
new self This is the new being which God, its Creator, is constantly renewing in his own
image, in order to bring you to a full knowledge of himself' At this point Christians can be
identified with Christ in this world. They must become Christ-like persons. On becoming
the Christ-like person Paul recaps the meaning of Galatians 3 :28 clearly in Colossians
3: 11: 'As a result, there is no longer any distinction between Gentiles and Jew,
circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarians, savages, slaves and free men, but Christ is all,
Christ is in all.' In becoming the Christ-like person, the Christian might lose his life.
We contended that modern and postmodern ethics based on the self or the other and the
this-worldly life paradigm cannot reach the Christ-centric ethics. Therefore, the life a
Christian must live, consists of life-giving dying or living with Christ. Christ who lives in
us continuously rules the world through his disciples' enactment of Christ-centric ethics.
Self-giving or life-giving love means that our human self has no own mastership so that we
must depend on the Holy Spirit who is the Spirit of Christ. Life-giving has two meanings.
The first is that the self must depend on God and receive Christ's life because he has no
autonomy. Our salvation as well as ethics come true only by faith in Christ. More exactly,
our salvation means that Christians transform to Christ himself Therefore, the second
meaning is that the self can give his life for the other. By the Holy Spirit we can practice
Christ-like ethics. By the Holy Spirit alone we can fulfil the Christ-like ethic which we
cannot accomplish by our human reason and power. Those who have the Spirit of Christ
178
can become Christ-like persons. Therefore Christ-centric ethic includes, as its esesential
part, worship and prayer.
Christian ethics must concentrate on Christ rather than on the self and the other. This
uniqueness and distinction of Christian ethics cause Christians to be opposed by the other,
even though they themselves are open to all people. Christians break the wall between the
self and the other. But still Christians are opposed by the other. They are persecuted. They
will be marginalized. When Christians concentrate on Christ rather than on the self and the
other, they live a paradoxical life. Our life is not our own. Our life is Christ's. In this
otherness of life, dying and living with Christ come true. We should live in this world with
Christ and in Christ. In this modern and postmodern world to live with Christ and in Christ
is to live in the life-giving dying or living in and for Christ.
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